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ABSTRACT




One hundred years after it was first mined, several 
uses of asbestos were banned in the United States. The 
latency period that typifies asbestos-related diseases was 
but one factor in the delayed recognition of asbestos as a 
health hazard. Many other factors delayed the initiation of 
practical measures to alleviate the hazards.
Controversies surrounding exposure to asbestos continue. 
Epidemiological studies have answered many questions, but 
many others are, and may remain, unanswered. Some of the 
controversies surrounding exposure to asbestos are embedded 
in the development of the United States of America as a 
country. An understanding of the historical basis for these 
controversies helps to explain the present relationships 
between business, labor, and government, and how these groups 
view issues of health and safety. Asbestos is an integral 
part of that history. It is used as the focus of this 
thesis, to examine the interplay of factors and forces which 
influenced the development of federal regulation of health 
and safety in the United States.
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PREFACE
Although it develops in, and is mined from rock formations, 
asbestos breaks into fibers that have the characteristics of 
silk or cotton, but will not burn. Not all fibrous minerals 
are asbestos minerals. The term asbestos refers, variously, 
to the group, or to a type in the group, or more specifi­
cally to the fibers, of six commercial minerals.
Asbestos is a worldwide commodity that was first mined 
in the 1870s. Commercial production of asbestos insulating 
materials was recorded by 1874. Worldwide production and 
use of asbestos increased from fifty tons in 1877, to four 
million tons per year in 1967. From 1900 to 1980, some 
thirty-six million metric tons were used worldwide.[1] 
Asbestos has been used in more than thirty-six hundred 
different commercial, consumer, and industrial products.[2]
The unique properties of asbestos fibers, which make 
them so useful commercially, also cause specific diseases. 
The risk of developing an asbestos-related disease depends 
on exposure to airborne asbestos fibers.[3] An apparent 
connection between exposure to asbestos dust and resulting 
sickness was noted as early as the first century A. D.
The scarring, or fibrosis, of the lungs caused from 
inhaling asbestos fibers, was identified at the turn of the 
nineteenth century, and given the name asbestosis in 1927. 
Even though there was some awareness that inhalation of 
asbestos dust was hazardous, exposure does not cause any
xvii
short term effects, and there are no warning properties.
The ill effects are long term. Twenty years may elapse 
between exposure and the manifestation of an asbestos- 
related disease.
In 1963, the only major asbestos-producing mine opera­
ting in the United States was GAF's Lowell mine in Vermont. 
During that year, four other mining operations began in 
California.[4] In 1978, there were six mine and mill 
operations, run by as many companies. Three of those were 
located in California, and one each was in Arizona, Vermont, 
and North Carolina. Total employment for the six firms was 
four hundred.[5]
In his 1978 book, Death On The Job, Berman estimated 
that ninety thousand people worked directly with asbestos, 
and that another five million worked with asbestos-contain­
ing products every day, commenting that "profits and jobs 
linked to asbestos have made it politically difficult to cut 
back its use."[6]
In 1964, a seminal study on asbestos exposure was 
presented at the New York Academy of Sciences International 
Conference on Asbestos Disease. The study, by Selikoff et 
al., found high rates of asbestosis, lung cancer, and 
mesothelioma, among the cohort when compared with the 
general population. It was not the first study to show 
these results, but it was the first to use data gathered 
independent of the asbestos industry. The study was deemed, 
by asbestos manufacturers, to be the first definitive study 
on the ill health effects from exposure to asbestos.
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The discussions at, and published proceedings of, the 
1964 conference initiated a discourse that helped to create a 
favorable atmosphere for enactment of the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act of 1970.
Under its power to regulate commerce, Congress passed 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act in 1970. Asbestos was 
the first substance to undergo the formal rulemaking 
procedure established by the OSHAct. It thus became the 
subject of the first federal, enforceable, comprehensive 
standard for "protecting the health and safety of workers," 
by regulating workplace conditions.
In 1990, the Collegium Ramazzini sponsored a conference 
on The Third Wave of Asbestos Disease which categorized three 
phases of asbestos exposure. The first included small 
populations involved in mining the raw material, and manu­
facturing asbestos-containing products. The second phase 
involved shipyard and insulation workers who installed those 
products. The third phase is exposure to asbestos-contain­
ing materials (ACM) that were put in place between 1930 and 
1980. More than thirty million tons of asbestos was used in 
the United States from 1900 to 1980.[7]
Researchers at Mt. Sinai's Occupational Health Clinic 
in New York City estimate that twenty-seven million people 
worked with asbestos between 1940 and 1980. Of that popula­
tion, more than one million are expected to develop an 
asbestos-related disease by the year 2000. Their research 
also estimated that, within the next thirty years, exposure
xix
to asbestos in the workplace will cause ten thousand cancer 
deaths above the normal cancer rate.[8]
OSHA considers occupational exposures which cause more 
than one death per one thousand workers over a working life­
time to be significant. Its 1994 Final Rule for Occupational 
Exposure to Asbestos estimates that the population at risk 
from exposure during new construction, renovation, abate­
ment, maintenance work and custodial activities ranges from
1,758,006 to 5,751,586.[9]
The other sphere of asbestos exposure is regulated by 
EPA under AHERA, which applies to primary and secondary 
school buildings. Benarde, in Our Precarious Habitat: 
Fifteen Years Later, estimates the average level of exposure 
in schools ranges from 0.001 to 0.004 fibers per cubic 
centimeter. He notes a study by Hughes and Weil of Tulane 
University which predicts the lifetime risk for school 
children exposed for five years, starting from age ten, 
at from 0.02 to 0.37 deaths per million children per 
year.[10] An article by Mossman, in the January 19, 1990 
issue of Science, advocates the "amphibole theory." [11]
This supports the view that other types of asbestos are 
more dangerous than chrysotile, which comprised more than 
ninety-five percent of all asbestos used in buildings in the 
United States. A review of the article in Time notes that 
Mossman estimates the risk to the general public to be no 
more one percent of the level deemed safe for workers, even 
in buildings where asbestos is damaged and flaking. The
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Time review states that "the risk of dying from smoking, 
drowning, airplane crashes or even playing high school 
football is 100 to 1,000 times as great as the risk of 
dying from asbestos exposure in buildings."[12]
All or none of these estimates may or may not be 
confirmed, but no "safe" level of exposure to asbestos has 
been determined. Public health policy advocates reducing 
exposures to the lowest level possible. OSHA's 1994 rule 
reduced the permissible exposure limit to 0.1 fibers per 
cubic centimeter (0.1 f/cc), while acknowledging the risk 
of developing an asbestos-related disease that still exists 
at that level.
The thread of asbestos woven through the development 
of the United States of America was slow to unwind, and 
hard to break. Events which got the spool rolling are 
presented herein, as are some of the medical studies which 
helped distinguish and establish the hazards of exposure to 
airborne asbestos fibers. The final chapter presents a 
sampling of the many factors which continue to prompt 
controversy concerning asbestos-related diseases. The many 
aspects and controversies concerning sampling and analytical 
procedures for estimating exposure levels are only discussed 
in the context of the impact of technology in establishing 
limit levels of exposure.
It is hoped that the general reader will gain a better 
appreciation of how and why the fairly recent clamor about 
asbestos developed. Presenting events in chronological
xxi
order is not always possible due to the long span of time 
over which the history unfolds. Recounting the one hundred 
year boom-to-bust sojourn of asbestos in the United States 
speaks to the power of labor, of industry, and of consumer­
ism. Each is a driving force of the country's economy, but 
in the final analysis, no one should have to sacrifice their 
life to boost profits or, without warning, jeopardize their 




1.1 Historical Names and Sightings 
Asbestos is the common name used in North American and 
Northern European languages to identify a group of fibrous 
minerals. The use of the Greek word 'sabestos' was recorded 
before the first century AD, to describe the asbestos wicks 
which kept their temples lamps and candles burning, but were 
not themselves consumed by the flames. The word meant inex­
tinguishable or unguenchable, derived from the Greek verb 
sbennumi, meaning to quench, die down, or extinguish.[13] 
This contradicts an essential characteristic of the mineral, 
which is that it does not burn. Its mode of formation was 
unknown, but the remarkable physical and chemical properties 
of asbestos were obvious, and did not go unnoticed in the 
annals of ancient history.
Pliny the Elder, the Roman naturalist, thought that 
it grew in the deserts of India, and reported that asbestos 
cloth 'came out of the flames whiter and cleaner than it 
could possibly have been rendered by the aid of water'.
The incombustible cloth shown to Marco Polo in Siberia was 
called salamander, said to be made from the skin of the 
salamander which lived in fire.[14] It is said that Charle- 
mange had a tablecloth made of asbestos to impress his 
warrior guests. He would throw it into the fire after 
dinner and withdraw it later, clean and intact.[15]
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In England, the mineral was originally known as amian- 
tus or amianthus, derived from the Greek amiantos, meaning 
the material which is undefilable. It was known as amiante 
in French, and amianto in Italian, and Spanish. In Germany 
it was known as stone flax (Steinflachs). French Canadian 
miners referred to it as cotton-stone (pierre-a-coton).[16]
1.2 Properties of Asbestos 
The chemical, and morphologic composition of asbestos 
differs according to where it is mined, and results in 
corresponding changes in physical properties such as range 
of the fiber diameter, degree of flexibility, tensile 
strength, and surface properties. In addition to elemental 
substitutions, the asbestos varieties are influenced to some 
extent by the presence of impurities. Impurities may be a 
part of the crystal structure, or they may be introduced by 
associated minerals.
In general, chrysotile deviates less in composition, 
and is less variable than the amphibole types.[17] The 
properties may vary considerably with the different types 
of, and to a lesser extent, between specimens of, the same 
mineral. Various properties of the commercial varieties 
of asbestos are included in Appendix D.
1.2.1 Unique Properties
Properties vary among asbestos types, but commercial value 
depends largely on the two common physical characteristics 
of noncombustibility, and unique fibrous structure.
1.2.1.1 Water Content, Dehydration, and Mineral Type 
Chrysotile contains approximately fourteen percent water. 
The water content of the amphibole varieties is only one 
or two percent, and they will withstand somewhat higher 
temperatures than chrysotile.
X-ray studies in the 1920s confirmed earlier work by 
W.T. Schaller, in concluding that all amphiboles contain 
water of crystallization. Myril C. Shaw's work, published 
in 1950, indicated that chrysotile contains both (OH), the 
hydroxyl radical or water of constitution, and H 2O, the 
water of crystallization.
Unlike vegetable and animal fibers, asbestos will not 
burn, but it will decompose and lose its essential physical 
properties at moderately high temperatures. Dehydration is 
accompanied by a pronounced change in physical properties. 
For example, olivine, also called chrysotile or peridot, is 
an anhydrous magnesium-iron silicate that does not exhibit 
the "asbestiform habit." Chrysotile, the fibrous form of 
serpentine, is a hydrous magnesium silicate. The adsorbed 
water of chrysotile is driven off at about 300 degrees cen­
tigrade. Between 550 and 600 degrees centigrade, all water 
of crystallization is driven off, and the mineral gradually 
alters to olivine.[18]
1.2.1.2 Fibrous Structure The outstanding physical 
characteristic of asbestos is its unique fibrous structure. 
When asbestos minerals are crushed, they have the property
of splitting lengthwise into bundles of fibers of varying 
strength and flexibility, exhibiting the "asbestiform 
habit".[19] Unlike hard crystal fragments typical of most 
minerals, asbestos minerals yield fibers that can be spun.
The fiberization is a cleavage process, defined as a 
tendency in some minerals to split in a certain direction 
along planes related to the molecular structure of the 
mineral, and parallel to possible crystal faces. Cleavage 
is described in five steps from poor (bornite) to fair, good, 
perfect, and eminent (mica).[20] The asbestos varieties 
exhibit good to perfect cleavage, crystallizing in bundles 
that look like organic fibers. Each fiber is composed of 
smaller fibers, or fibrils. A strand of human hair is more 
than twelve hundred times larger than a typical asbestos 
fiber. Asbestos fibers can stay airborne for weeks. The 
aerodynamic behavior is a function mainly of diameter, but 
also of size, shape, and density.[21]
1.2.2 Morphology of Asbestos Fibers
Perhaps egual in importance to the fibrous nature is the 
difference in morphology or fiber structure. The most 
striking difference between chrysotile and amphibole 
fibers is in their shape.
1.2.2.1 Chrysotile No other mineral is as fibrous as 
chrysotile, and its fibers are the most flexible of any 
asbestos fibers. In its natural state, chrysotile is
slippery and soapy to the touch. The fibrous surface is 
so hard that it will dull a sharp knife, yet it can be 
scraped with the fingernails into a soft, fluffy, fine, 
fibrous mass, ranging from a lustrous white to shades of 
gray. The fine fibers have a delicate texture, and a 
perfectly smooth surface.[22] Chrysotile fibers can be 
separated into fibrils, with diameters in the range of 200 
to 400 angstroms (one angstrom equals one ten-billionth of 
a meter). A chrysotile fiber can readily yield one thousand 
fibrils of the same length. Fibers mined from serpentine 
rock deposits in Quebec and Vermont varied from one-half 
to three inches in length.[23] The fibers in a piece of 
chrysotile as big as the tip of a finger would stretch 
around the world if placed end to end.[24]
The typical tubular structure of chrysotile is formed 
by the tendency to roll up onto itself as the fiber cleaves, 
giving the appearance of long, curved, hollow cylinders.
Some fibers which are solid show an unusual growth pattern. 
Filling the cylinder with foreign material may also result 
in a solid appearance, and a change in density. The density 
of Arizona and African chrysotile is compatible with tubular 
structure, but Canadian chrysotile with a high density has 
at least fifty percent filled tubes.[25]
1.2.2.2 Amphiboles originally, the term asbestos was 
applied to fibrous minerals closely related to amphiboles. 
Amphibole fibers are usually straight, and exhibit good
cleavage. The cleavage planes of amphibole minerals are 
at about 55 degrees and 125 degrees, forming wedge-shaped 
fragments. The crystals are often long or needle-like, and 
when short, they are six-sided.[26] The amphibole fibers are 
acicular, with minimal diameters of 600 to 2500 angstroms. 
After fiberizing processes, the amphiboles produce a great 
flocculent volume, composed mainly of air held in minute 
cells by the framework of fibers.[27]
1.2.3 Specific Properties by Type
Heat resistance and ease or difficulty of fiberization were 
important properties for the commercialization of asbestos. 
Other important properties include flexibility, durability, 
high tensile strength, high strength-to-weight ratio, chem­
ical, corrosion and moisture resistance, and resistance to 
searing temperatures. The varying chemical compositions and 
physical properties of the asbestos varieties made them more 
or less suitable to certain commercial applications.
1.2.3.1 Properties of Chrysotile Chrysotile, also called
white asbestos, is the only variety with a positive electric 
charge. It is very elastic, and the most flexible of the 
asbestos varieties. It also has the highest resistance to 
heat, becoming brittle around 650 degrees centigrade, and 
fusing at well over 1,000 degrees centigrade. Chrysotile has 
virtually no resistance to acids, and is readily decomposed 
by sea water and moist air. The fibers are long, and strong, 
easily separable, and have a silky luster.
1.2.3.2 Properties of the Amphiboles Amphiboles are 
straighter and harsher than chrysotile, but will withstand 
somewhat higher temperatures. Amosite and crocidolite were 
the most widely used amphiboles.
Amosite, or brown asbestos, is a ferrous silicate in 
which a proportion of the iron is replaced by magnesium.
It has good tensile strength, heat resistance and flexi­
bility. It is less resistant to acids than crocidolite, 
but fuses at a higher temperature. Its fibers are fairly 
strong, and unusually long, but coarse.
Crocidolite, or blue asbestos is a complex silicate of 
iron and sodium. It is the strongest of all natural fibers, 
with a basic tensile strength 1-1/2 times that of steel 
piano-wire.[28] It is noted for resistance to acids, alkalis 
neutral salts, and organic solvents, but will discolor and 
loose strength at temperatures above 360 degrees centigrade, 
as a result of oxidation.
Tremolite is a calcium-magnesium silicate. It is 
characterized by the lack of iron, and resistance to acids. 
The fibers are long and silky, but brittle, and low in 
tensile strength.
Anthophyllite is a silicate of magnesium and iron, 
usually with small amounts of aluminum. Its fibers are 
usually brittle, and lack tensile strength. Both tremolite 
and anthophyllite are superior to chrysotile in resistance 
to chemical reaction.
Actin is similar to tremolite, except that iron 
replaces some of the magnesium. It has good resistance 
to acids, and the lowest tensile strength of the asbestos 
varieties. Its fibers are weak and brittle.[29]
1.3 Historical Early Uses 
Sometimes called the "Funeral Dress of Kings," asbestos 
cloth was used in ancient Egypt as a burial shroud to keep 
the ashes of the royally deceased separate and protected 
from those fueling the funeral pyre.[30] Clay pots from 
Finland in this same era, cira 2500 BC, contained asbestos 
as a binder to enhance the material strength.[31]
The first recorded use of the material for acoustic 
purposes was in 28 BC, when Anaxilaus, a Greek doctor, 
described how a tree could be felled noiselessly if it was 
surrounded by asbestos linen. Pliny the Elder recorded 
that it would not burn in the first century BC, and also 
noted its apparent debilitating effect on slaves weaving 
asbestos cloth.
Until the end of the 17th century, asbestos was more 
an object of superstition and curiosity than a commercial 
commodity.[32] As late as the 1880s, its properties were 
so singular, and its occurrence in nature so unusual, that 
it almost defied classification.[33]
1.4 Mining
Asbestos is mined like other minerals, in huge open-pit 
or underground workings. "Crude" asbestos was separated 
from dirt and rock, and sorted into groups for milling. 
"Milled" asbestos consists of all grades produced by 
mechanical treatment such as crushing, screening and air 
separation. The end product is graded by fiber length.[34]
All uses of asbestos are as processed fiber. Long 
fibers were used in the textile industry. The shorter 
fibers were used in a variety of products, according to 
their individual properties. Because the various asbestos 
minerals differ in their chemical composition, crystalline 
structure, fiber dimensions, and chemical properties, they 
share certain properties to varying degrees, but each has 
distinctive properties.
The asbestos miner had virtually no control over the 
percentage of the various grades produced, and the prop­
erties of a particular asbestos type were often associated 
with the mine or location from which it was extracted.
Commercial mining of asbestos began in the 1870s, in 
a remote region of the Italian Alps. The Italian chrysotile 
asbestos fibers were straight, smooth, and slippery. Cotton 
fibers were mixed in to enable spinning. The large chrso- 
tile deposits in Canada were first mined in 1876. Although 
not as long as the Italian variety, the Canadian fiber had a 
slight hook on it that enabled easy spinning. Within a few
10
years there were four mines operating in the vicinity of 
Thetford, Quebec.[35]
1.5 Deposits
Development of the extensive chrysotile deposits in eastern 
Quebec in the 1880s was followed by further exploitation of 
already known and extensive deposits. Major deposits of 
chrysotile occur in the southern Ural Mountains of Russia, 
eastern and southeastern Quebec, and the Italian Alps. The 
Italian Alps deposits are in Susa, Lanzo, and Val Malenco. 
Limited deposits were located in Italy and Cyprus. Signifi­
cant deposits in the United States were mined in Arizona, 
California and Vermont.[36]
South Africa is the major source for both amosite and 
crocidolite. Deposits of the famous Cape blue variety of 
crocidolite near Prieska were first mined in 1891.[37]
Limited deposits of crocidolite were also mined in Australia, 
Brazil and Canada. Amosite was first discovered in the 
Transvaal, South Africa, in 1907, where commercial mining 
began in 1908.[38]
1.6 Summary
In antiquity, asbestos was known for its resistance to fire. 
The wide spread modern use of asbestos is intimately 
connected with industrialization, and the use of asbestos for 
the conservation of heat, to make the steam-powered machinery
which propelled that era more efficient. The variety of 
favorable and adaptable properties probably accounts for 
the diverse applications and multiple uses of asbestos.
Crude asbestos fibers could be separated by standard 
industrial procedures into useful sizes, and were easily 
incorporated into the manufacturing operations of already 
established industries such as commercial mining, and 
textiles. The relatively limited use of asbestos was greatly 
expanded during the Industrial Revolution. A vast industry 
evolved, using asbestos as the raw material of choice, to 
manufacture a great variety of valuable products.[39]
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Figure 2.1 Flow diagram for asbestos textile 
manufacture.
Source: Burgess William A. Recognition of Health 
Hazards in Industry: A Review of Materials and 
Processes. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1981): 
155.
CHAPTER 2
DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF COMMERCE 
2.1 Textiles
The Industrial Revolution began in England around 1760, 
and later spread to other countries, including the American 
colonies. The most important developments in England's 
Industrial Revolution came in the field of textiles.[40]
2.1.1 Textile Operations
Asbestos fibers pass through the same steps as cotton, an 
operation which was well established by the time the first 
Italian asbestos was used as a raw material in England's 
textile industry. The principal textile operations are 
carding, spinning, and weaving.
After leaving the mines, crude asbestos was shipped to 
England for further processing. At first, workers picked out 
the longer fibers by hand. Eventually, the raw material was 
separated by mechanical processes. The asbestos fiber was 
then grouped and graded according to length. Those of 
suitable length were used to make yarn, rope, and assorted 
fabrics.[41] The operation starts with breakers and crushers 
to separate and clean the fiber, while guiding it over slats, 
screens, and rollers. The fibers are formed into a large, 




Carding is the specific operation for opening up the 
fibers, further eliminating dirt and foreign substances.
It also straightens the fibers somewhat and removes some of 
the very short fibers. The fibers leave the carding machine 
with no twist, in a long, soft, round rope called a "card 
sliver.11
The slivers are drawn out, to straighten the fibers 
and lay them as parallel as possible and at the same time 
to reduce the strand in diameter. Roving continues the 
drawing-out process and gives a twist to the sliver. Leaving 
the roving machine, the strand is called a "roving" and is 
ready for spinning into yarn. Drawing and roving are the 
necessary final operations prior to spinning.[43]
Spinning completes the drawing operation. The strand 
is drawn out to the final si2e required? it is then given the 
desired amount of twist, and is wound on bobbins, spools, or 
other suitable packages. In this form it is called "yarn," 
and can be woven, knitted, twisted, or plaited into fabrics.
A small percentage of cotton was usually blended with the 
straight, smooth Italian fibers
to facilitate the spinning operation. This addition was not 
necessary for the Canadian fiber, which already had a slight 
hook. The characteristic hook and more accessible location, 
made Canadian fiber more desirable than the Italian fiber as 
a raw material.
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2.1.2 Textile Industry, England
The number of textile mills grew as various inventions 
speeded production. Spinning and weaving were slow, hand­
crafted arts practiced with little change for about seven 
thousand years until 1733, when John Kay invented the "flying 
shuttle." This device allowed a single weaver to sit at the 
center of the loom and pull a handle that sent the shuttle 
twice the distance previously covered by hand. It enabled 
weavers to weave fabric faster than spinners could make 
thread.
That same year, John Wyatt and his partner Lewis Paul 
introduced the use of mechanical rollers to form a tough, 
compressed thread that could be stretched out in spinning to 
any desired fineness. In 1769 Richard Arkwright, a barber 
who became Britain's first great industrialist-capitalist, 
gave England "the power of cotton." Arkwright made and 
patented the first spinning machine powered by waterwheel. 
Called a "water frame", it had a series of rollers that 
could spin a much stronger cotton thread faster, and made 
it possible for cloth to be woven entirely of cotton. 
Arkwright was also the first to develop the factory system 
by taking textile workers out of their homes.[44]
In 1770, James Hargreaves invented the "spinning jenny," 
which could operate a number of spindles simultaneously.[45] 
It produced more thread in a day than six or eight human 
spinners and their handwheels. In 1779, Samuel Crompton
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combined the water frame's rollers and the jenny's movable 
carriage into a "mule," able to produce stronger thread at 
higher speed.[46] Mule spinning is an intermittent process, 
but drawing out and twisting operations are performed at the 
same time.[47] Crompton's mule became the standard for the 
textile industry. One worker with a Crompton mule could spin 
as much thread in a day as three hundred workers could spin 
in 1760 with handwheels.[48]
The conversion to steam powered machinery started in 
1785, when Edmund Cartwright, a clergyman, built a power 
loom. It used horse power at first, and then steam.[49] By 
1785 steam power was applied to drive machines for spinning 
and weaving. Spinning mules driven by water or steam were 
soon producing literally millions of miles of yarn and 
thread. The textile mills made Britain the world's richest 
industrial power, boosting exports from insignificance in 
1780, to nearly eight million pounds sterling two decades 
later. By 1824, the textile industry, regarded as "the 
sacred staple and foundation" of British wealth, was well 
on the way to complete conversion to steam [50] as the main 
power source for the various machines used in the textile 
industry.
2.1.3 Textile Industry, United States
Factories using jennies were established in 1787, in Phil­
adelphia, in Beverly, Massachusetts, and elsewhere in the
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country, but none proved successful, partly because of the 
inferior quality of the product. To protect its cotton 
trade, England forbade export of textile machinery, or its 
design. The textile industry was smuggled to the United 
States by Samuel Slater, an apprentice working in Belper, 
England for one of Richard Arkwright's partners.
Slater left England in 1789 to pursue his fortune in 
America. Early in 1790, he sought out Moses Brown, who ran 
a spinning mill in Providence, Rhode Island. They set up a 
business agreement, and Slater set to work building textile 
machinery from memory. Four days before Christmas, 1790, 
the machines started to spin, powered by the arm of an 
elderly Negro man named Samuel Brunius Jenks. Later, water 
power was supplied from the falls of the Blackstone River. 
Within four years of leaving England, Slater built the first 
successful cotton-spinning mill in the United States, on a 
site in Pawtucket, Rhode Island.
By 1804, a Pittsburgh factory was selling textile 
machinery, and by 1807, there were fifteen or twenty mills, 
with about 8,000 spindles in operation. By 1810 there were 
some ninety mills operating perhaps 80,000 spindles. Ten 
years later the number of spindles in use had climbed to 
191,000.
In 1812, upon his return from two years in England 
studying the industry, Francis Cabot Lowell designed, from 
memory, a textile operation at a plant in Waltham, Massachu­
setts. This may have been the first time anywhere that both 
the spinning and weaving processes came together under one 
roof.[51]
2.2 Transportation
It is said that the United States of America could not have 
been without the steam engine. The steam engine consumed 
and wasted considerable fuel, but it also fueled the devel­
opment of America and the transportation network needed to 
support it. The American Revolution officially ended with 
the signing of the Peace Treaty of Paris, on September 3, 
1783. What emerged from the Revolutionary War were some four 
million people living in thirteen states, joined in a loose 
federation, strung out along the Atlantic seaboard. Wagons 
and roads were an expensive way to carry merchandise, 
especially bulk freight. The network of waterways available 
made the steamboat a natural alternative to overland 
transport.[52]
2.2.1 Steamboats
The first commercially successful steamboat run in America 
was developed by Robert Fulton of Pennsylvania.[53] In 1806, 
Fulton returned from twenty years in Europe with a Boulton & 
Watt engine that he had managed to take out of England. In 
August, 1907, he launched the flat-bottomed, 100-ton North 
River Steamboat on the Hudson River. Within two months, it 
was carrying sixty to ninety passengers on each trip between
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New York and Albany, covering the 150 miles in thirty-six 
hours or less. In time, Fulton renamed his flagship the 
Cleremont.[54]
The prosperity of the shipping industry flourished 
throughout America from 1792 to 1807. Output from the 
shipyards rose from 200,000 tons in 1789 to 1,400,000 in 
1810. By this time, American ship's were hauling ninety 
per cent or more of both the nation's exports and imports, 
the value of which had more than tripled since the 1760s.
Improved engines and the use of screw propellers pro­
duced more powerful boats, cutting travel times substan­
tially. An upriver trip from New Orleans to Louisville, 
which once required twenty-five days, was reduced to less 
than five days. By 1820, sixty steamboats were operating on 
the western rivers. Exports had climbed to $70 million, and 
imports to $74 million. Steamboats were largely responsible 
for the growth of Mississippi Valley commerce, estimated at 
more than $650 million by 1852. Navigation of the waterways 
was a natural development, especially on the eastern rivers 
where passenger traffic was more important, but the railroad 
was recognized as a key factor in developing the transporta­
tion network and the push to go west. The railroads got a 
much later start than steamboats, partly because of the 




Like the steamboat, the railroad, got its start in England. 
The early steam engines were bulky, extremely hot, and could 
not be used where fire was a hazard. They also consumed 
huge amounts of fuel. The possibility of using steam loco­
motives instead of horses to haul coal from the mine pits 
of England inspired experiments using faster, more compact 
engines. This produced a variety of coaches and configura­
tions intended for rail transport, some of which had trouble 
staying on the rails.
In 1829, the Rainhill contest was held to determine 
which locomotive to use on the thirty-five mile track built 
for the new Liverpool & Manchester Railway. Stephenson's 
Rocket won by hauling a thirteen-ton train an average of 
fifteen miles per hour. With this event, problems of 
technology were considered solved.
The first successful railroad in America, the Baltimore 
& Ohio, was chartered in 1827. The B & 0 had a 300-mile (480 
km) right of way from Baltimore, Maryland, across the 
Allegheny wilderness to Wheeling, Ohio. The first thirteen 
mile (21 km) stretch of B & O track was designed for horse- 
drawn cars traveling between Baltimore and Ellicott's Mills, 
Maryland. By 1833, 137 miles (220 km) of track to Harper's 
Ferry, Virginia had been completed. It was the longest 
stretch of railroad track in the world.[56]
The Mohawk & Hudson, chartered in 1826, was the earl­
iest forbear of the New York Central. The Mohawk & Hudson 
railroad opened in 1830, as did the Charleston & Hamburg,
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followed by the New York and Erie in New York, the Western 
in Massachusetts, and many more small lines.[57] By 1830, 
some 230 steamers were churning America's rivers and the 
American railroad industry was developing full steam ahead. 
Within ten years, the fame of American locomotives had spread 
abroad and their manufacturers began filling orders from 
Russia, Germany, Austria, Cuba, even England itself.[58]
One bottleneck to railroad expansion was overcome in 
1839, when the Burden railroad spike machine was developed.
It formed spikes in one operation, and produced them at a 
rate of fifty per minute, much more than fifty blacksmiths 
and their helpers could forge.
By 1840 more than 400 companies were operating almost
3,000 miles of track, and heavy duty steam-driven machinery 
was invented or adapted as needed to continue the push west. 
Between 1820 and 1850 the population of the United States 
grew from 7.9 million to 19.6 million, with the population 
living west of the Alleghenies rising from 27 to 45 per cent 
in that period.[59]
Between 1850 and 1860 rail mileage tripled to thirty 
thousand (40,000 km). Most of the new construction occurred 
in the Midwest, connecting cities of the east with those on 
the Great Lakes and along the Mississippi, and the Ohio 
Rivers.[60] In 1868, George Westinghouse invented the air 
brake, making the use of more powerful locomotives possible. 
The first transcontinental railroad was established on May 
10, 1869, when the Golden Spike driven at Promontory Point,
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Utah, joined the Union Pacific and Central Pacific rail­
roads. A cross-country trip that had taken 118 days twenty 
years ago was now completed in a little over six days.
Between 1868 and 1873, thirty-three thousand miles of 
rails were laid, and many lines were double-tracked, with 
steel rails beginning to replace iron.[61] In addition to 
greater passenger comfort and speed, railroads cut inland 
freight rates still further and brought a mobility that 
was vital to the nation's commerce.[62]
2.2.3 Automobiles
The search for an internal combustion engine was advanced 
in 1860 when French inventor Etienne Lenoir built a small, 
single-cylinder, internal-combustion gas engine, but its 
running costs were excessive compared with steam engines.
Ford built his first successful automobile in Dearborn, 
Michigan, in 1896. It had a two-cylinder, four horsepower 
(3 kW) gasoline engine, and could travel sixty miles (100 km) 
on its three gallon maximum capacity tank. Three years 
later, Ford quit his engineering job with the Detroit Edison 
Company to concentrate on building the car he envisioned.
In 1908, he introduced the Model T, a sturdy, practically 
indestructible car that cost $850.
The long sought concept of cost effectiveness through 
assembly-line production was finally achieved at Ford's 
Highland Park, Michigan plant. In 1913, assembly of the 
Model T 's five thousand parts were consolidated into
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defined, successive, linear operations. The car drove 
out onto John R. Street on operation number forty-five.
As production climbed from 78,440 cars in 1911-1912 
to 785,432 in 1916-1917, the Model T's price plummeted from 
$690 to $360. Before Ford discontinued them in 1927, some 
fifteen million Model Ts had rolled off the assembly line. 
Ford's Model T made automobile ownership possible for the 
average working person, and demonstrated the efficiency of 
assembly line production. Since then, both the number and 
variety of products and assembly lines have multiplied 
beyond reckoning.[63]
The overwhelming success of the automobile brought a 
new asbestos friction product into the market. In 1907, 
a woven asbestos fabric and wire composition product was 
introduced. It replaced the use of leather in brake shoes 
and clutch facings.[64] The best braking materials convert 
kinetic energy into heat very rapidly, and then dissipate 
the heat as quickly as possible.[65] This ability, along 
with other properties, including durability, traction, 
resistance to thermal and chemical breakdown, and 
incombustibility, made asbestos ideal for brakes.[66]
2.3 New Products and Uses Developed for Asbestos 
The Industrial Revolution that had started in 1760 in England 
reached America about fifty years later, and was embraced 
with a vengeance in those industries which had been imported 
to the American colonies. Growth of the nation's industries
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and transportation network was made possible by adopting, 
adapting, and improving steam technology.
2.3.1 The Power of Steam
The steam engine was the preeminent source of power in the 
nineteenth century. Because it was virtually impossible 
to machine cylinders and pistons to fit together exactly, 
various kinds of seals or packings had to be used. Most 
common in the mid-nineteenth century were leather packings 
or hemp soaked in grease. These and other organic materials 
deteriorated rapidly under the extreme conditions in the 
interior of steam engines.[67]
A major improvement in precision parts machining in 
1776 led to the development of mass production.[68] By 
the 1850s, the standardized part was a symbol of American 
industrial practice. By the 1860s, asbestos was being spun, 
woven, or fashioned into a type of millboard or corrugated 
cardboard for use as a packing and sealing material. Asbes­
tos was uniquely suited to this use "owing to its power of 
resisting moisture, friction, high temperatures, and even 
flame itself."[69]
Advances in steam engineering led to higher steam 
pressures and temperatures. Wasted fuel due to heat loss 
was still a major problem. Eighty to ninety percent of the 
heat loss could be prevented by providing insulated cover­
ings. [70] Asbestos was a component in a large number of the 
new products developed for insulating hot engines, boilers,
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and piping. One of these new products was called eighty- 
five percent (85%) magnesia.
2.3.2 Eighty-five Percent Magnesia Insulation 
In 1885 Hiram M. Hanmore, a pipe coverer, began to mix 
magnesia with other pipe-covering materials and patented his 
idea. The addition of asbestos fiber acted as a binder to 
give strength and cohesion to the magnesia sludge, which 
could then be cast or molded into standard shapes and dried. 
The optimum mix was eighty-five percent magnesia and fifteen 
percent finely divided, long fiber chrysotile asbestos, the 
only type available when eighty-five percent magnesia was 
developed.
The use of eighty-five magnesia insulation spread 
rapidly, especially in the United States. By 1888 the U.S. 
Navy used coverings of eighty-five magnesia almost exclu­
sively in its capital ships "because by maximum conservation 
of heat these coverings enabled ships to steam farther on a 
given coal capacity." In the 1880s and early 1890s, such 
products could be sold on the basis of their efficiency as 
well as their cost effectiveness.[71]
As the variety of materials enhanced by the thermal, 
condensation, and noise insulating properties of asbestos 
became more popular, they were used for a variety of pur­
poses in shipbuilding. A characteristic difference among 
the types of asbestos was also utilized by the Navy to reduce 
the tonnage of naval vessels.
2.3.3 Use of Asbestos in Naval Vessels
During World War I, the allied powers agreed to a proposal 
by Charles Evans Hughes, Secretary of State under President 
Harding.[72] The 1921 Washington Treaty of Limitations in 
Tonnage called for a drastic reduction in the gross weight 
of naval vessels. The use of amosite reduced the density of 
eighty-five magnesia insulation from 16-26 to 14-18 pounds 
per cubic foot. Long fiber amosite was also less costly 
than the Canadian chrysotile. By switching to eighty-five 
magnesia insulation made with amosite, heavier weapons 
could be utilized without increasing the total weight of 
the vessels.
Amosite felt was developed in 1934. It was lighter, 
more resistant to higher temperatures (up to 900 degrees 
Farenheight), and more flexible than any previous insulating 
material. Loosely compacted amosite felt did not pack under 
vibration. The fabric retained its insulating qualities 
after it got wet and dried out again. Amosite felt was used 
as a protective covering for eighty-five magnesia insulation 
and other forms of insulation, and for turbines, valves, and 
fittings on virtually all U.S. combat vessels built just 
before World War II.[73]
Other weight saving materials which incorporated amosite 
into naval vessels included a lightweight, fireproof 
wallboard, called Marinite, used for partitions, and amosite 
insulated mattresses. The amosite mattresses weighed 9-1/2 
pounds per cubic foot. Those made of chrysotile weighed up
to fifty percent more, and would not conform with Navy 
specifications. Asbestos was also used in other personal 
items, such as safety clothing, curtains and blankets on 
board the ships.[74]
Asbestos was utilized extensively by the Navy during 
building, conversion, and repair to insulate and fire-proof 
hulls, boilers, engines, electrical lines, and piping. The 
work was often carried out in confined spaces under cramped 





Speculation in asbestos contributed to one of the severest 
depressions the country had ever experienced during the 
Panic of 1893. In one six-month period, eight thousand 
businesses failed. One company that managed to survive 
was the H.W. Johns Manufacturing Company of New York.[75] 
The company's name would be as indelibly linked to asbestos 
as the Industrial Revolution's was to the power of steam.
3.1.1 The H. W. Johns Manufacturing Company 
Henry Ward Johns had moved to Brooklyn in 1858 at the age 
of twenty-one, and began a small business handling roofing 
materials. Upon learning about the properties of asbestos, 
Johns experimented with various ways to incorporate it 
into his products. He patented roofing material made with 
asbestos in 1868 and also developed a prefabricated pipe 
covering. This new insulation product was lined with 
asbestos paper and precut to standard sizes. It could be 
wrapped or wired around pipes. The company's sales 
increased immediately.
Asbestos fibers added strength to the insulation and 
roofing materials. Shorter, inferior fibers were suited for 
these products and much less expensive than importing the
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long fiber Italian asbestos. The raw material needed by 
Johns' products could be provided from local sources, such 
as the minor deposit of asbestiform material discovered on 
Staten Island in 1874. By 1880, the H.W. Johns Manufacturing 
Company had a second factory in Brooklyn manufacturing paints 
made with asbestos, marketed as a fireproofing product.[76]
3.1.2 The Birth of an Industry
In 1880 several European mining and manufacturing companies 
combined to form the United Asbestos Company, Inc., and 
subsequently monopolized the Italian chrysotile deposits.[77] 
The demand for noncombustible fabrics produced by the cotton 
industry in England and France provided incentive for 
commercial development of the mines. Incorporating asbestos 
gave the fabrics increased durability and better sealing 
properties.[78 ]
The chrysotile deposits discovered in Canada in 1876 
opened a new supply source, and the slight hook on the 
Canadian fibers saved steps in processing for textile 
applications. An asbestos industry that had been virtually 
non-existent in the United States was about to evolve. Johns 
and his American competitors soon became the major consumers 
of Canadian asbestos. By 1889 the United Asbestos Company 
had acknowledged the superiority of the Canadian fiber and 
obtained mines in Quebec.[79]
The cost of asbestos had risen steadily during the 
1880s. In 1889, first-quality fiber ranged from $80 to $120 
per ton. By 1891, first-guality asbestos sold for $250 per 
ton or more. The typical cost of production and preparation 
for market of a ton of asbestos was about $25. As demand for 
asbestos increased, additional efforts were made to use the 
cruder fibers and to extract even more fibers from what had 
previously been considered waste material. Removal of 
impurities became important when it was discovered that they, 
and not the asbestos fibers in the packing material used in 
steam engines, caused scoring of the piston rods. The 
introduction of more capital eguipment and machinery to 
accomplish the needed operations decreased production costs 
to about $15 dollars a ton. Mining was a profitable 
operation for companies which could finance the needed 
acquisitions, and asbestos mining was recommended as an 
ideal investment.
3.1.3 The Johns-Manville Corporation
In 1891 the H. W. Johns Manufacturing Company of New York 
retained its name and joined with several other firms and 
competitors to become the largest asbestos manufacturer and 
dealer in the world. Now the company had factories in New 
York, Chicago, and Philadelphia, which more than quadrupled 
Johns's former production capacity. By the early 1890s the 
new company had obtained its own mine in Canada, as did other
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asbestos manufacturing companies in both the United States 
and Europe.[80] The first asbestos textile mill in the 
United States opened in 1896.[81]
In 1898, Johns died in Yonkers of scarring of the 
lungs.[82] His death certificate listed the cause as "dust 
phthisis pneumonitis," which was probably a medical euphemism 
for asbestosis.[83] His son took over the company. One 
vendor of Johns' products was a company started in 1886 by 
Charles B. Manville and his three sons. The Manville 
Coverings Company of Milwaukee also manufactured pipe and 
boiler coverings, but none contained asbestos. Manville sold 
Johns' asbestos insulation products in the midwest for high 
temperature applications. By the end of the century, the 
Johns Company was deeply in debt. The paint company was sold 
first, and a buy-out of the entire company to the Manville 
Covering Company of Milwaukee was arranged in 1901.[84]
Thomas F. Manville, a son of the Manville Company's 
founder, became president of the new Johns-Manville Company. 
Rather than focus on research and development as Johns had, 
Manville further diversified the company's product line by 
adding hundreds of non-asbestos products.[85] He built a big 
hotel in the small town of Manville, which had developed 
around the complex of asbestos factories started there in 
1912.[86] He also established an extensive network of sales 
offices throughout the country staffed by salaried agents.
By the fall of 1925, when T. F. Manville suddenly dropped 
dead in his hotel room, the company had sales of almost forty
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million dollars a year and a catalogue of two thousand 
different products.[87]
3.2 Products and Competition
Growing recognition of the adaptability and utility 
of asbestos for modern industrial use stimulated the rapid 
exploitation of the Canadian deposits, and an expansion of 
asbestos manufacturing.[88]
3.2.1 Fiber Sizes Used in Products
The longer fibers (greater than 6 mm) were spun and woven 
into rope, tape or cloth.[89] Fabrics made of asbestos were 
soft, flexible, and very strong. They were widely used 
commercially where fire protection was essential. Common uses 
were curtains in theatres, or protective clothing in certain 
industries, including aprons, helmets, arm protectors, 
gloves, leggings, shoes, coats, and overalls.[90] As early 
as 1853, the uniform worn by the Parisian Fire Brigade 
consisted of a full hooded body jacket of asbestos-containing 
material (ACM). Fifty years later, fire fighters uniforms 
made of ACM encapsulated the whole body.[91]
Intermediate (2 to 6 mm) and the smallest size fibers 
(less than 2 mm) were more abundant than the longer fibers. 
They were used in products such as packing for steam 
engines; building materials such as roofing, shingles, and 
caulking; millboard; paper products; paint; brake linings;
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clutch facings; electrical insulation; floor tiles; and 
filters.[92]
3.2.2 Friction Products
American companies competing with Johns-Manville included 
Keasbey and Mattison of Ambler, Pennsylvania, and Philip 
Carey Company of Cincinnati. Each had their own mines, and 
manufactured roofing and insulation products. The Asbestos 
Corporation, a combination of Canadian mining companies, was 
also active in this market. Other companies concentrated on 
newer specialty asbestos products, one of which was the 
manufacture of "friction products." These were primarily 
brake shoes and clutch facings, in demand due to the 
continuing rise in automobile sales.[93]
At the end of World War I, there were 5.5 million motor 
cars in America - one for every nineteen Americans.[94] In 
1920 there were 8.25 million registered automobiles. The high 
numbers of people killed and injured each year in automobile 
accidents from driving without experience prompted a rapid 
conversion in the mid-1920s from two-wheel to four-wheel 
brakes as a safety measure.[95] By 1927 the number of 
automobiles had more than doubled the 1920 figure. By the 
end of the 1920s, there were more than 23 million cars on the 
roads - about one for every five Americans.[96] All of those 
vehicles had brakes and clutches that required asbestos 
friction products.[97]
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Companies competing with Johns-Manville in the friction 
products market included the Raybestos Company, formed in 
1916 in Connecticut; the General Asbestos and Rubber Company 
of South Carolina, started in 1895; and the Manhattan Rubber 
Manufacturing Company, which began in New Jersey in 1893. 
Raybestos bought out the General Asbestos and Rubber Company 
in 1925. Four years later, it consolidated with the 
Manhattan Rubber Company to become Raybestos-Manhattan 
Company, the country's largest manufacturer of friction 
products.[98]
Johns-Manville continued to dominate the building 
products and insulation sector, listing over fifty sales 
offices in the company's 1927 annual report. After T. F. 
Manville died, his younger brother had become president.
Hiram Edward Manville consolidated, then promptly sold most 
of his holdings, retained a large block of Manville stock, 
and went into semi-retirement as chairman of the executive 
committee.[99] By 1927, Johns-Manville was no longer a 
family-owned business.[100] That was the same year in which 
Cooke coined the term asbestosis to describe an industrial 
lung disease caused by inhaling asbestos dust.
3.3 Summary
The asbestos industry was poised to take off, and their 
main concern was the ability to sustain a very profitable 
business. Industry, medical, and government interests and 
interactions, in combination with a number of other factors,
served to delay the consideration of practical measures to 
prevent exposures to asbestos.
As the industry grew, its executives collaborated to 
preclude damaging information about asbestos, while influ­
encing legislation favorable to their business interests. 
Industry manipulated the dissemination of medical data as a 
condition of sponsorship, and controlled the workplace as a 
function of ownership. Industry's influence on the medical 
community compromised the research that was being conducted 
and what was known about the hazards.
CHAPTER 4
MEDICAL AWARENESS in ENGLAND
4.1 Introduction
The ability to control hazards depends on the knowledge 
and assessment of the cause, as derived from some measure 
of exposure. The most accurate measures of occupational 
exposures are obtained from workers and workplace condi­
tions. [102] During the first quarter of the nineteenth 
century, there were few regulatory restrictions and almost 
nothing was done to control dust levels in asbestos 
factories. Little medical information was gathered on 
asbestosis and few dust samples were taken.[103]
The long latency period of asbestos-related disease, 
ignorance about the cause, confusion with other pulmonary 
disease-causing agents, and evaluation of exposure were 
factors in establishing the hazards of working with asbestos. 
Awareness of the dangers posed by inhalation of asbestos 
fibers existed long before medical evidence established the 
nature of the hazard.[104] Some of the studies and reports 
from England which established the nature of the hazard are 
presented briefly in this section.
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4.2 Early Reports of Disease
4.2.1 British Home Office Report, 1898
Until the 1870s, there had been minimal importation of 
asbestos into England. The Industrial Revolution and the 
inventions it spawned occurred there first, as did the 
first documented case of asbestos-related disease.[105]
It was reported approximately thirty years after chrysotile 
was first mined, but serious health effects were noted before 
the turn of the century.
The earliest British government document to cite 
the hazards of asbestos fiber was The Annual Report of Her 
Majesty's Women Inspectors, in 1898.[106] The report 
mentioned asbestos textile work specifically, and identified 
common symptoms exhibited from the effects of the dust on 
the respiratory system.[107] Eight years later, the Lady 
Inspector of Factories reported that, of all the "dusty 
trades" for which complaints were received, none surpassed 
the injuriousness of asbestos processes."[108]
4.2.2 Report of Mortality, 1906
The results of the first study of mortality among asbestos 
workers appeared in 1906, in the Bulletin de 1'Inspection du 
Travail et de l'Hyqiene Industrielle.[109] The article was an 
account by an inspector in the Department of Labor at Caen 
named Auribault. He was reporting on conditions at an 
asbestos-weaving mill that had been established in 1890.
Fifty workers died in the first five years of the mill's
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operation, including all but one of seventeen workers 
recruited by the factory's director, from the staff of a 
cotton mill he had previously owned.
4.2.3 Murray, 1900
The first fatal case of pulmonary asbestosis was observed in 
1900 by Dr. H. Montague Murray, Senior Physician at Charing 
Cross Hospital in London. It involved a thirty-three year 
old man who had worked for fourteen years in an asbestos 
textile factory. He claimed to be the last survivor of ten 
men who had been working in the carding room of the factory 
when he started in 1886. The patient had been suffering from 
severe pulmonary fibrosis. At autopsy, Murray found spicules 
of asbestos in the lung tissue.[110] Although not the first 
such case reported in detail, Murray's was the first with a 
post-mortem description of the victim's lungs as extremely 
tough and fibrous, especially in the lower parts.[Ill] As 
the first documented case of a death resulting specifically 
from asbestos, it established a presumptive connection 
between occupation and disease.[112]
In testimony before a British Departmental Committee on 
Compensation for Industrial Diseases in 1906, Murray said, 
"that considerable trouble is now taken to prevent the 
inhalation of dust, and so the disease is not so likely to 
occur as heretofore."[113] His correlation between asbestos 
dust and disease prevailed for the next two decades.
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Attention focused on reduction of the high dust levels 
and dusty conditions commonly found in industry.
4.2.4 Cooke, 1927
In 1927, the year in which Johns-Manville ceased to be 
a family-owned business, Dr. W. E. Cooke, an English 
physician, coined the term asbestosis. Cooke used the term 
to describe[114] the unusual fibrosis of the lungs he had 
observed and previously reported, regarding the case of a 
thirty-three year old female patient. At the age of 
thirteen, she had started working in an English asbestos- 
textile factory that had no system to remove dust. By 1917, 
after thirteen years of exposure, she was coughing and in 
bad health.[115]
The case had been detailed in Cooke's article "Fibrosis 
of the Lungs Due to the Inhalation of Asbestos Dust," 
published in the July 26, 1924, edition of the British 
Medical Journal.r1161 The autopsy showed extensive pulmonary 
fibrosis and dense strands of abnormal fibrous tissue 
connecting the lungs and the pleural membranes surrounding 
them.[117] It was the first clear case of death due to 
asbestos exposure, and only the second death from asbestosis 
that had been so identified.[118]
Cooke's discovery sparked intensive study in England 
over the next seven years. The most important work was 
conducted by Dr. E.R.A. Merewether, Medical Inspector of 
Factories for the British Home Office.[119]
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4.3 Medical Studies in England
4.3.1 Merewether, 1930 - Asbestosis and Silicosis 
In 1928 the British Medical Journal published Seiler's 
South African case of "pure" asbestosis in an asbestos 
textile worker. This was only the third such case 
reported. It prompted the Factories Department of the 
Home Office to initiate a study of asbestos textile workers 
in England's factories.[120]
Between 1928 and 1929, a comprehensive study was 
conducted by Merewether and Price. Their investigation 
was confined to workers exposed to pure asbestos fibers.[121] 
After excluding other possible causes, they concluded that 
over one-quarter of the workers had contracted the disease 
because of their occupation.[122]
Merewether and Price determined that, over a period of 
years, inhalation of asbestos resulted in serious fibrosis in 
those air-cells of the lungs where the asbestos came to rest. 
The normal reserve capacity of the lungs masked the effect 
for some years. They found that the disease could be fatal, 
with no detectable difference evident, when considering the 
different types of asbestos fibers used in British industry. 
They also discovered that the disease was dose-related. 
Workers exposed to higher concentrations of dust had a 
greater probability of becoming ill.
Of the 160 factories employing 2,200 workers in manu­
facturing asbestos products in England in 1930, Merewether 
and Price found 18 factories involved in weaving textiles
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from fibers. MuCulloch outlines how the subjects were 
selected and gives a description of conditions in the most 
dusty plants, where mattresses were made using asbestos as 
a filler and covering material. Brouder also gives an 
account of the study selection and results.[12 3]
Merewether and Price's study was entitled "Report on 
the Effects of Asbestos Dust on the Lungs and Dust Suppres­
sion in the Asbestos Industry: Part 1 - Occurrence of 
Pulmonary Fibrosis and Other Pulmonary Afflictions in 
Asbestos Workers; Part 2 - Processes Giving Rise to Dust 
and Methods for its Suppression". Published in 1930, it 
was the first major study of the effects of asbestos on 
occupational health published in Britain. The authors' 
reasoning - that reducing the dust levels found in industry 
would reduce the dose, and therefore lengthen the time before 
the appearance of disease - emphasized elimination of the 
hazard by controlling dust levels in industry.[124]
Based on the results of the study, the Home Office 
issued a notice to all manufacturers about the pathological 
and clinical distinctions between silicosis and asbestosis. 
Each disease was described in detail. Dust suppression, 
such as wet versus dry methods of processing, and other 
engineering controls were recommended. Periodic medical 
examinations for all employees was also encouraged.[125] By 
1930, the hazard had grown to such proportions that measures 
were adopted to suppress dust in asbestos factories.[126] 
Parliament passed legislation in 1931 that instituted
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periodic medical examinations for workers engaged in 
particularly dusty processes in the asbestos-textile 
industry, made asbestosis a compensable disease, and 
reguired improved methods of ventilation and dust 
suppression in asbestos-textile factories.[127]
4.3.2 Merewether, 1947 - Lung Cancer
As dust levels decreased, more workers lived long enough 
to develop lung cancer. In this regard, another study 
conducted by Merewether is topical, because it provided the 
first evidence of a causal link between asbestos and lung 
cancer. An association between lung cancer and asbestosis 
was first suggested by clinicians in the 1930s.[128] Some 
articles appeared in the British medical journals, but lung 
cancer was not a frequent diagnosis at the time and no firm 
conclusions were drawn.[129]
In 1934, Wood and Gloyne described lung cancer in 
asbestos workers.[130] The following year, the first 
published reports began to suggest that asbestos workers 
with asbestosis also appeared be at unusual risk of devel­
oping cancer of the lung. Two of those reports were by 
Gloyne, and one was by Lynch and Smith from Charleston, 
South Carolina.[131]
In 1936, Gloyne reported a case of oat cell carcinoma 
in an asbestos factory worker, and Middleton reported three 
lung cancers among fifty-four cases of asbestosis. Another
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American case by Egbert and Geiger, from New Haven, Connec­
ticut, brought to six the total number of published reports 
by 1936.
Three more cases were reported in 1938. These came 
from Germany,[132] whose physicians by that time were calling 
lung cancer an occupational disease of asbestos workers. The 
following year, asbestosis became a compensable disease in 
Germany.[13 3] An editorial in the British Medical Journal 
reviewed the general question of the relationship between 
lung cancer and dust diseases, and urgently called for 
further study.
Six more articles appeared between 1938 and 1942 that 
mentioned a suspected relationship between asbestos exposure 
and cancer of the lung. Seven pages were devoted to asbes­
tosis in Wilhelm Hueper/s 1942 textbook, Occupational Tumors 
and Allied Diseases, in which he reviewed the evidence and 
concluded that "there is an incidence of lung cancer in 
asbestosis of the lung which is definitely excessive."[134]
In 1947, Merewether investigated the link between lung 
cancer and asbestosis. He considered 235 autopsy reports in 
the period from 1924 until 1946, in which the acknowledged 
cause of death was asbestosis, and found 31 with cancer of 
the lung or pleura. In addition to the causal link, Mere­
wether found a much higher incidence of cancer when compared 
with silicosis sufferers.
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Merewether's report was published in 1949. It was 
substantiated by other studies which culminated in Richard 
Doll's work.[135] Doll studied post-mortems dating back to 
1935, and provided epidemiological evidence of a causal link 
between cancer and asbestos exposure. Doll concluded that 
cancer of the lung was a specific hazard for asbestos 
workers.[136]
4.4 State of Medical Awareness 
That exposure to asbestos may lead to diffuse pulmonary 
fibrosis has been known since early in this century.[137] 
Because of ignorance about the cause of the disease, and 
because it manifests itself slowly and insidiously over a 
period of ten to twenty years or more, asbestosis was 
probably, more often than not, misdiagnosed as pulmonary 
tuberculosis, fibrosing pneumonia, or silicosis.[138]
In referring to the uncertain nature of the hazard, the 
1898 Annual Report of Her Majesty's Women Inspectors stated 
that, "the general symptoms produced by dust on the various 
respiratory organs are to the lay mind so similar to those 
produced by other causes that it is not always easy to trace 
the connection."[139] This difficulty in diagnosis was 
evident in earlier works of Murray, Cooke, Merewether and 
others.
Cooke's 1924 case, and others previously reported, was 
complicated by co-existing tuberculosis or pneumonia, making
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an exact specification of the effects of asbestos dust less 
certain.[140] Over the next five years, a number of articles 
on the subject of pulmonary disorders would indicate that 
asbestos-related disease of the lungs was quite distinct 
from that in patients with tuberculosis.[141]
Industrial lung diseases such as silicosis and 
asbestosis were well defined in the medical literature by 
1930. A specific chronic disease of the lungs attributed to 
breathing asbestos was well described in dozens of different 
medical articles, involving hundreds of cases. In addtion 
to confirming the link between lung cancer and asbestosis, 
Merwether's 1949 report showed a much higher incidence among 
those suffering from asbestosis than for those with 
silicosis.[142] An awareness of the individuality of 
diseases caused by asbestos dust was reflected by the 
title of the Third International Conference of Experts 
on Pneumoconiosis held in Sydney, Australia in February 
and March, 1950. Previous conference titles had only 
used the term "silicosis."[143] The 1950 conference 
title acknowledged the broader spectrum and individuality 
of dust diseases.
CHAPTER 5
DEVELOPMENT OF AWARENESS in the UNITED STATES
5.1 Introduction
The English studies documented the very real hazards of 
occupational exposure to asbestos dust, and differentiated 
asbestosis from other forms of pneumoconiosis. As early 
as 1907, more than 280 American entries were listed in a 
preliminary bibliography on occupational diseases and 
industrial hygiene.[144] Despite this information, 
asbestosis would be confused and overshadowed in the 
United States by the contemporary pulmonary diseases of 
tuberculosis and silicosis.[145]
5.2 Early Reports of Disease
5.2.1 Pancoast, 1917
The first published case of asbestos-related disease in the 
United States was reported by Dr. Henry K. Pancoast.[146] 
Like Murray of England, Pancoast was a pioneer in the use 
of X-rays for medical diagnosis, and was considered to be 
the foremost roentgenological authority in the United 
States.[147]
In 1915, Pancoast and his colleagues at the University 
of Pennsylvania began an investigation of chest X-rays in 
the diagnosis of workers exposed to dust in various occupa­
tions. These included potters, metal grinders, cement 
workers, coal miners, marine firemen, and asbestos workers.
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Pancoast concluded that the "effects are the same in 
general but may vary in degree." The report was published 
in 1917. Its reception in the medical community focused on 
the economic impact of the undue prevalence of tuberculosis 
in industrial workers. The following year, Pancoast et al. 
reported findings of lung scarring and fine fibrosis in X- 
rays of fifteen asbestos factory workers.[148]
5.2.2 Hoffman, 1918
In 1918, the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics 
published a special study titled "Mortality from Respiratory 
Diseases in Dusty Trades (Inorganic Dusts)."[149 ] The study 
was conducted by statistician Frederick L. Hoffman, chief 
actuary for the Prudential Insurance Company of America, 
Newark, New Jersey.[150] The report/s conclusion noted 
"that in the practice of American and Canadian life insurance 
companies, asbestos workers are generally declined on account 
of the assumed health injurious conditions of the industry." 
Hoffman concluded that the industry involved "considerable 
dust hazard," and cited the fact that American asbestos 
workers were experiencing unusually early deaths.[151]
Hoffman called urgently for "more qualified and extensive 
investigation of the health aspects of asbestos manufacture."
Hoffman's findings and his urgent call for further 
investigation were repeated in future years by others 
researching asbestos-related disease. Their calls went
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unanswered for various reasons. Among these were the 
laissez-faire relationship between government and industry, 
events of national scope that displaced attention, and lack 
of any adequate response to the research results sponsored 
by industry. There was also the ongoing problem of 
recognition of asbestos as a disease causing agent.
5.3 "The New Public Health"
The earliest American reports of asbestos related disease 
were published amidst changing ideas about, and approaches 
to, disease identification, causation and control. The 
belief that disease resulted from miasmas emitted by 
decaying organic matter held sway in the United States until 
the 1890s.[152] This was superseded by the germ theory of 
disease, which focused on the individual as the key factor 
in disease causation. H. W. Hill, of the Minnesota State 
Board of Health, expounded the belief that disease producing 
germs resided chiefly in relatively few people. In a widely 
read and influential book for the general public, called The 
New Public Health, Hill announced the New Order: "The old 
public health was concerned with environment; the new is 
concerned with the individual. The old sought the sources 
of infectious disease in the surroundings of man; the new 
finds them in man himself."[153]
Unlike the Inspector of Factories in England, there 
was no centralized data collection, assessment, or federal 
regulation of workplace hazards in the United States.
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Responsibility for public health rested with territorial, 
state, or local governmental units which were spread out 
across the frontier society.[154] Most of the state and 
local agencies were thinly staffed, minimally funded and 
often politically controlled. These agencies had little 
if any regulatory power and lacked laboratory and other 
technical resources so vital to the surveillance of hazards 
in industry.[155] Even federal government agencies, such 
as the Public Health Service, required the cooperation of 
industry to gain access to their factories.[156]
Until the 1920s, the asbestos industry was so small 
that no individual physician would have come across a 
sufficient number of cases of asbestosis, or lung cancer 
among asbestos workers, to be alerted to the connection.
The American Medical Association (AMA), in representing 
the interests of individual physicians, and in promoting 
free market competition, ostracized contract practice, as 
economically and professionally detrimental to the medical 
profession. From 1901 to 1920, during the period in which 
mergers created giant corporations in industry, the AMA 
waged a negative campaign against contract doctors while 
reorganizing to become one of the most effective and 
powerful lobbying organizations in the United States.[157] 
Public health reformers did not perceive the environ­
ment of the worker as their main concern even though indus­
trial settings provided the "great human laboratory" 
envisioned by pioneer industrial physician Henry Mock.[158]
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5.4 Government Initiatives 
Physicians had always been employed to treat injured 
workers, but when the rate of industrial accidents became 
a national scandal early in the twentieth century, state 
and federal agencies were forced to respond to conditions 
in industry. Disasters, especially epidemics, created the 
political pressures necessary for initiating action.[159]
It was during this period that the new field of industrial 
hygiene emerged.
5.4.1 Regulating Working Conditions
The first federal law to regulate working conditions was 
the Hours of Service Act passed in 1907. A coal mine 
explosion in West Virginia that same year led to creation 
of the Bureau of Mines in 1910, and in 1913 the Department 
of Labor was formed to "foster, promote and develop" the 
lot of wage workers. One of the first reports on asbestosis 
in the United States appeared in a 1918 Department of Labor 
publication.[160]
Between 1911 and 1920 most states passed worker compen­
sation laws requiring employer's to carry liability insurance 
to ensure payment of legitimate claims. Worker's compensation 
tion was intended to be an incentive to reduce accidents and 
injuries by improving working conditions. Due to industry's 
influence on the lawmakers, the legislation proved to be a 
boon for employers. They were allowed to compensate for loss 
of life or limb at bargain prices during a time when injury
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and death rates had soared in coal mines, steel mills and 
textile factories.[161] In the 1930s, the public outcry, 
over another disaster in West Virginia, prompted a change 
in some of these laws.[162]
5.4.2 U. S. Public Health Service
In 1914, the United States Public Health Service formed a 
Division of Occupational Health. It was headed by Dr. Joseph 
Schereschewsky, first president of the American Association 
of Industrial Physicians and Surgeons (AAIPS). Mock was one 
of the 125 physicians and surgeons, in industry or government 
service, who met in Detroit to form the AAIPS in 1916. Like 
members of similar groups, such as the Conference Board of 
Physicians in Industry, members of the AAIPS identified more 
strongly with the large corporations for which they worked, 
than did the average contract physician.[163]
Schereschewsky also headed the Public Health Service's 
Division of Industrial Hygiene until 1918. On staff with 
this Division were Anthony Lanza and William McConnell, who 
both participated in industry sponsored asbestos research 
in later years. Under Dr. Lewis Thompson, the Division of 
Industrial Hygiene carried out a number of extensive dust 
studies using equipment developed jointly by Dr. Leonard 
Greenburg and George W. Smith, of the Public Health Service 
and the Bureau of Mines, respectively. Soon after taking 
over in 1923, Thompson, hired a young sanitary engineer 
named Jack Bloomfield. Bloomfield pioneered the use of the
51
Greenburg-Smith impinger over a ten year period. It became 
the standard instrument for dust measurement in the United 
States.[164]
5.5 Harvard's Program in Industrial Hygiene
One of the first comprehensive programs in industrial 
hygiene was developed by Philip Drinker, a professor at 
Harvard University. The new program began as a joint 
venture between the Sanitary Engineering Department of 
the Engineering School, and the Department of Ventilation 
and Illumination at the new School of Public Health.
When the School of Public Health was formally founded 
in 1918, retired Jackson Professor Frederick Shattuck raised 
$125,000 from manufacturing firms in New England to support 
the new program. The program was managed by Philip's older 
brother, Cecil Drinker, who succeeded Shattuck as Jackson 
Professor in 1916, and eventually became the second dean of 
the School of Public Health.
The objective of the program was to train company 
doctors, and teach students how to investigate industrial 
health problems. Industrial hygiene was regarded princi­
pally as a medical problem. A certificate of public health 
was issued after completion of a five month course. As the 
program expanded, it became apparent that industry was more 
interested in engineering problems, some of which were beyond 
the scope of the industrial physician's ability to solve.
In 1922, the School of Public health entered a new 
phase, paying more attention to the measurement and control 
of hazards. Physicians in the program were soon outnumbered 
by engineers and scientists, who were taught to design less 
dangerous workplaces. In this capacity, the university's 
facilities were made available for research and training.
The Schools of Public Health and Engineering launched 
Harvard's new program in industrial sanitation in 1927.
The title is significant. Until 1925, sanitary engineering 
was the only discipline that addressed the impact of the 
environment on public health. This impact was exemplified 
by the great improvement in public health following reforms 
such as water purification and waste disposal earlier in 
the century.
Eventually, the program became the Industrial Hygiene 
Department of the School of Public Health.[165] The first 
engineering oriented graduates from Harvard's industrial 
sanitation program would again connect public health with 
the environment, this time in industrial settings. They 
graduated just in time to address the growing silicosis 
epidemic.
5.6 Silicosis
The medical literature of the 1930s pointed to dust disease 
as the prevalent threat in occupational settings, and an 
avalanche of litigation by workers suffering from silicosis 
got the most attention. Silicosis is a disease associated
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with those who drill, crush, or pulverize rocks, such as 
granite and sandstone, where silica is released into the air 
as respirable dust. Breathing becomes difficult as the lung 
tissue becomes scarred, and shortness of breath is a common 
result. Those who are thus affected are more susceptible to 
tuberculosis, a complicating factor in diagnosis.
Measures to prevent the disease were suggested as early 
as 1700, by Bernardino Ramazzini, a professor of medicine at 
the University of Padua. The first pathological description 
of silicosis was given in 1762 by Ijsbrand van Diemerbroeck, 
a professor of medicine at the University of Utrecht. In the 
United States in 1887, silicosis was found at autopsy in the 
lungs of a stove-foundry worker in Poughkeepsie, New York.
Though well established in the medical literature, and 
despite protective practices standardized by the Bureau of 
Mines, more than one million workers in the United States had 
been exposed to harmful amounts of silica dust by 1930. At 
least one in four of them could have been expected to develop 
silicosis. In 1933, damage suits totaling more than $100 
million were pending, and a year later the figure had risen 
to $300 million.[166] One source of the swelling number of 
lawsuits was the Hawks Nest tunnel disaster, near the town 
of Gauley Bridge in Fayette County, West Virginia.
5.6.1 Gauley Bridge - Hawk's Nest Tunnel Disaster 
Excavation on the tunnel began in late March, 1930, with a 
crew of about two thousand laborers. Three-fourths of them
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were Black, many had migrated to the area, and all of them 
were paid depression era wages. The contractor, Rinehart 
and Dennis of Charlottesville, Virginia, permitted dry 
drilling of the 3-3/4 mile tunnel through Gauley Mountain, 
which was, in parts, 99.44% pure silica. Construction was 
completed in December, 1931.[167] It was reported that 
almost five hundred workers died, and fifteen hundred were 
disabled from severe silicosis within a few years.[168]
At the time, worker's compensation only covered those 
occupational injuries which occurred at a definite time 
and place. Silicosis was a compensable disease in only six 
states, and West Virginia was not one of them.[169] Eighty 
claims had been filed with the West Virginia State Compensa­
tion Commission. The contractor's appeal to have the claims 
settled through the Commission was denied by the state 
supreme court in February of 1933. The only other redress 
for injured tunnel workers was through common-law negligence 
suits, which were eventually filed by more than 500 of the 
2,500 tunnel workers.[170]
The first lawsuit came to trial in the Fayette County 
District Court on March 16, 1933. It lasted six weeks, and 
ended in a hung jury. In an out-of-court settlement, the 
contractor paid $130,000 to 157 plaintiffs. Half of that 
amount was in exchange for the plaintiff's seventeen 
attorneys' agreement not to prosecute.[171] By the time 
the trial concluded, more than 330 suits were pending, 
and the courts were clogged. More than two hundred
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additional new lawsuits were thrown out by the courts, 
citing the trial agreement to forgo further prosecution.
In March, 1935, the West Virginia legislature enacted 
new provisions to cover silicosis, including a one year 
statute of limitation for filing claims, and a two year 
employment requirement. No action was ever taken on the 
original eighty claims filed with the Commission, and the 
new time restraints jeopardized the viability of the pending 
lawsuits.[172] As a result, Rinehart and Dennis was able 
to settle the remaining cases for some $70,000, with the 
stipulation that all evidence and data be relinquished.[173] 
The story of Gauley Bridge might have remained a local 
tragedy. By chance, early in 1934, a playwright named Albert 
Maltz learned about it, and passed the story on. Late in
1935, the People's Press, a weekly labor tabloid, broke the 
story under a banner headline that read, "476 DEAD, 1500 
DOOMED, IN W. VA. TUNNEL CATASTROPHE."[174]
The resulting publicity prompted hearings before a 
subcommittee of the House Committee on Labor in January,
1936, but Congress made no further effort to investigate 
the charges. However, the public outcry resulting from 
the hearings did promote a change in legislation, with 
more attention paid to occupational disease.[175]
5.6.2 Industry Response
In business circles, silicosis was known as the "Depression 
disease." One remedy for industry to deal with the rising
number of claims had been recommended in 1932, by Andrew 
Farrell, a Chicago insurance-company lawyer. In an article 
in Industrial Medicine, concerning the onslaught of silicosis 
claims, Farrell recommended that silicosis and other pulmo­
nary dust diseases be taken out of the courts and covered 
by worker's compensation acts wherever possible, using the 
statute to limit the amount that could be recovered.
Worker's compensation statutes for pulmonary dust diseases 
were enacted in some twenty states over the next decade, and 
business interests were once again placed before the health 
and welfare of the afflicted workers.[176]
Research and training opportunities were other responses 
to the mounting silicosis claims. The Air Hygiene Foundation 
was created in 1935, at industry's request and with backing 
from the Mellon Institute. It was established specifically 
to address technical issues concerning silicosis that 
industry felt were beyond its own capability. Among its 
twenty members were representatives from the Aluminum Company 
of America, Dupont, Owens-Illinois Glass, the Public Health 
Service, and the Bureau of Mines. Anthony Lanza chaired the 
Medical Committee. The Preventive Engineering Committee was 
chaired by Philip Drinker.
In 1941, the name of the organization was changed to the 
Industrial Hygiene Foundation. At that time, John D. Harper, 
Vice-President of the Aluminum Company of America, wrote that 
"It is encouraging to me that in an era when the extensive
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grasp of government is reaching out to regulate and control 
more and more phases of economic life, there is a voluntary 
and nongovernmental research organization to turn to on 
problems of environmental engineering."[177]
5.7 The State of Industrial Medicine 
The employer's consideration for workers' health was not 
so much with installing costly preventive or protective 
measures. Their concern was that escalating disability 
payments would negatively effect production and profits.
Their insurer's were frightened about the prospect of 
having to make massive compensation payments.
The primary social role assigned to contract doctors 
was to keep workers' compensation costs down, and their 
primary tool was the physical examination. For industrial 
use, the examination was reduced to a ten minute assessment 
of a worker's fitness for work. Knowledge regarding a 
worker's medical condition was, by law, the exclusive 
property of the employer, not of the employee.[178]
The ambiguity between an industry that is economically 
healthy and one with healthy workers was a blurred distinc­
tion that lay at the heart of early industrial medicine.
A 1930 editorial in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association set the boundaries: "Industrial medicine...must 
deal with the worker as a producing unit not as a social 
unit." The editorial warned that to do otherwise would
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result in loss of status as specialists and a reversion to 
their former reputation as "poorly educated, low salaried 
'hacks7."[179]
The restrictions placed on physicians in the workplace 
is exemplified in Brouder's account of the Drs. Wise. David 
Wise began as a contract physician for Johns-Manville's 
Pittsburgh, California plant in 1926. His son, Kent, took 
over in 1962, and was specifically instructed to ignore 
medical evidence of disease among the workers. Both doctors 
were named in a lawsuit, filed by former workers against the 
company in the 1970s, at which time Johns-Manville refused 
to defend either one.[180] Even though distinguished as a 
specialty and separated from the discredited tradition of 
contract practice, industrial medicine in 1930 was still 
not a part of mainstream organized medicine.[181]
As described in The Health and Safety of Workers, the 
alignments and divisions that resulted from the reorganiza­
tion of medicine in the United States had unintended side 
effects on the discipline of public health and the nascent 
specialty of industrial medicine. For the latter, Ozonoff 
notes that "the result would be a shift in focus from the 
individual employee to the interests of the employing 
firm."[182] Access to, and conditions in the workplace, 
and knowledge of the hazards of asbestos exposure were 
still controlled by industry.
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5.8 The State of Industrial Hygiene
Against this backdrop, industrial hygiene was emerging as a 
specialty in its own right. In 1930, only five states and 
one city (New York City) had official industrial hygiene 
programs. In an effort to increase those numbers, the Public 
Health Service initiated a series of short training seminars 
in industrial hygiene, with funding provided from the 1936 
Social Security Act. The seminars were held in conjunction 
with the territorial and state health agencies. A group that 
formed to help coordinate actives for the fledgling state 
industrial hygiene units became the American Conference of 
Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH).
The American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA) 
was the major support organization for those employed full 
time by private companies, many of which held large 
government contracts.[183] Viewing themselves as worker 
rather than company oriented, "the ACGIH split from the AIHA 
in 1938 expressly to keep out corporate influence."[184] 
Ironically, the ACGIH would later recommend an inadequate 
threshold level for exposure to asbestos dust that was 
adopted as the standard by industry.
5.9 Concern Over Mounting Litigation
The Gauley Bridge tunnel tragedy was a symbolic turning 
point. It focused all attention on silicosis, even though 
tuberculosis was still the prevalent concern. Concern with
asbestos-related disease was overshadowed, but it was not 
unnoticed. The first disability claim for asbestosis was 
filed in 1927, by a foreman in the weaving department of an 
asbestos-textile mill in Massachusetts. The claim was upheld 
by the Massachusetts Industrial Accident Board. In 1930, the 
first case of asbestosis found at autopsy in this country was 
reported in a journal called Minnesota Medicine. The subject 
of the case was a worker who had been employed at an asbestos 
mine in South America.[185] In 1932, there was a report of 
an asbestos-related disability of a hospital maintenance 
worker in Wisconsin.[186]
Construction of the Gauley Bridge tunnel began as the 
depression was starting. By the time the incident was 
finally publicized in late 1935, the depression was in full 
swing. By then, the public's attention was focused on jobs, 
not on job health.[187]
5.9.1 Insurance Companies
During this period, industry and their insurers assessed the 
possibility of a similar situation regarding their products' 
manufacture and liability. The position they took gave 
asbestos-related diseases more time to incubate. The 
insurers position appeared in the Philadelphia Record in 
August 1935, in an article of response, by John L. Spivak, 
about the insurance companies' awareness of the asbestos 
hazard. Spivak wrote of an intercompany occupational rating
conference that had been held in May, 1928, at the home 
office of the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company 
in Boston, Massachusetts. At the conference, officials 
of the Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company of Philadelphia 
delivered a paper advising their colleagues, that:
until we have the benefit of our experience with 
this class of workers, we should continue to look 
upon those who may be exposed to large quantities 
of dust...as risks to be selected with great care 
and only at an extra premium that will provide for 
an estimated extra mortality of fifty percent, 
disability not to be granted."[188]
The following year, the nation's largest life-insurance 
carrier, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, began a survey 
of health conditions in asbestos-textile mills. The report 
was completed in 1931, but was not published until 1935. By 
that time, the perception of the hazard had changed.[189]
5.9.2 Industry
The concern with litigation was also recorded in Johns- 
Manville's Board of Directors meeting minutes dated April 
23, 1933. Negligence suits filed by former employees who 
had developed asbestosis while working at the Manville, New 
Jersey plant were pending in federal court. The company's 
attorneys had been approached by the attorney for the plain­
tiffs "with an offer to settle all the cases upon a much
lower basis than had ever been previously discussed." The 
recommended settlement offer was "approximately $30,000 
provided written assurance were obtained from the attorney 
for the various plaintiffs that he would not directly or 
indirectly participate in the bringing of new actions against 
the Corporation." The minutes of this meeting came to light 
during court proceedings which took place more than forty- 
five years later.[190]
Various points of view emerged as disability and 
compensation claims became big items on the business agenda, 
and issues of occupational health crept into public debate.
CHAPTER 6
A DECADE OF MEDICAL STUDIES
6.1 Introduction
The precise data required to permit appropriate medical 
and engineering controls was only available from impartial 
scientists in industry or in the public sector.[191] Research 
studies were sponsored by the industry, and conducted by the 
Public Health Service. The dichotomy of views about the 
nature and extent of the asbestos hazard was reflected in 
the research results.
Industry executives decided to fund medical research 
that would discredit reports of asbestos hazards, and 
"keep...a check on workers' health while telling them as 
little as possible."[192] To this end, the asbestos industry 
funded a substantial amount of research, some in conjunction 
with the insurance companies. In 1928, industry began a 
long-term relationship with the Saranac Laboratories.
The body of work sponsored by the public sector was 
conducted by the US Public Health Service in conjunction 
with various state units. Much of the work involved devising 
detection methods, equipment, and techniques with which to 
make dust measurements during field. One of the first of 
these studies became the basis for the ACGIH's recommendation 




Silicosis and Asbestosis was a popular medical text 
written by Dr. Anthony Lanza. In a chapter on the health 
and economic aspects of pulmonary dust disease, Lanza wrote 
that "Silicosis and asbestosis burst upon the amazed 
consciousness of American industry during the period 1929- 
1930," citing "Among the first claims for damages were those 
for asbestosis, a hitherto unheard of disease in the United 
States."
At the time Merewether began his study of workers in 
England's asbestos textile mills, Lanza began similar work 
on a smaller scale in the United States. "In 1929, the 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company was approached by firms 
representing the asbestos industry in the United States with 
the reguest that a hygienic study be made of that industry, 
to ascertain "... whether asbestos dust was an occupational 
hazard in their establishment and if so, what was the nature 
of this hazard and what should be done to prevent or control 
it."[193] So began the introduction to the first epidemio­
logical study of asbestos workers in the United States.
The study was conducted by Lanza and two of his 
colleagues for their employer, the Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company. Lanza was assistant medical director 
for Metropolitan Life. Working with him were William J. 
McConnell, formerly of the Public Health Service's Industrial 
Hygiene Division, and William Fehnel, a Harvard trained 
industrial hygienist. After attending Harvard, Fehnel
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returned to the New Jersey Zinc Company. Previously, he 
had worked there as a chemist, and was assigned to assist 
the Drinkers in measurements of dust levels during their 
investigation in the early 1920s, of manganese poisoning at 
the plant. Fehnel returned to the company to monitor the 
program, and may be the first person hired by industry 
specifically to perform industrial hygiene work. He left 
New Jersey Zinc shortly thereafter to work at Metropolitan 
Life.[194]
From October 1929 through January 1931, Dr. Lanza and 
his colleagues examined and took X-rays of workers [195] 
in five asbestos plants and mines in the United States and 
Canada.[196] Results showed an unusual prevalence of 
enlarged hearts. Signs of fibrosis appeared in the X-rays 
of forty-three percent of those engaged less than five years 
in asbestos factory work, and rose dramatically to eighty- 
seven percent for those with over fifteen years.[197] Fifty- 
three percent of the workers studied were classified as 
asbestotics. Only seventeen percent were asymptomatic.[198]
The written report, entitled "Effects on the Inhalation 
of Asbestos Dust Upon the Lungs of Asbestos Workers,11 was 
submitted to industry sponsors Johns-Manville and Raybestos- 
Manhattan for their review just as a New Jersey legislative 
commission was trying to decide if silicosis should be made 
a compensable disease under worker's compensation. With the 
increased attention on dust borne diseases, the sponsors were
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concerned that the report, if published as written, might 
prompt inclusion of asbestosis in the legislation.[199]
The sponsors complicity in editing the report was 
revealed in correspondence contained in files belonging to 
Sumner Simpson, president of Raybestos-Manhattan. The files 
were recovered in 1977 during deposition for a product 
liability suit filed in May 1975 on behalf of former workers 
at a Raybestos-Manhattan plant in Passaic, New Jersey. They 
had been saved by his son, William, who was then CEO of the 
company. The recovered files included correspondence between 
Simpson and Vandiver Brown, head of Johns-Manville's legal 
department. Sumner Simpson had died in 1953, and the 
plaintiff's attorneys were told that Vandiver Brown was also 
dead. In fact, he was in Glascow, Scotland, very much alive, 
but mentally debilitated.[200]
Upon reviewing the 1931 report, Brown had consulted 
with attorney George S. Hobart, of the law firm of Hobart & 
Minard, Newark, NJ, who had handled some damage claims for 
Johns-Manville. In stressing the importance of a medical 
report which drew a distinction between asbestosis and 
silicosis, Hobart's reply to Brown outlined a "state-of-the- 
art" defense argument that the industry would use for the 
next forty years:
...one of our principal defenses in actions against 
the company on the common law theory of negligence 
has been that the scientific and medical knowledge
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have been insufficient until a very recent period 
to place upon the owners of plants or factories 
the burden or duty of taking special precautions 
against the possible onset of the disease in their 
employees.[201]
Variations of the "state-of-the-art" defense were used 
successfully by the industry, until Borel vs. Fibreboard 
Paper Products Corp. et al. That suit was filed by Ward 
Stevenson, in federal district court in Beaumont, Texas, 
on October 29, 1969, against eleven asbestos insulation 
manufacturing companies. In the first case of its kind in 
the nation, Stevenson argued successfully that the doctrine 
of strict liability applied to asbestos insulating materials. 
By failing to provide adequate warnings of foreseeable 
dangers associated with their products, the manufacturers 
had breached warranties, and could be held strictly liable 
in the death of the plaintiff, Clarence Borel. In Borel vs. 
Fibreboard, the courts established that exposure to asbestos 
was cumulative. Each exposure represented a separate, 
additional injury.[202]
In November 1933, more than two years after receiving 
Lanza's report, Simpson invited discussion on his idea to 
standardize methods of dust control in asbestos factories.
A month later, on December 29, 1933, Simpson and three Johns- 
Manville executives (W.R. Seigle, Chairman of the Board; E.M. 
Voorhees, Secretary; and Brown) agreed to allow Metropolitan 
Life to bring its survey up to date.[203]
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During the 1931, study Lanza had observed that the 
severity of symptoms exhibited was less than might be 
expected from the X-rays, and concluded that asbestosis 
was a clinically milder disease than silicosis. By late 
1934, he was aware that other scientists, including 
Merewether, were finding asbestotics dying at a younger age, 
and contracting their disease under dust conditions that 
appeared to be safe in other industries. Lanza revised the 
1931 report accordingly, and submitted the proofs.
Vandiver Brown reguested a compromise from Lanza.
"All we ask is that all of the favorable aspects of the 
survey be included and that none of the unfavorable be 
unintentionally pictured in darker tones than th circum­
stances justify.11 [204 ] Among the changes proposed was a 
reinstatement of the 1931 report's conclusion, complete 
with the suggested wording that "Clinically, from this 
study, it appears to be of a type milder than silicosis." 
Presenting asbestosis as a less dangerous disease than 
silicosis obscured the serious health hazards of asbestos as 
demonstrated by the study. Yet, the changes were accepted 
as editorial comments by Lanza, sanctioned by Metropolitan 
Life, and incorporated in the final report.[205]
The final Metropolitan Life report emphasized the 
differences between asbestosis and silicosis. The finding 
that fifty-three percent of the workers were classified as 
asbestotics was absent. The study was finally published on
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January 4, 1935 by the Public Health Service. By then,
Lanza had become a leading figure in the field of occupa­
tional medicine.[206]
Lanza's Silicosis and Asbestosis was published in 1938. 
In it, he identified dyspnoea, or shortness of breath, as 
the most striking symptom of asbestosis. He explained the 
detectable changes in X-rays preceding the reduced lung 
function that caused shortness of breath. He also noted that 
misdiagnosis of asbestosis was frequent because other cardiac 
ailments were thought to cause enlargement of the heart, a 
common symptom of asbestosis sufferers. In the latter 
stages, clubbing of fingers and toes, and anorexia are 
outward signs of disease progression.
Prior to the books' publication, Lanza knew of only 
seventy-eight cases in England which documented asbestosis 
as the cause of death. These occurred from 1930 to 1936.
In his book, Lanza suggested a link between asbestos exposure 
and lung cancer, but drew no firm conclusions due to the lack 
of statistical evidence. Like his peers, Lanza believed that 
the chemical composition of asbestos was most likely 
responsible for its harmful effects. Although it was not 
accurate, this view was predominant for many years.
Questions about the mechanics of disease causation 
remain, but modern research has identified the morphology 
of asbestos fibers as the enabling factor, rather than 
chemical composition. The indestructibility and physical 
structure of the fibers wreck havoc on the natural defense 
systems of body tissue.[207]
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Silicosis and Asbestosis remained in print for twenty years. 
Lanza left Metropolitan Life after World War II, and finished 
his career as a Professor of Industrial Hygiene at New York 
University Medical Center. Before he died at the age of 
eighty in 1964, the university renamed its laboratories at 
Sterling Forest the Anthony J. Lanza Research Laboratories 
for Environmental Medicine.[208]
6.3 Saranac Laboratories
Many of the industry sponsored studies were conducted at the 
Saranac Laboratories in Saranac Lake, NY. Originally named 
the Trudeau Foundation's Saranac Laboratory for the Study of 
Tuberculosis, the institute was founded by Edward Livingston 
Trudeau, a pioneer of the anti-tuberculosis movement of the 
1890s and early twentieth century.
6.3.1 Gardner
In 1927, Dr. Leroy Upson Gardner became director of the 
Saranac Labs. Gardner had been diagnosed with tuberculosis 
in 1917, and sent to the Trudeau Sanatorium at Saranac Lake 
to recover. By 1919, he was the pathologist for the sanato­
rium's laboratory. During this period, Gardner learned of 
the high tuberculosis mortality rate among granite cutters in 
Barre, Vermont compared to marble cutters in nearby Proctor, 
who had fewer cases than expected. As a result of Gardner's 
investigations, the laboratory's research turned to the 
relationship between tuberculosis and mineral dusts.[209]
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Loss of support from private philanthropies in the 1920s 
caused the Laboratory to seek other sources of funding. An 
alliance with industry was formed, and in 1928, Gardner was 
retained by Johns-Manville to conduct animal studies.[210] 
During these experiments, Gardner was able to produce 
asbestosis in the test animals by allowing them to inhale 
pure asbestos. Industry discounted the results claiming that 
they would only apply to factory workers exposed to one 
hundred percent asbestos fiber.[211] In 1930, Gardner began 
conducting experiments with asbestos dust. By the early 
1930s, he was in charge of one of the few groups with 
experience and information on dust borne diseases.[212 ]
On November 20, 1936, Gardner received an offer to 
finance his animal experiments on asbestosis for a three- 
year period, at a cost of five thousand dollars per year.
The offer came from Johns-Manville counsel Vandiver Brown, 
representing eight or ten asbestos-products manufacturers. 
Communications and finances were handled by Brown and 
Sumner Simpson, President of Raybestos-Manhattan.[213]
Brown explained the conditions for support in his letter 
to Gardner:
It is our further understanding that the 
results obtained will be considered the 
property of those who are advancing the 
reguired funds, who will determine whether, 
to what extent and in what manner they shall
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be made public. In the event it is deemed 
desirable they shall be made public, the 
manuscript of your study will be submitted to 
us for approval prior to publication.11 [ 214 ]
Three days later, Gardner agreed to the terms and began 
his experiments late in 1937. An article by Gardner entitled 
the "Etiology of Pneumoconiosis" appeared in the November 
1938 issue of the Journal of the American Medical Society.
It was included in the 1938 Saranac annual report along 
with other addresses by Saranac staff about their work on 
asbestosis. In May 1939, Brown wrote to Simpson concerning 
Gardner's article. "The information covered by these 
references has presumably been derived from the experiments 
which Dr. Gardner is conducting for, and with funds provided 
by, the group members of the Asbestos Textile Industry." 
Simpson agreed that Gardner was "certainly not living up to 
his agreement of November 1936."[215]
Even though Gardner had breached the agreement, it must 
have extended beyond three years, because by 1943, he had 
received almost thirty thousand dollars. By then, nineteen 
cases of lung cancer in asbestos workers had appeared in the 
medical literature. In his studies, Gardner had noted an 
excessive incidence of pulmonary cancer among a small group 
of white mice inhaling asbestos dust for a period of from 
fifteen to twenty-four months.[216] Rather than approach the 
industry for additional funding, he applied to the National
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Advisory Cancer Council to finance a new series of experi­
ments on the cancer-causing potential of asbestos. Gardner 
was turned down, and so was not able to conduct the new 
series of tests he had planned.
Many of the test animals in Gardner's studies had 
developed pulmonary disease from exposure to asbestos 
dust.[217] Shortly before he died suddenly, in October,
1946, Gardner was said to be very distressed because the 1936 
agreement would not allow him to publish his findings.[218]
6.3.2 Kaylo - 1943 to 1952
In 1943, Saranac Labs was retained by another asbestos 
company to study a new insulation product that used asbestos 
as a reinforcing agent.[219] After receiving samples of the 
insulation material, and determining its components, Gardner 
wrote to the company on March 12, stating "the fact that you 
are starting with a mixture of guartz and asbestos would 
clearly suggest that you have all the ingredients for a first 
class hazard."[220]
The product was called Kaylo, a name derived from the 
"K-factor" rating used in heat transmission. The lower the 
heat loss or K-factor, the better the insulation. Kaylo was 
developed during the 1930s by the Owens-Illinois Glass 
Company of Toledo, Ohio. The product was made from calcium 
hydroxide and silica, and had a chrysotile asbestos content 
of approximately fifteen percent. The study began in 1944.
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By May, Gardner had produced asbestosis-like symptoms in test 
animals whose lungs had been injected with the product. He 
was directed to proceed with inhalation experiments. Interim 
reports were sent to the company by Saranac Lab until the 
study was completed in 1952.[221]
6.3.2.1 Vorwald Gardner was succeeded by Dr. Arthur 
Vorwald, who was a pathologist at the Saranac Laboratory 
from 1934 to 1942. A year after Gardner died, Vorwald sent 
an interim report which "tentatively concluded that Kaylo 
alone fails to produce significant pulmonary damage when 
inhaled into the lung." The following year Vorwald reversed 
that conclusion, informing the company that "...Kaylo on 
inhalation is capable of producing asbestosis and must be 
regarded as potentially-hazardous material" that "might 
pose a grave danger to the company's employees."[222]
Despite these warnings, Owens-Illinois prepared to 
manufacture Kaylo, and started production in the early 1940s 
at factories in Berlin, and in Sayerville, New Jersey. Pre­
employment and annual X-rays were instituted to monitor the
505 people who worked in these plants.
The final report of the study, entitled "Investigation
Concerning the Capacity of Inhaled Kaylo Dust to Injure the
Lung," was marked "Confidential," and sent to Owens-Illinois 
on February 7, 1952, along with Vorwald's comments on its 
publication. He promised that neither the company or the
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product would be mentioned by name, and assured review of 
the final manuscript by the company prior to its release for 
publication. The study on Kaylo was finally published in 
September 1955. By that time, Kaylo, and other new asbestos- 
containing products, had been installed in schools and other 
public buildings that had been constructed following World 
War II.[223]
6.3.2.2 Schepers After the study on Kaylo was finally 
published, the company requested an evaluation by the new 
director of the Saranac Laboratories, Dr. G. W. H. Schepers. 
Schepers had been sent to America in 1949 by the South 
African government to apprentice under Lanza. He also spent 
three months at the Saranac Laboratories with its director, 
Dr. Vorwald. During this time, Schepers had the opportunity 
to meet Vandiver Brown, who asked him to delete statements 
that embarrassed Johns-Manville from his reports. In 1954, 
Schepers returned to the United States to succeed Vorwald as 
director of Saranac Laboratories.[224]
Like his predecessor, Schepers did not mention the 
company or the product by name in his article. He noted 
that lesions and fibrosis on the test animals' lungs, as a 
result of inhaling the product, were similar to experimental 
asbestosis, and concluded that "this harmful effect was 
probably caused by the chrysotile asbestos it 
contained."[225] The company's delight with Schepers's
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conclusion was reflected in an intercompany memo dated 
October 5, 1955: Kaylo was "no more harmful than the 
universally used heat insulation - asbestos - in fact 
less so, since Kaylo contains a very small percentage 
of asbestos." [226]
6.3.2.3 The Kaylo Files Files of the Saranac experiments 
were transferred to new owners when Owens-Illinois sold their 
Kaylo line to Owens-Corning in 1958. Upon purchase of the 
plant in Berlin, New Jersey, Owens-Corning became the sole 
manufacturer of Kaylo. Two years earlier, insulators in 
Owens-Corning's employee contract units had begun to file 
worker's compensation claims for disability caused by 
asbestosis. A decade would pass before Owens-Corning began 
issuing warnings in December, 1966 that Kaylo was dangerous 
to inhale.
The Kaylo documents first came to light in 1979 as a 
result of litigation. That spring, the director of the 
Saranac Laboratory was subpoenaed in connection with two 
asbestos cases in Albany, New York. This led to Vorwald's 
medical papers at the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, 
in Washington, D.C., deeded there by his widow following 
his death in 1974. The remaining documents were produced 
by Owens-Corning from the summer of 1979 through the winter 
of 1980. Litigation in that case involved workers at the 
Berlin, New Jersey plant.[227]
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The reference to chrysotile as the specific disease 
causing agent, and the "very small percentage of asbestos" 
contained in a product, would be used by industry to plead 
ignorance about the harmful effects of asbestos in their 
"state-of-the-art" defense. This defense worked as long as 
the industry was able to manipulate the published literature, 
or suppress publication altogether.
6.3.3 Seventh Symposium
The total amount of information suppressed by the industry 
is unknown, but an indication of the extent is evident in 
the case of the Saranac Laboratories. Documents detailing 
the industry's meddling were uncovered during litigation in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. During that time, it was 
discovered that thousands of documents had disappeared.
Among these were some thirteen hundred experimental studies 
of asbestos and other hazardous substances that had been 
conducted at Saranac over a thirty year period.[228]
In addition to the research it conducted, this pre­
eminent institution held a yearly symposium. Vorwald 
organized the Seventh Saranac Symposium. The week long 
conference on pulmonary dust disease was held in September, 
1952. Merewether, Lynch, Lanza, and Philip Drinker were 
among more than two hundred attendees, who heard from some 
of the leaders in the field of asbestos research. Johns- 
Manville, Owens-Illinois, the U.S. Public Health Service, the
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American Cancer Society, the Industrial Hygiene Foundation 
and major insurance companies were also represented. Unlike 
the proceedings of six previous meetings, those of the 
Seventh Symposium were never published, supposedly due to 
lack of funding. Despite the groundbreaking data which was 
presented, none of the participants publicized any of the 
conference's discussions. It would be another twelve years 
before the scope and definitive nature of the Seventh Saranac 
Symposium were duplicated. That event was the 1964 New York 
Academy of Sciences Conference on the Biological Effects of 
Asbestos, organized by Dr. Irving J. Selikoff. Its proceed­
ings were both published, and well publicized. In the 
interim, the number of exposures to asbestos continued to 
increase.
6.4 Dreessen, 1938
The acceptable level of exposure to asbestos dust in industry 
was a guideline adopted by the American Conference of 
Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) in 1946. The 
guideline set the level of exposure at five million particles 
per cubic foot (5 mppcf) of air. The guideline was based on 
a 1938 study sponsored by the Public Health Service.
In 1937, the Public Health Service began a series of 
field investigations in conjunction with various state and 
territorial boards of health. One of the first of these 
investigations was done at the request of North Carolina's
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State Board of Health and its Industrial Commission, which 
administered the state worker's compensation act.[229]
The study team was headed by Dr. Waldemar Dreessen 
of the Public Health Service. The team inspected three 
asbestos textile plants, only one of which existed before 
1920. Fourteen occupational groups containing a total of 541 
workers were examined after their occupational histories were 
obtained. Two hundred of them had previously worked with 
other fibers in cotton and wool textile factories.
Asbestos workers were the youngest group of workers 
examined. Ninety-four percent were under fifty years old, 
with an average age of approximately thirty-two. Eighty 
percent were employed less than ten years, and more than half 
less than five years. Only twenty three had previously worked 
in a dusty trade before working in the asbestos textile 
factories.[230]
The 126 page report of the study was published in 1938, 
as a Public Health Service bulletin. Its findings were 
typical for people working in dusty trades. Almost one- 
quarter of all workers examined showed signs of asbestosis. 
Evidence of the disease increased rapidly as dust exposure 
increased. This duplicated the conclusion reached by Mere- 
wether and Price in their 1930 study in England; i.e., 
workers exposed to higher concentrations of dust had a 
greater chance of becoming ill.
A total of 242 dust counts were made using the 
Greenburg-Smith impinger, the standard sample collection 
instrument for obtaining dust measurements.[231] The 
impinger was a dust trapping device. The particles which 
settled at the bottom of the impinger's collecting cell 
could only be viewed at a magnification of one hundred times 
(100X).[232] The impinger did not differentiate between 
asbestos and any other airborne fibers. Dust concentration 
was measured in millions of particles per cubic foot (mppcf) 
of air.
Dreessen's team noted that concentration and duration 
were dual factors responsible for causing a higher preva­
lence of asbestosis. The team combined these factors to 
describe exposures in "millions-of-particle-years." This 
combined system diluted the importance of the duration 
factor. An exposure of five mppcf for ten years was com­
parable to ten mppcf for five years. Each was equivalent 
to fifty million particle-years.[233]
Using this measurement system, half of the workers with 
more than one hundred million particle-years had asbestosis. 
This figure was extremely low compared to the dust levels 
needed to cause a similar degree of silicosis. Later, it 
was discovered that fifteen months prior to the study, 150 
workers had been discharged and replaced with others who had 
little or no previous exposure to asbestos. Sixty-nine of 
the 150 displaced workers were located and examined. More
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than sixty percent of them showed evidence of asbestosis, 
more than double the rate for those still on the job.
The continuing problem of what to consider as a "safe" 
threshold level of exposure was addressed in the study 
report:
Ideally, a threshold concentration of dust 
should be the highest dust concentration that 
would not produce pneumoconiosis in originally 
healthy workmen during their entire working life. 
The chief difficulty in this study, as in most of 
the earlier studies of the Public Health Service, 
is that very few workmen are exposed for a long 
period of time to low concentrations of asbestos 
dust.[234]
Study results showed that three-guarters of the workers 
in the 50-99 million particle-year category, equivalent to a 
ten to twenty year exposure at five mppcf, had developed 
asbestosis. An earlier study in Pennsylvania also indicated 
that exposures below five mppcf would lead to asbestosis.[235] 
Even though decidedly inadequate for disease prevention, five 
mppcf was tentatively proposed by the Dreessen team "as the 
threshold level for asbestos-dust exposure... for the guidance 
of factory managers and engineers until more complete data 
are available." Below that level symptoms were developing, 
but above that level definite cases of asbestosis had already 
developed.[236]
The rationale for the proposed level was that new 
technology was available and capable of reducing dust 
exposures below five mppcf for the majority of the workers. 
Reducing levels to five mppcf would have been a major 
accomplishment because most levels without dust control 
exceeded fifty mppcf. The team also assumed that the 
explicitly tentative nature of their recommendation would 
prompt further and more extensive investigation on a wider 
scale.[237]
6.5 Drinker, 1946
In 1938, Philip Drinker was asked to establish a health and 
safety program for the Navy's shipyards. By 1941, Harvard' 
School of Public Health began intensive, four-month courses 
to train Naval personnel in occupational medicine and indus 
trial hygiene. By this time, Drinker chaired the Schools' 
Industrial Hygiene Department. He had also maintained a 
friendship with a former school mate, Jim Forrestal, who 
was then Undersecretary of the Navy.
The friendship came in handy when the U.S. Maritime 
Commission and the Navy requested that Drinker conduct a 
survey of health conditions at shipyards. For his staff, 
Drinker selected eight Naval officers who had taken the 
Harvard course, but could not get the Navy to assign them. 
His request was denied until he spoke directly to Forrestal 
and Chester Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet
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The study began in 1942 with an inspection of the 
shipyard at the Bath Irons Works in Maine. Two years later, 
the team returned because of "concern among the pipe covering 
crews that the amosite [asbestos] was causing some respira­
tory troubles." Of the thirty-eight workers X-rayed, twelve 
displayed changes significant enough to prompt further 
investigations.[238 ]
Four more shipyards on the East Coast were selected.
All of them had high labor turnovers, and dust levels that 
greatly exceeded five mppcf. In the dustiest yard, forty- 
eight workers were examined, representing less than ten 
percent of the workforce. Three of the forty-eight had ten 
or more years of exposure. No asbestosis was found. In the 
least dusty yard, all of the workers were examined. Nine of 
the 168 workers had ten or more years of exposure. Two cases 
of asbestosis were found among the nine. Of the total of 
1,074 men examined, three cases of asbestosis were found 
among the group of fifty-one workers who had ten or more 
years of exposure.
Though well aware of the hazards from his work at 
Harvard and previously documented studies, Drinker emphasized 
the more positive aspects of the survey. The results were 
published in 1946, in The Journal of Industrial Hygiene and 
Toxicology, a periodical edited by Drinker.[239]
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6.6 Summary
Like others before them, Dreessen and his team assumed that 
additional research would be conducted. Exposures, although 
high in dosage, were still largely confined to factory 
settings. Dusty environments were common in the workplace, 
but people working with asbestos were obviously at greater 
risk. Unfortunately, in addition to the subterfuge practiced 
by the industry and their insurers, one national crisis after 
another served to forestall sustained, impartial, or 
comprehensive efforts to answer the questions being raised 
about asbestos-related diseases.
Despite sporadic medical reports, asbestos-related 
diseases had not yet occurred in any great numbers. The 
definitive medical evidence that did exist was overshadowed, 
or ignored altogether. Failure to comprehend the latency 
period characteristic of asbestos-related diseases served to 
increase the numbers of people who were eventually exposed.
In the public domain, the reality of the hazard lay 
dormant. McCulloch notes that "the lapse in time between 
Merewether and Doll's publications was the period during 
which the industry expanded most rapidly in Britain and in 
North America."[240] The industry, and the number of 
asbestos-containing products it produced, continued to grow 




7.1 Between Two Wars 
The asbestos industry began a long-term expansion after 
World War I. [241] From 1925 on, thousands of new uses 
were developed, and annual sales swelled from millions 
to billions of dollars over the next half century.[242] 
Asbestos made the leap from factories and workplaces to 
the public domain in the mid-1930s, when widespread use 
began in homes, schools, office buildings, and other public 
facilities.[243] A new process for spraying asbestos- 
containing material widened the uses of, and exposures 
to, asbestos-containing materials.[244]
There were no enforceable regulations regarding worker 
safety or workplace conditions, but the first official fed­
eral dust standard was published by the government in the 
"Basic Safety and Health Requirements for Establishments 
Subject to Walsh-Healy Public Contracts Act". The Walsh- 
Healy Act of June 30, 1936, applied only to government 
contracts. It required companies contracting with the 
government to insure that no hazardous health conditions 
existed in the plants in which their goods were produced. 
There was no authority to compel compliance. The only way 
to enforce the Act was to deny or withhold a contract from 
the offending company, which proved to be impractical at
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the time. The country was gearing up for World War II.
Large scale naval construction was already underway, and 
total focus was on the war effort.[245]
By 1942, the first asbestos litigation crisis 
had disappeared.[246] Compensation laws in many states 
had already been amended to prevent workers with asbestosis 
from suing their employers under common law. Asbestos 
manufacturers and their insurers continued to settle dozens 
of worker's compensation claims for several thousands dollars 
apiece.
The upward trend in asbestos use, which began in the 
1930s, expanded after World War II, and continued to the 
1980s. During this fifty year period, asbestos came to be 
known as the "miracle" fiber or the "magic" mineral. The 
many cases of asbestos-related disease that began to appear 
in the 1960s actually got their start during World War II.
It was at that time that hundreds of thousands of people 
were employed to carry out the massive build-up for the war 
effort, especially in the nation's shipyards.[247]
7.2 World War II
The Navy and Maritime Commission issued minimum safety and 
industrial health reguirements based on Drinker's work, and 
on surveys conducted by other health and safety consultants 
[248] but there were no changes in work practices.[249]
Twenty years passed before further studies of asbestos
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exposure in shipyards were conducted. "Neither the Navy 
nor the Maritime Commission was aware of asbestos-related 
illness in shipyard employees until December of 1944," was 
the government's response to a lawsuit filed against them 
almost fifty years later by Johns-Manville.[250]
7.2.1 Restrictions on Asbestos
The United States was the largest consumer of the world's 
raw asbestos supply, but produced less than eight percent 
of all grades, and only two percent of strategic grades, 
domestically. In June 1940, government officials met with 
asbestos importers and manufacturers to help formulate the 
National Defense Commission's strategy to "insure production 
and importation of adequate supplies..." of certain grades 
and types of asbestos. These were strategic materials 
considered vital to the success of the war effort.[251]
The Office of Production Management issued the first 
in a series of restrictive orders on January 20, 1942. 
Conservation Order M-79 "was issued to effect conservation 
of the asbestos supply and restrict the usage of African 
fibers." Amosite was only available from South Africa and 
Southern Rhodesia. There is no record of its being imported 
before 1930.[252] Imports of amosite increased from 500 tons 
in 1935, to 4,500 tons in 1945. Order M-79 was revoked on 
August 20, 1945. By the end of that month, all restrictive 
orders on the asbestos industry were lifted.
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7.2.2 Repercussions
In 1983, Manville filed suit against the federal government 
for harming the health of shipyard workers by exposing them 
to asbestos products during the war. Manville claimed that 
the government took control over every aspect of asbestos 
fiber, including expanding mining and manufacturing facil­
ities, purchasing, stockpiling, allocation, processing, 
exporting, and importing. The suit also cited the change to 
a less dense variety of asbestos which broke up (fiberized) 
more easily.[253] This referred to the particular character­
istic which makes some types of asbestos more suitable than 
others for certain uses. The lighter weight of amosite, and 
its superior heat and acid resistance, had been utilized to 
meet the requirements for lighter naval vessels.
The aerodynamic quality typical of all asbestos fibers 
is more pronounced with amosite. Resistance to wetting makes 
its fibers more readily airborne for longer periods of time, 
with greater potential for contaminating adjacent spaces.[254] 
Becklake notes that differences in the physical properties 
of the various types of asbestos fibers may account for 
differences in the health effects of exposure.[255]
7.3 Beyond the Shipyards
Those who worked in factories supplying the naval yards 
were also at risk. The Union Asbestos & Rubber Company of 
Chicago (UNARCO) established a plant in Paterson, New Jersey
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to supply amosite insulation for the pipes, boilers, and 
turbines on navy and cargo vessels.
Between 1941 and 1954, a total of 1664 workers were 
employed at the facility. Twenty years later, workers from 
this plant were being referred to a medical clinic in 
Paterson, founded in 1953 by Dr. Irving J. Selikoff,[256] 
a native of Paterson. By 1990, two-thirds of the workers 
had died, 554 of them from cancer.[257]
7.3.1 The Trail to Tyler, Texas
UNARCO closed the Paterson plant in 1954, and established 
a similar operation in Tyler, Texas. In 1962, UNARCO sold 
the Tyler operation to Pittsburgh Corning, and got out of 
the asbestos business completely. Twenty years later, UNARCO 
went bankrupt due to the mounting asbestos lawsuits filed 
against the company.[258]
Pittsburgh Corning was a joint venture between Corning 
Glass Works and Pittsburgh Plate Glass (PPG Industries).
Over a period of six and a half years, Owens-Corning 
conducted five surveys on health conditions at the Tyler 
plant. On February 3, 1972, two months before a compliance 
deadline imposed after an OSHA inspection in October, 1971, 
the board of directors chose to shut down the Tyler plant.
7.3.2 Repercussions
Yandle vs. PPG Industries was the class action suit filed 
on behalf of former workers at the Tyler plant. It was the
first case to involve the federal government directly in a 
major asbestos health claim. The suit was filed on January 
2, 1974, in first district court in Tyler, by Frederick 
Baron. Baron used the strategy developed by Ward Stevenson 
in Borel vs. Fibreboard. Yandle vs. PPG Industries was 
settled in secret in September, 1977, when the defendants 
agreed to pay twenty million dollars (Oil, Chemical and 
Atomic Workers International Union - $1 million; PPG and 
Pittsburgh Corning - $8.05 million; Cape Industries - $5.2 
million; and the US government - $5.75 milion) to 445 former 
employees represented in the case. No money was disbursed 
until the following spring because of the government's 
reluctance to pay its $5,750,000 share of the settlement.
7.4 A Period of Peak Exposures
Exposures to asbestos in the shipyards reached their peak 
during the war years. "The use of asbestos insulation in 
'Liberty Ships' during World War II has proven to be the most 
fertile source of asbestos-related cancer."[259] The number 
of shipyard workers increased from 177,300 in 1940, to 1.89 
million in 1944.[260] Selikoff estimated that 4,325,000 
workers were employed in the nation's shipyards between 1940 
and 1945.[261] Some thirty years later, that period of naval 
construction would represent half of the asbestos-related 
health claims in litigation.[262]
CHAPTER 8
EXPANDED USE OF ASBESTOS
8.1 Post-World War II Construction Boom
On Tuesday, August 14, 1945, President Truman announced 
the unconditional surrender of the Japanese government.
World War II was suddenly over, along with the contracts 
that had been anticipated from a lengthier war. Inflation 
and union strikes took over in the post-war period. When 
the dust settled, many Americans had a higher material 
standard of living. Pent up demand from the war years 
produced an unprecedented boom in building construction.
From 1940 to 1950, the demand for asbestos increased 
by two hundred percent.[263] Half of that increase occurred 
in the five years following the end of World War II. The 
use of asbestos insulation for fireproofing accounted for 
a major portion of that increase.
8.2 New Products and Uses for Asbestos 
The four major uses of asbestos in insulation products were 
fireproofing, thermal insulation, acoustical and decorative 
uses, and condensation control. The products, manufactured 
for a variety of applications, came in many forms. The pro­
portion of asbestos fibers, other fibers, binders, adhesives, 
and agents contained in insulation products varies according 
to end use. Thermal insulation for turbines contains almost
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all amosite or crocidolite asbestos, or a combination of 
both. Materials used for decorative or acoustical purposes 
may contain little or no asbestos. Material used for fire­
proofing may contain from five to thirty percent asbestos 
fibers.
The focus for marketing asbestos products was switching 
from insulation to fireproofing. New asbestos-containing 
products developed during this period included theatre and 
welding curtains, high temperature corrugated paper, cold- 
applied adhesives, joint compound, spackles, air tight paints 
and coatings, and cementitious products such as siding 
panels, roof tiles, and pipe. Vinyl asbestos floor tile 
and sheeting was introduced in 1950.[264]
Products containing amosite or chrysotile asbestos, 
or a combination, were marketed aggressively, and used 
extensively in the construction industry.[266] Following 
World War II, all state building codes specified asbestos 
insulation as the material of choice for fire retarda­
tion. [266] A method for applying asbestos insulation in a 
spray-on form made it the premier fire-proofing material.
"By the late 1950s, the major American producers of asbestos- 
containing construction products were positioned to market 
their products as school construction took off as a result 
of the "baby boom."[267]
8.3 Spray-On Asbestos
8.3.1 The Process
Dry materials are prepared for spray application by either 
the wet or the dry method. In the dry method, the dry 
material is dumped into a hopper, mixed, and blown into a 
hose, which conveys it to the mixing nozzle. The operator 
can control the mix of air, material, and water by adjusting 
valves located at the mixing nozzle. In the wet method, the 
dry material is premixed with water in a hopper and is then 
pumped through a hose. By either method, a slurry results 
which can be sprayed or troweled onto the surface to be 
coated. After being applied, the material can be shaped. 
After it dries, the material is inherently friable.
8.3.2 Development in England
Soon after the British government adopted measures for dust 
suppression based on Merewether's 1930 study, a method for 
applying insulation by spraying it onto surfaces was devel­
oped in England. Speights and Runyan credit the Turner & 
Newall Company with developing 'Limpet7, the first spray- 
applied asbestos-containing product, in 1931.[268] Limpit 
was apparently both a process and a product name. Reitze 
credits N.L.Dolbey, Director of Research for the J. W. 
Roberts Company, with developing a sprayed inorganic fiber 
insula- tion with the Limpet process, which the company 
introduced in 1932.[269] The daily press carried
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illustrations of an experiment to reduce noise in the London 
subway system by coating the tunnel walls with asbestos. The 
Lancet warned about the foreseeable consequences of such an 
experiment in its February 20, 1932, issue:
In view of the fact that the dust 
particle producing the lesion in the 
lung has a diameter of only 2u to lOu, 
it is obvious that the dust must be 
suppressed at its source; the use of 
respirators is futile; ...
Experience in asbestos factories would 
indicate that, should the experiment of 
the London tube railways lead to an exten­
sive use of this method for deadening 
noise in all the underground railways 
of London, then a large increase in 
industrial pulmonary asbestosis may be 
expected in years to come.[270]
8.3.3 Use in the United States
The spray process was first used in the United States in 
1935 to apply decorative finishes to ceilings and walls in 
nightclubs, restaurants, and hotels. In 1950, the National 
Gypsum Company had its brand of spray insulation approved 
as a fireproofing material by Underwriters Laboratories. 
Underwriters Laboratories also approved an inorganic fibre 
blend developed by the Asbestospray Company in 1951.[271]
8.3.3.1 High Rise Building Construction Spray-on asbestos 
insulation was particularly useful in the construction of 
steel framed buildings. Previously, structural steel was 
encased in concrete to prevent buckling and subsequent 
failure resulting from the high temperatures during a fire, 
but steel roof decks were left exposed. Spray-on asbestos 
insulation provided adequate fire protection, reduced the 
weight load on steel building components considerably, and 
lowered installation costs. Where condensation was a 
problem, the wicking action of asbestos fibers drew moisture 
away from inner insulation materials, preventing extensive 
corrosion of the structural steel.[272]
The first large high-rise project to use spray-on 
fireproofing was the Chase Manhattan Bank headquarters 
building, constructed in New York City, in 1958. This sixty 
story building used 1,500,000 square feet of sprayed fire­
proofing product. By the early 1960s, spray-on fireproofing 
cost just twenty-five cents per square foot. A thirty story 
building might use two hundred tons. An estimated forty 
thousand tons was used in 1968 by the construction industry 
for fireproofing alone, exclusive of thermal, acoustical, or 
condensation control uses.[273] In 1970, seventy percent of 
the world's asbestos supply was reportedly used for products 
used by the construction industry.[274]
By 1970, more than half of all large, multi-story 
buildings being constructed around the country were being 
sprayed with fireproofing products. In New York City, six
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to eight buildings over thirty stories tall were being 
sprayed on any given day. Five thousand tons was used 
for fireproofing in the 110 story twin towers of the World 
Trade Center. Only non-asbestos-containing spray materials 
were used above the fortieth floor, due to a change in city 
regulations.[275]
8.3.3.2 New York Responds In April 1970, New York City 
became the first governmental agency to address the occupa­
tional hazards associated with sprayed asbestos insulation. 
The city issued its Sprayed Insulation Regulations, seeking 
to control or minimize the hazards by engineering methods and 
industry procedures, as an alternative to an outright ban on 
the practice. The city's Department of Air Resources was in 
charge of the program. Less than two years later, citing an 
inability to ensure compliance or control of environmental 
hazards, the New York City Council banned all spraying of 
asbestos as of February 15, 1972.
In 1991, the New York State Supreme Court ruled to 
allow tax abatements for liabilities incurred due to ACM in 
buildings. Chase Manhattan received a $24 million refund for 
fiscal years 1984-1990, for its headquarters building at One 
New York Plaza.[276] In 1994, adding a new wrinkle to the 
health-related damage suits that were piling up, Chase sued 
Turner & Newell, claiming losses of $185 million in property 
damage caused by the use of their product in the construction 
of the bank building.[277]
CHAPTER 9
THE ROAD TO REGULATION
9.1 Introduction
Selikoff's work at the Paterson, New Jersey clinic, which 
he opened in 1953, sparked his interest in asbestos-related 
diseases. At the time, he was an epidemiologist at the Mount 
Sinai Hospital in New York, specializing in the detection by 
X-ray of lung dysfunction. Among his first patients were 
seventeen men from the UNARCO plant who had been referred by 
a local attorney. All of these men were still working, and 
appeared to be in good health, but fifteen showed signs of 
pulmonary defects from the inhalation of asbestos fibers.
By 1961, four of them had died.[278]
By 1961, nearly half of all insulation workers were 
dying from occupational cancer and asbestosis, even though 
their average exposure was comparable to the exposure level 
recommended by the ACGIH in 1946.[279]
9.2 Selikoff, 1964 
Selikoff sought support for a study of the Paterson plant 
from UNARCO, and from the US Public Health Service, but was 
denied. In 1962, he established a working relationship with 
two locals of the International Association of Heat and Frost 




The International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators 
and Asbestos Workers (IAHFIAW) represents insulation workers 
in the construction trade, and also employed in refineries, 
industrial plants, shipyards, and powerhouse construction and 
repair. The IAHFIAW was charted by the American Federation 
of Labor in 1910 to represent independent locals throughout 
the country, and the Salamanders Association of New York.
The Salamanders was the first union of insulation 
workers in the United States. It started in New York City 
in 1884 as the Salamander Association of Boiler and Pipe 
Felters. Local 12 in New York City is directly descended 
from the Salamanders, and Local 32 is an affiliate located in 
Newark, New Jersey.[280] Detailed records kept by the union 
dated from 1914.
9.2.2 The 1964 Studies
With the cooperation of the locals, and his associates at 
the Mount Sinai Hospital, Selikoff, along with Dr. Jacob 
Churg, Chief Pathologist at Barnert Memorial Hospital, in 
Paterson, New Jersey, and Dr. E. Cuyler Hammond, Vice- 
President for Epidemiology and Statistics of the American 
Cancer Society, began the first comprehensive studies of the 
effects of asbestos exposure among insulation workers, using 
data independent of the asbestos industry.[281]
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Preliminary research confirmed that the asbestos 
content of the products used by the insulation workers had 
remained fairly consistent over the years. Magnesia block, 
the most commonly used product, contained approximately 
fifteen per cent asbestos. Cement products contained from 
fifteen to twenty percent asbestos. The appearance and 
increased use of amosite in insulation for shipbuilding, 
beginning in 1934, was also noted.
Several stages of disease manifestation were investi­
gated using the extensive database compiled in cooperation 
with the IAHFIAW and its members. Insulation workers not 
included in the study were those working in other trades or 
other unions, spray-insulation workers, nonunion workers, 
and some maintenance workers.
In 1963, the IAHFIAW rolls contained 14,803 members.
Of this number, 1,258 were counted in the New York-New Jersey 
locals. In addition, 264 men had died from January 1, 1943 
to December 31, 1962. The cohort consisted of the latter two 
groups, a total of 1522 cases. The studies began on January 
1, 1963.
9.2.2.1 The Twenty Year Latency Period Previous reports 
mentioned the appearance of neoplasia associated with asbes- 
tosis that seemed only to occur after twenty years from onset 
of exposure. This question was addressed by a separate study 
on the mortality of asbestos workers with twenty or more
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years of exposure. The cohort was a sub-group of 632 workers 
who were members of either of the locals as of Dec 31, 1942. 
339 of these men had been exposed to asbestos dust prior to 
1924, and had twenty years of exposure as of 1943. The 
others were counted in the study as they reached the twenty 
year exposure mark, which was before 1962. Those who died 
before the twenty year exposure mark were not counted. A 
total of 8,737.5 man-years of exposure histories of twenty 
years or longer were compiled.[282]
Using five year time periods, the death rate among the 
asbestos workers was compared to the average age-specific 
death rate of the US white male population. In the first 
period, the rate among asbestos workers was substantially 
lower, but was slightly higher in the second period. In the 
third period, from 1953 to 1957, 85 deaths occurred compared 
to 56.6 expected. From 1958 to 1962, 88 deaths occurred 
compared to 54.4 expected.[283] Excluding seven men who 
died before the twenty-year-exposure mark, 255 of the 632 
asbestos workers died before Jan. 1, 1963. This was twenty- 
six percent in excess of the 201.5 deaths that would have 
been expected.[284]
Death from cancer of the lung or pleura was far higher 
than expected in each of the five year periods. Forty-five 
of the 632 workers died from cancer of these sites, when only 
6.6 such deaths were expected. The three deaths listed as 
neoplasms of the pleura were all mesotheliomas. This one
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percent incidence was considered extremely high for such a 
rare tumor. The other 42 deaths were from bronchogenic 
carcinomas. Cancers of the stomach, colon, and rectum were 
three times more frequent than expected. Cancer from all 
other sites was consistent with the expected rates.[285]
The question of environmental exposure was briefly 
discussed, with particular concern for other tradespeople 
on job sites where asbestos was used. Because the "floating 
fibers do not respect job classifications," these workers 
were subject to passive, or second hand, rather than direct 
exposure. The mortality study on asbestos exposure and 
neoplasia was published in the Journal of the American 
Medical Association in April, 1964.
9.2.2.2 Asbestosis The study of asbestosis among insula­
tion workers included all 1522 members on the roster of the 
New York-New Jersey locals from January 1, 1943 through 
December 31, 1962. 264 members had died. Of 1258 living
members, 1086 were still working in the trade, 63 had 
retired, and 34 were not working due to illness. The 
remaining 75 had left the union and were no longer employed 
as insulation workers. Union records, which were compiled 
on a weekly basis, detailed the work history of each member. 
These were used to fill in information on workers who were 
not examined, and supplement the occupational histories 
obtained from those who were. Death certificates were used 
to obtain and analyze hospital and autopsy records for the 
264 members who had died.[286]
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From the examinations and records, such details as: 
onset and lapses of employment, protection measures used, 
materials handled, occupational settings, and smoking habits 
were established. Reasons for inactivity or leaving the 
trade were ascertained. All physical examinations included 
X-rays, measures of vital lung capacity, and fluid samples. 
Many of the examinations were even more detailed.
Radiological change was the sole criteria used to 
establish evidence of pulmonary asbestosis in those who 
were examined. Examination was voluntary and 1117 members 
participated. This included 984 of the 1806 active working 
members, 50 retired members, 28 who were ill, and 55 who had 
left for other employment.[287] Evidence of pulmonary 
asbestosis was present in half of this group. The extent of 
fibrosis varied directly with the duration of exposure.[288] 
Time from onset of exposure to time of examination of 
the 1117 workers was divided into ten year periods. Only 36 
(10 percent) of the 346 workers with less than ten years 
showed some sign of radiological abnormality. For workers 
with exposures from ten to nineteen years, 167 of 379 (44 
percent) showed some abnormality, nine of which were greater 
than minimal. Pleural fibrosis was present in 35, and 5 
showed evidence of calcification.[289]
The majority of the 392 workers with more than twenty 
years showed evidence of pulmonary asbestosis. This group 
included the majority of older members who had retired, or 
were ill. Of this group, 56 of the 77 (72 percent) with
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twenty to twenty-nine years had abnormal films. This 
increased to almost ninety percent for 194 workers with 
thirty to thirty-nine years, and to ninety-five percent 
for those with over forty years. The extent and severity 
of asbestosis increased with the time from onset of 
exposure.[290]
9.2.3 Study Results
Dyspnea, or shortness of breath, is the physical complaint 
most often associated with asbestosis. The study found that 
dyspnea on exertion rarely correlated with X-ray evidence of 
fibrosis.[291] Only twenty-five percent of ninety-nine cases 
with twenty or more years of exposure, in which moderate or 
severe dyspnea was present, had X-rays showing moderate or 
extensive parenchymal fibrosis. "Thus significant disability 
may be present with relatively little to be seen on X-ray 
and, conversely, X-ray changes may be extensive with little 
functional difficulty."[292]
Particular attention was paid to the known increased 
risk of lung cancer among asbestos workers. Seven cases 
(0.7%) were found among 984 of the 1086 members who were 
still active in the trade. Among the 172 who were no longer 
active, 133 were examined and four cases (3%) of lung cancer 
were found. These cancers occurred in the 392 members with 
more than twenty years of exposure. None was found in those 
with less than twenty years exposure prior to examination.
In 307 consecutive deaths examined in the cohort, lung cancer
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was found to be seven times greater than expected, and cancer 
of the gastrointestinal tract was three times as common. Ten 
cases of mesothelioma of the pleura or peritoneum were found.
The difficulty of comparison with earlier studies was 
cited, noting the conditions under which some of these took 
place, the skewed populations involved, and the lack of 
prolonged exposures. Of particular interest is mention of a 
report by Fleischer et al. in 1945. It is cited as "the only 
large scale survey of asbestos insulation workers undertaken 
...in the US." The men were examined while at work, and only 
51 of the 1074 examined had more than ten years of work 
experience. Only three cases of asbestosis were found, and 
the study concluded that 'asbestos pipe covering of naval 
vessels is a relatively safe operation.'
The study by Selikoff et al. concluded that pulmonary 
asbestosis, and the complications of lung cancer and meso­
thelioma associated with it, were significant hazards among 
insulation workers exposed to asbestos, particularly for 
those with more than twenty years from onset of exposure. 
Results of the study were presented at the New York Academy 
of Science's International Conference on the Biological 
Effects of Asbestos, held at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in 
October 1964 in New York City.[293]
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9.3 The State of Awareness
9.3.1 The Medical Literature
From 1930 to 1960, industry executives had conspired to 
suppress damaging information about the health effects of 
asbestos exposure, by either editing the results to appear 
more favorable, or not allowing publication, of at least nine 
statistical health studies performed on humans or animals. 
Independent studies in the 1930s and 1940s linked asbestos 
exposure to pulmonary disease, lung cancer, and mesothelioma 
tumors.[294] These were mainly occupational diseases, but 
the possibility of environmental or community exposures had 
been suggested. By the 1950s and 1960s, public health 
officials and scientists were paying more attention to the 
ill health effects attributed to asbestos exposure.
By 1960, sixty-three papers on the problems of asbestos 
exposure had been published in the United States, England, 
and Canada. The papers sponsored by industry downplayed 
asbestosis and dismissed any connection between lung cancer 
and asbestos exposure. The other fifty-two papers, published 
independently of the industry, concluded the opposite - that 
asbestos exposure was a dangerous source of asbestosis and 
lung cancer.[295] After 1960, the industry sponsored the 
publication of three times as many studies as it had in the 
preceding thirty years, and spent more than thirty times as 
much on research as any government agency.[296] By the end 
of 1964, more than seven hundred medical articles worldwide 
detailed the hazards of asbestos exposure.[297]
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9.3.2 New York Academy of Science Conference, 1964 
"The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Insulation Workers in 
the United States" appeared in the Annals of the New York 
Academy of Science on December 31, 1965, which published 
the proceedings of the 1964 conference. The study was used 
by attorney Ward Stevenson, whose precedent setting strategy 
of suing asbestos manufacturers under product liability law 
successfully breached the industry's "state-of-the-art 
defense".[298] The decision rendered by the court in the 
case of Borel vs. Fibreboard Paper Products "triggered the 
greatest avalanche of toxic-tort litigation in the history 
of American jurisprudence."[299]
The extensive scope, objectivity, and thoroughness 
of the database and methodology of the 1964 study presented 
conclusive evidence of definite hazards resulting from 
asbestos exposure.[300] At the time, less than half of 
the state governments had enacted regulations pertaining to 
asbestos exposure. Most of these only addressed asbestosis, 
and all of them were based on less than reliable data.[301] 
Unions led the drive to channel funding to Mount Sinai for 
further research and education efforts. By the end of 1964, 
unions were pressing for federal government intervention.
The 1964 New York Academy of Science conference, and 
the publication of its proceeding had opened the passage to 
public debate on the use of asbestos, asbestos exposure and 
its ramifications. The reality of decades of asbestos 
exposure was well known, but the twenty year latency period,
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and long term hazards of exposure had not been so apparent. 
The 1964 studies confirmed the possibility that millions of 
workers exposed during the war years were currently at risk. 
It was also apparent that the five mppcf exposure limit value 
adopted by the ACGIH did not provide an adequate level of 
protection. The TLV for asbestos and how it was set were 
major topics of discussion at the 1964 conference.
9.4 The ACGIH
9.4.1 Formation
TLVs were the brainchild of the American Conference of 
Governmental Industrial Hygienists. Despite its name, the 
ACGIH is a voluntary organization with no formal ties to 
the federal government. It was an outgrowth of training 
seminars funded by the 1936 Social Security Act. For 
the first time, states received money for public health 
activities, including education and training. The focus 
was on industrial hygiene, and the Public Health Service 
worked with the Conference of State and Provincial Health 
Authorities of North America to establish active industrial 
hygiene units in state and local health departments.[302]
The American Industrial Hygiene Association was the 
dominant group representing industrial hygienists. Most 
of its membership worked in private industries which held 
large contracts from the federal government. The AIHA had 
industry support and was viewed as "industry-friendly," 
whereas, the ACGIH saw itself as "worker-friendly". The
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groundwork for its formation was laid after the second series 
of training seminars in the summer of 1937. By 1938, the 
Public Health Service had organized industrial hygiene units 
in twenty-eight states. The ACGIH held its first convention 
apart from the AIHA in June, 1938, and continued to do so 
until 1943.[303]
The reason for forming the ACGIH was that a non­
governmental organization would have more flexibility in 
responding to issues when the Public Health Service could 
not. The model for the ACGIH was the Conference of State 
Sanitary Engineers. This private group met annually with 
the Public Health Service's Division of Sanitary Engineering 
to discuss policy and training matters.[304] The purpose of 
the ACGIH was to:
promote industrial hygiene in all its aspects 
and phases; to coordinate industrial hygiene 
activities...by official federal, State, local 
and territorial industrial hygiene agencies? to 
encourage the interchange of experience among 
industrial hygiene personnel in such official 
organizations; to collect and make accessible 
to all governmental industrial hygienists such 
information and data as may be of assistance to 
them in the proper fulfillment of their 
duties.[305]
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9.4.2 The 1946 Guideline
The ACGIH adopted a strategy to maximize the impact of the 
new group's national standing and impact. To that end, 
standing committees were formed to recommend guidelines for 
levels of hazardous agents in the workplace.[306] These 
guidelines were called Maximum Allowable Concentrations 
(MACs).
The purpose of the MAC list was to define acceptable 
limits for exposures to ambient concentrations of substances 
used in the workplace, as a guide for industrial hygienists.
A MAC value was based on an average concentration over an 
eight hour day, called a time-weighted average (TWA). The 
MAC value was not a maximum concentration. During an eight 
hour period, the value could be exceeded, as long as lower 
values occurred to balance the exposure to an average con­
centration that did not exceed the MAC.[307] The MAC list 
included some materials that were known or suspected human 
carcinogens. This information was not specified, and did 
not appear to be the basis for including such materials on 
the list.[308]
The ACGIH established a formal Committee on Threshold 
Limit Values (TLVs) in 1941. Its members included William 
G. Fredrick, Bureau of Industrial Hygiene for Detroit, as 
chair; Leonard Greenburg, co-inventor of the Greenburg-Smith 
impinger; and Philip Drinker of Harvard.[309] The TLV 
Committee began publishing an annual report in 1946, the same 
year in which asbestos was approved as an addition to their
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MAC list. The guideline adopted for asbestos was based 
on the tentative recommendation of the 1938 Public Health 
Service study conducted by Dreessen, et al. It was not 
based on engineering solutions or modified work practices, 
but on a numerical limit. The limit applied only to asbes­
tosis, based on a total average dust count of five mppcf, 
over an eight hour period. The 1938 study had already 
documented that workers exposed at the five mppcf level 
were developing asbestosis. The limitations of the study 
were thus incorporated, when the ACGIH adopted five mppcf 
as the allowable exposure limit for asbestos in 1946.
9.4.2.1 The 1947 Hemeon Report New Jersey adopted the 
ACGIH guideline as a workplace standard in 1946, and also 
considered restricting its industrial hygiene code to apply 
only to long fibers. Gardner, in his industry funded 
research at Saranac Labs, had already produced asbestosis 
in guinea pigs breathing ball milled asbestos. The total 
concentration of asbestos dust was 138 mppcf, but only 0.8 
mppcf of the fibers were longer than ten microns. Shorter 
asbestos fibers had produced lung damage in rabbits in a 
study by King in England, which also found interstitial 
fibrosis produced by asbestos fibers as short as 2.5 microns. 
Despite the insistence of Johns-Manvilie's counsel Vandiver 
Brown, Gardner refused to endorse the New Jersey proposal 
by testifying that short fibers were harmless.[310]
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The strongest criticism of the five mppcf guideline 
came in a 1947 report by the Industrial Hygiene Foundation 
of America (IHF). The IHF evolved from the Air Hygiene 
Foundation (AHF), a research laboratory begun in 1935 by 
the Mellon Institute. The AHF had been formed, at the 
request of industry, in response to the silicosis problem 
prompted by the Gauley Bridge Tunnel disaster.[311 ]
The year it was formed, Brown wrote to the industry 
trade magazine Asbestos, praising the new foundation for 
"approaching various problems relating to air hygiene from 
an unbiased viewpoint". He also noted that it was "never­
theless the creature of industry and is the one institution 
upon which employers can rely completely for a sympathetic 
appreciation of their viewpoint." Brown urged the co-oper­
ation and "unqualified support of all members of industries 
faced with a dust disease hazard."[312] Asbestos companies 
supporting the AHF formed a group named the Asbestos Textile 
Institute (ATI). Their purpose was to exchange information 
on, and promote the use of successful methods of dust control, 
among themselves. In 1941, the Air Hygiene Foundation became 
the Industrial Hygiene Foundation.
In 1947, the ATI requested an evaluation by the IHF to 
define the nature and magnitude of the asbestosis problem. A 
preliminary investigation was conducted that spring by Dr. W. 
C. L. Hemeon, and Dr. Richard Walmer, medical director and 
chief engineer, respectively, for the foundation. They took 
dust surveys, and evaluated medical studies in ten asbestos
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textile plants owned by ATI member companies. Only five of 
the ten plants had programs for taking chest X-rays. In two 
of those plants, the Raybestos-Manhattan factory in Manheim, 
Pennsylvania, and the Johns-Manville plant in Manville, New 
Jersey, about twenty percent of the workers had developed 
asbestosis. The average total dust level for the Raybestos- 
Manhattan plant was only two mppcf.[313]
Hemeon concluded that "the information available does 
not permit complete assurance that five million [ppcf] is 
thoroughly safe nor has information been developed permit­
ting a better estimate of safe dustiness." He urged the ATI 
to find a method for "accurately measuring any remaining 
hazards in the dust zone below five million [ppcf] for the 
elimination of future asbestosis depends on the degree of 
control effected now." He also recommended that further 
studies be done at ATI companies in North Carolina, where 
annual X-rays of textile workers were required by state law, 
especially "in one or two plants with a long history of high 
order of dust control...".[314]
The 1947 report was never published, and none of the 
further studies that Hemeon suggested were done.[315] The 
1947 report was uncovered by plaintiff attorneys thirty 
years later, and subsequently publicized during the trial 
of Bob Alan Speake vs. Johns-Manville Corp. et al.r316]
As a tribute to the ACGIH's initial strategy to gain 
national impact and influence for its work, the five mppcf 
guideline stood firm as the only available industry standard
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for asbestos, despite continued criticism of its inadequa­
cies. Hemeon felt that the five mppcf limit was too high. 
Brown questioned whether it should exist at all. At the 
Sixth Saranac Symposium on Dust Diseases, organized by 
Gardner's successor Vorwald, Brown presented a speech on 
"Management's Viewpoint" in which he addressed the ACGIH 
guideline that New Jersey had recently adopted. Brown used 
Hemeon's report to support his own argument that "no one can 
state with certainty what is the maximum allowable limit for 
asbestos dust." He stated with assurance that "no study 
has been made specifically directed toward ascertaining this 
figure and I question there exists sufficient data correla­
ting the disease to the degree of exposure to warrant any 
determination that will even approximate accuracy."[317]
9.4.2.2 Modifications Proposed Vorwald, a member of the 
TLV Committee in 1952, tried to incorporate some aspects of 
Gardner's earlier Saranac study into the standard. Vorwald 
proposed a companion limit of one mppcf for fibers longer 
than ten microns in length. The proposal was not adopted by 
the ACGIH, but it was considered by Johns-Manville.
In 1954, Johns-Manvilie's safety executive directed a 
change in the company's internal reporting of MAC values.
The five mppcf standard would still be used for total 
airborne dust, but fibers longer than ten microns would be 
reported in fibers, rather than particles, per cubic foot.
The change was an attempt to measure long asbestos fibers
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more accurately because they were thought to be the most 
hazardous airborne contaminants. Johns-Manville decided on 
the change despite the difficulty of reconciling and then 
applying to humans, the contradictory conclusions from two 
studies that involved different animals (guinea pigs and 
rabbits).
Another attempt to modify the ACGIH standard was made by 
toxicologist Herbert Stokinger of the Public Health Service.
In 1955, after Doll's study confirming the link between cancer 
and asbestos exposure, Stokinger spoke at a "Symposium of 
Threshold Limits" held jointly by the ACGIH and the American 
Industrial Hygiene Association. Even though he was skeptical 
about the carcinogenicity of asbestos, Stokinger proposed a 
safety factor of from one hundred to five hundred for 
industrial carcinogens. Stokinger was a member of the TLV 
Committee for the next twenty years, but his proposal was 
never implemented.[318] The addition of asbestos to the 
MAC list in 1946 had been followed by arsenic in 1947 and 
chromates in 1950. Nickel carbonyl was added in 1955, at 
the time of Stokinger's presentation at the symposium.[319]
The substances were finally identified as carcinogens in the 
ACGIH's "Documentation of the TLV Values" for 1966, but no 
limits were recommended for them.[320]
Dr. Paul Gross became a member of the TLV Committee in 
1965, primarily to address the setting of limit values for 
mineral dusts including asbestos. Gross was a pathologist 
with the Mellon Institute. He started there in 1954 and over
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a six year period, had examined various lung samples sent 
from Johns-Manville. Cancer was present with asbestosis in 
most of these lung samples, leading Gross to the belief that 
asbestos was carcinogenic. He was the principal handler of 
the asbestos standard for the TLV Committee until 1983.[321] 
In 1968, the ACGIH issued a "Notice of Intent" inviting 
comment from "industry-connected individuals principally, but 
others also," on proposed changes to the 1967 TLV list.[322] 
The proposal for asbestos included special consideration for 
crocidolite:
A limit of 5 MPPCF, based on impinger 
samples counted by light-field technics 
(sic), is satisfactory to control exposures 
to most forms of asbestos. Crocidolite, 
however, has been shown to produce, in 
addition to the asbestotic inflammation, 
also mesothelioma. Since no safe limit can
be established for this form of asbestos,
it is recommended that workers exposed to 
crocidolite be equipped with air-supplied 
helmets.[323]
Official recognition of crocidolite as a cancer causing 
agent, even at low levels of exposure, would create a
problem for the industry. Most of the crocidolite imported
to the United States was used to manufacture large-diameter, 
asbestos-reinforced cement pipe for drinking water supply
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systems. A blend of chrysotile and fifteen percent by 
weight of crocidolite produced the best product. Selikoff 
and other public health officials raised doubts about the 
wisdom of this practice, and questioned whether crocidolite 
was actually more hazardous than chrysotile or amosite 
asbestos. Stokinger recommended banning further use of 
asbestos-cement pipe for water supply systems.[324]
9.4.3 Setting the Guidelines
The TLV Committee faced inherent difficulties. The ACGIH 
was formed "expressly to keep out corporate influence," but 
was virtually dependent on industry to supply data the TLV 
Committee needed.[325] Speaking as chair of the committee 
in 1969, Stokinger summarized his view of this dilemma:
The TLVs are industry's values... industry 
has the sole responsibility to develop data 
on its own products; government is not in a 
position to develop the facilities to handle 
the problem in total, nor should it, when 
reliable toxicological consultants are now 
available."[326]
Stokinger went on to acknowledge the inability to 
obtain "appropriate industrial hygiene data as the greatest 
problem facing the TLV Committee" in setting standards.[327] 
The industry was not forthcoming, and the government was not
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able to exert influence, forcing the TLV Committee to rely 
on other sources.
The ACGIH opted not to open membership to those in 
private industry when it split with the American Industrial 
Hygiene Association in 1938. As a result, the TLV Committee 
was an insular body of toxicologists and industrial hygien­
ists, most from government health agencies. "Outsiders" such 
as Vorwald and Gross had indirect connections with industry, 
but their professions were similar to those represented on 
the TLV Committee. The persistent lack of physicians on the 
committee increased the ire of the more established indus­
trial doctors, especially as the ACGIH guidelines became 
more widely recognized.[328]
9.4.3.1 Emphasis on Prevention The TLV Committee 
concentrated on prevention by seeking some minimum level 
of exposure which would not lead to sickness. The data on 
which to base a lower limit were not available to them, so 
other criteria were used. These criteria are amply described 
by McCulloch's comment about the coal dust standard for New 
South Wales: "The standard was determined through a trade­
off between technical efficiency, acceptable cost to the 
producer and the existing dust levels found in the industry." 
McCulloch's comment referred to discussions of preventive 
measures and setting standards, which took place at the Third 
International Conference of Experts on Pneumoconiosis, in 
Sydney, Australia in 1950. The conference unanimously
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adopted a proposal favoring prevention because "...no 
reliance should be placed on an appliance which depended 
on the individuals using it correctly, unless it was quite 
impossible in the circumstances to use any other." Preven­
tion, a higher level of protection, took precedence over 
safety equipment in setting standards.[329] Although the 
ACGIH achieved its goal of gaining national impact, its 
standards were not enforceable unless adopted by state law. 
Even when enforceable, the five mppcf standard for asbestos 
was not an adequate level of protection to prevent asbesto­
sis, the only asbestos-produced disease it addressed. The 
standards could be no more stringent than what the technology 
at the time was capable of measuring.
9.4.3.2 Changes in the TLV The ACGIH had approved the 
addition of asbestos to the first MAC list published in 1946. 
In 1963, the ACGIH changed the name for its list, from 
maximum allowable concentrations (MACs) to threshold limit 
values (TLVs).[330] The need for a more stringent standard 
was somewhat acknowledged by the "Notice of Intended Changes" 
for 1968. Although the proposal for special handling of 
crocidolite was dropped, the TLV for asbestos was lowered to 
twelve fibers per cubic centimeter of air (12 f/cc), or two 
mppcf for all particles. One particle per cubic centimeter 
(ppcc) equals 35.3 times one mppcf. A conversion factor, of 
one mppcf equal to six fibers per cubic centimeter, was used 
to facilitate a more accurate system of measurement which, 
like the old system, could only count microscopic dusts.[331]
In 1970, the ACGIH established a new subcommittee on 
carcinogenic substances. Over the next six years, represen­
tatives from major corporations in private industry became 
so prevalent that they made up half of the committee members. 
In some cases, primary responsibility for reviewing new 
products was done by representatives from the companies which 
made those same products. In 1974, the TLV for asbestos was 
listed at 5 f/cc, two years after OSHA had adopted a standard 
at that level through the formal rulemaking process.[332]
In 1980, the ACGIH revisited its earlier proposal for 
special consideration for crocidolite, and lowered the TLV 
for crocidolite to 0.2 f/cc. The TLV for amosite was lowered 
to 0.5 f/cc. The TLV for chrysotile and other forms of 
asbestos was lowered to 2 f/cc. By 1980, the 2 f/cc level 
of exposure had been in effect for four years in the United 
States, and for eleven years in England.[333]
CHAPTER 10
FEDERAL REGULATION OF ASBESTOS
10.1 Introduction
In 1969, a federal standard of twelve fibers per cubic 
centimeter (12 f/cc) of air was adopted under provisions 
of the Walsh-Healy Public Contracts Act, which applied 
to government contract jobs costing $10,000 or more.[334] 
After several years of consideration, a watershed of federal 
legislation concerning environmental issues was pending in 
the Congress.
10.2 The OSHAct of 1970
"Through the exercise of its power to regulate commerce 
among the several States and with foreign nations," the 
91st Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act of 1970. The OSHAct of 1970 was signed into law by 
President Nixon, on December 29, 1970. It became effective 
on April 28, 1971.
10.2.1 Provisions of the OSHAct
The purpose of the Act was to "assure safe and healthful 
working conditions for working men and women by authorizing 
enforcement of the standards developed under the Act; by 
assisting and encouraging the States in their efforts to 
assure safe and healthful working conditions; by providing
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for research, information, education, and training in the 
field of occupational safety and health; and for other 
purposes."[335]
10.2.1.1 Administration The Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW), and the Department of Labor 
(DOL) were the agencies designated to carry out the 
provisions of the OSHAct. The term "Secretary" in the 
OSHAct, refers to the Secretary of Labor. The Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) was the enforcement 
agency created in the Department of Labor. OSHA was the 
first centralized, federal depository for information on 
workplace conditions in the United States.
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare was 
established in 1953 to combine the government's various 
health related activities under the administration of one 
federal agency.
10.2.1.2 NIOSH Section twenty-two of the OSHAct created 
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH) in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
(HEW), which later became the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS). NIOSH is administered by the Centers for 
Disease Control. Its functions include research, training, 
employee education, and related activities. NIOSH is 
responsible for developing and recommending standards.
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10.2.1.3 Setting Standards The primary responsibility for 
setting occupational safety or health standards is assigned 
to the Secretary of Labor. Section six of the OSHAct estab­
lished the procedure for setting a "national consensus stan­
dard." In the event of "conflict among any such standards, 
the Secretary shall promulgate the standard which assures the 
greatest protection of the safety or health of the affected 
employees."[336] Standards for toxic or harmful physical 
agents were to assure, "to the extent feasible, on the best 
available evidence, that no employee will suffer material 
impairment of health or functional capacity even if such 
employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by 
such standard for the period of his working life."[337] 
Promulgation of an OSHA standard would supersede those 
safety or health standards which predated the OSHAct.
10.2.2 The Rulemaking Process
The first test of OSHA's rulemaking procedure for setting 
standards in the public forum was set in motion within one 
year of the act's passage.
10.2.2.1 The First Consensus Standard The first consensus 
standard adopted under the OSHAct limited asbestos exposure 
to 12 f/cc of air, averaged over an eight hour day. It was 
adopted by OSHA on May 29, 1971. In October, 1971, NIOSH 
investigators surveyed the Owens-Corning plant in Tyler,
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Texas, at the request of its owners. More than seventy- 
five percent of the fifty-four air samples taken, failed 
to meet the existing standard of 12 f/cc, but this was not 
mentioned in the inspection report. Instead, an "extremely 
serious occupational-health situation" was said to exist. 
Extensive improvements to the ventilation and dust control 
systems were to be completed by March 31, 1972, and a $210 
fine was imposed for other "non-serious" violations.[338]
The situation at the Tyler plant prompted action from the 
AFL-CIO. On November 4, 1971, the Industrial Union Division 
of the AFL-CIO petitioned Secretary of Labor James D. Hodgson 
to declare an emergency temporary standard (ETS) 
for asbestos exposure of 2 f/cc.
10.2.2.2 The First Comprehensive Standard On December 7, 
1971, Secretary Hodgson issued an ETS of 5 f/cc, and a peak 
exposure of 10 f/cc as a "scientific compromise".[339] The 
Secretary called for hearings on a permanent standard to 
begin in March, 1972, and assigned a five person advisory 
committee representing government, labor, industry and 
science. OSHA retained the Arthur D. Little consulting 
firm to conduct a survey of the health effects, at various 
levels of exposure (0.2, 2, 12, and 30 f/cc), over a working 
lifetime. Labor unions, research scientists, and the 
advisory committee recommended a standard of 2 f/cc.
Industry supported the ETS of 5 f/cc that was in effect.
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The consensus standard of 12 f/cc was no longer considered 
feasible by any group. NIOSH prepared a Criteria Document 
recommending a standard of 2 f/cc, to be effective in two 
years, along with requirements for recordkeeping, monitor­
ing, medical surveillance of workers, and labeling. The 
report was submitted to the Secretary on February 1,
1972.[340]
OSHA promulgated its first comprehensive health stan­
dard for asbestos on June 7, 1972. The emergency standard 
was retained until July 1, 1976, when a reduction to 2 f/cc 
became effective. A decision was made on May 24, 1983 to 
apply any new standard adopted for general industry to 
construction, as well.
10.2.2.3 The 1984 Hearings An ETS of 0.5 f/cc, published 
on November 4, 1983, was invalidated in March, 1994, by the 
US Circuit Court of Appeals. On April 10, 1984, OSHA began 
the formal rulemaking process again, by announcing two 
possible exposure levels for asbestos (0.5 and 0.2 f/cc), 
and permitting the use of respirators.[341]
At OSHA's public hearing on June 21, 1984, a NIOSH 
representative testified that there was "no safe airborne 
fiber concentration for any of the asbestos minerals. NIOSH 
stated that not even the lowest fiber exposure limit could 
assure all workers of absolute protection from exposure- 
related cancer," and reaffirmed the agency's earlier conclu­
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sion, that "there is no scientific basis for differentiating 
health risks between types of asbestos fibers for regulatory 
purposes."[342]
10.2.2.4 Risk Analysis OSHA considers as significant those 
occupational exposures which cause more than one death per 
one thousand, over a working lifetime. Through its risk 
assessment analysis, OSHA determined that a reduction of the 
PEL from 2 f/cc to 0.2 f/cc would reduce the lifetime risk 
of death from asbestos-related cancer from 64 to 7 deaths 
per 1000 workers. Excess cancer risk for a twenty year 
period of exposure was estimated at 4.5 per 1000 workers.
For asbestosis, the incidence over a working lifetime was 
estimated at 5 per 1000, with an incidence for twenty years 
of exposure of 2 per 1,000 workers.[343]
10.2.3 A Ten-fold Reduction Over Ten Years
On June 17, 1986, OSHA issued two revised standards, one for 
occupational exposures in general industry, and the other for 
construction. The construction standard included specific 
requirements for asbestos abatement and demolition work. The 
time-weighted average permissible exposure limit (TWA-PEL) 
for asbestos was the same for both standards. It was reduced 
from 2 f/cc to 0.2 f/cc, and an action level of 0.1 f/cc was 
established.
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Both standards included occupational exposure to the 
non-asbestos varieties of tremolite, anthrophyllite and 
actinolite asbestos. This provision was subsequently deleted 
in June, 1992. The 1986 standards became effective on July 
21, 1986. In the ten year period from 1976 to 1986, OSHA 
had reduced the PEL for asbestos tenfold, from 2 f/cc to 0.2 
f/cc.[344]
10.2.4 OSHA Regulations
Congress created OSHA under its power to regulate commerce, 
and the OSHAct of 1970 focused on occupational settings, 
mostly in private industry. The regulations are codified in 
the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) for the construction, 
and maritime industries, as well as for general industry.
In general, OSHA regulations cover employees and employers 
in occupational settings, through federal jurisdiction, or 
through OSHA-approved state programs.[345] OSHA has never 
had the resources to inspect all of the nation's workplaces, 
which means that compliance is largely voluntary. Despite 
OSHA's extensive recordkeeping and reporting requirements, 
lack of data on the causes of injury are still one of the 
agency's greatest problems.
10.3 Mounting Litigation
The landslide of claims in the 1970s and the 1980s from 
asbestos-related exposures helps to explain why the federal 
government was forced to intervene. As a matter of
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commerce, it was becoming difficult to obtain financing and 
insurance for buildings which contained asbestos.[346] The 
numbers of product liability claims, and the amounts being 
awarded, were piling up.
10.3.1 Increasing Damages
The average settlement cost had tripled in the ten year 
period from 1970 to 1979, then doubled in the next four 
years. In mid-1982, the courts began awarding punitive 
damages as well. By the end of 1982, manufacturers and 
their insurance companies had paid approximately six hundred 
million dollars in compensation, to settle some four thousand 
product liability cases.[347] A study completed in March, 
1984, surveyed compensation paid for asbestos-related disease 
claims in trials that began between January 1, 1980 and 
August 26, 1982. The average total compensation, for the 
fifty-three percent of the plaintiffs who won their cases, 
was $388,000.[348]
10.3.2 Johns-Manville
By 1982, claims against Johns-Manville were coming in at 
a rate of six thousand per year. Seventeen thousand cases 
were still pending. Compensation payments with no end in 
sight prompted the company to change its name, and file a 
petition in Federal Bankruptcy Court.
10.3.2.1 Bankruptcy On August 26, 1982, the Manville 
Corporation filed for reorganization under Chapter 11, 
seeking protection from the continuing onslaught of personal 
injury lawsuits. The next day, Manville Chairman and CEO 
John A. McKinney's full page ad appeared in the Washington 
Post, the New York Times, and the Wall Street Journal. 
McKinney chastised Congress for failing to pass a statutory 
compensation program, and held the government responsible for 
conditions at naval shipyards during World War II. Selikoff, 
who was then Director of the Environmental Sciences Labora­
tory at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine in New York City, 
called the filing "simply the latest episode in a fifty year 
history of corporate malfeasance and inhumanity to man 
unparalleled in the annuls of the private enterprise system."
At the time of filing, the company had over two billion 
dollars in assets, and was ranked 181st on the Fortune 500 
list of domestic industrial concerns. Bankruptcy was seen 
as the only viable solution for keeping the company alive to 
face the onslaught of product and strict liability lawsuits. 
[349] Manville voluntarily declared bankruptcy to force 
government intervention on the industry's behalf[350] so 
that, as CEO McKinney stated, "the thousands of citizens 
and voters caught up in this problem will be spared the 
expensive, inefficient, and haphazard litigation system 
we have been saddled with."[351]
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10.3.2.2 Manville Sues the Government The suit filed by 
Manville in May 1983 was the first of its kind against the 
federal government. The company sought reimbursement of 
compensation it had already paid to former shipyard workers. 
Half of the claims were from shipyard workers. Most of them 
had never even worked for the company, but had used its 
products.[352] Manville argued that Navy specifications and 
government actions during World War II made the federal 
government liable for damages. The suit was Manville's way 
of forcing the government to do something about the prospect 
of never ending claims.
10.3.3 Organizing to Settle Claims
On June 19, 1985, the Wellington Agreement was signed in 
the United States by thirty-four asbestos producers and 
sixteen insurers.[353] Manville did not participate, as it 
had already established a trust for settling claims during 
its reorganization. The agreement established the Asbestos 
Claims Facility to settle bodily injury claims, and to 
provide a joint defense against claims brought by asbestos 
victims. Sixty-five thousand lawsuits were settled under 
the Asbestos Claims Facility, but it could not handle the 
number of cases being brought, or the increasing number of 
cases from new and different sources of exposure. The Claims 
Facility was dissolved in 1988. It was succeeded by the 
Center for Claims Resolution, formed by some of the producers 
and insurers who had signed the original agreement.[354] 
Disputes continue regarding settlement of claims.
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10.4 EPA
Overall workplace conditions have probably improved because 
of OSHA, but the agency responsible for bringing the subject 
of asbestos fully into the public arena was the Environmen­
tal Protection Agency (EPA) through its administration of 
the asbestos-in-schools programs.
10.4.1 Provisions for Regulating Asbestos
OSHA regulates matters of health and safety in occupational 
settings. EPA enforces public health and environmental 
safety laws.[355] The EPA Worker Protection Rule of 1987 
extended OSHA's asbestos regulations for the construction 
industry to cover workers in the public sector who are 
engaged in asbestos abatement activities.
In 1979, the agency established the Technical Assis­
tance Program (TAP) to provide guidance and technical 
assistance for the identification and control of ACM in 
buildings.[356] EPA regulates asbestos under several 
provisions, and each of its ten regional offices has a 
Regional Asbestos Coordinator.
Emissions to ambient air are regulated under the 
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants 
(NESHAP), which EPA administers under authority of the Clean 
Air Act of 1971.[357] NESHAP revisions in 1973 specified 
work practices and procedures to be followed in order to 
prevent "visible emissions" of dust. Removal of asbestos
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prior to renovation and demolition projects, and prior 
notification to EPA of same, are requirements of NESHAP.
Under NESHAP, asbestos was designated as a hazardous 
air pollutant in 1971. The use of asbestos in spray-on 
insulation or fireproofing applications was banned in 1973, 
followed by a ban on its use for decorative purposes. The 
disposal of asbestos waste in landfills is regulated under 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976, 
which pertains to solid, but not hazardous, wastes.
10.4.2 The Asbestos-in-Schools Programs
EPA regulates the asbestos-in-schools programs to monitor 
asbestos abatement in public and private, elementary and 
secondary school buildings. The most prominent of these 
programs is regulated under the Asbestos Hazard Emergency 
Response Act (AHERA) of 1986.
AHERA was originally created as Subchapter II under 
the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). TSCA was enacted in 
1976 to fill the gaps left in other federal laws regulating 
toxic substances.[358] Under TSCA, EPA issued the Friable 
Asbestos-Containing Materials in Schools Identification and 
Notification Rule (Asbestos-In-Schools rule), effective in 
June, 1982.
10.4.2.1 Identification and Notification Rule The Identi­
fication and Notification rule required private schools and 
school districts to inspect for friable asbestos by June 28,
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1983, and notify parents and employees, whether or not it 
was present. [359] Abatement was not required, and there 
were no guidelines for the inspections, or for establishing 
when abatement would be an appropriate response.
No funding was allocated to carry out the inspection 
and notification program. Schools that had complied with 
the Asbestos-In-Schools rule could apply for funding under 
the Asbestos School Hazard Abatement Act of 1984, which 
provided loans and grants to correct serious exposure 
situations in financially needy schools.[360]
An EPA survey of 2600 schools, completed in January,
1984, showed that ninety-three percent of them had been 
inspected, but only thirty-four percent were in full com­
pliance with the rule. One year later, EPA had issued 147 
civil complaints nationwide, for failure to comply. Fines 
levied on the school districts totaled more than one million 
dollars.[361]
10.4.2.2 AHERA of 1986 To correct deficiencies in the 
rule, Congress directed the EPA to regulate response actions 
to friable ACM found in the schools. Friable asbestos is 
defined as any material, containing more than one percent 
asbestos by weight, that can be easily crumbled by hand 
pressure. Representative Jim Florio, of Gloucester Township, 
New Jersey, sponsored the federal legislation which became 
known as the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act (AHERA)
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of 1986.[362] The act was signed into law by President 
Reagan on October 22, 1986.
AHERA required local education agencies (LEAs) to 
establish management plans with inspection, monitoring and 
notification procedures for the control of asbestos in the 
schools. Approximately 107,000 schools in the nation were 
affected by AHERA,[363] and abatement work was anticipated 
for 45,000 of them.[364]
Control options included repair, encapsulation, 
enclosure, and removal. Removal of non-friable asbestos- 
containing materials was rarely required by AHERA. A poorly 
done removal job could increase, rather than eliminate, the 
risk of exposure. Abatement work in the schools, including 
inspections and the design of management plans, was to be 
done only by EPA accredited personnel. A readily available 
work force of such personnel was not yet established.
The implementation of AHERA required a vast education 
and training effort. The EPA published numerous guidebooks 
on controlling asbestos-containing materials in buildings, 
and in January, 1985, established the first supervisory 
level training centers at the University of Kansas, Tufts 
University, and Georgia Institute of Technology.[365]
Maryland, New Jersey, and Alaska were the first states to 
establish training and certification programs for asbestos 
abatement personnel.
The original deadline for completing the inspections 
and submitting the asbestos management plans was October
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12, 1988. Most school districts experienced difficulties, 
and many of the plans that were submitted were technically 
inadequate. In New Jersey, less than twenty percent of the 
school districts had filed by the deadline. President Reagan 
signed a bill in mid-July allowing the LEAs to request delays 
until May 9, 1989, but the original July 9, 1989 deadline 
for implementation of the plans remained unchanged. By the 
end of August, EPA had approved training and certification 
programs for asbestos abatement in only eight states (New 
Jersey, Alaska, Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachu­
setts, and Michigan).[366] A general lack of understanding 
of the regulations, and the temperament of the times, 
resulted in a plethora of removal projects, undertaken during 
the summer of 1989.
10.4.3 The 1988 Study
One provision of AHERA required EPA to determine whether 
public and commercial buildings should be subject to the 
asbestos-in-schools regulations. In February 1988, the EPA 
Study of Asbestos-Containing Materials in Public Buildings:
A Report to Congress was issued. The study detailed the 
results of extensive inspections conducted in a statisti­
cally representative sampling of 231 buildings located at 
ten sites around the country. The sample represented 3.5 
million buildings in the United States, divided into three 
classes - federal government, private non-residential or 
commercial, and residential apartments.[367] The study found
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that almost sixty percent of the buildings contained ACM.
The worst levels of airborne asbestos fibers in a sample 
of forty-three federal buildings were no higher than those 
found in ambient outdoor air.[368] The study found that 
asbestos was commonly found in large, residential apartment 
buildings and most commonly used in heating systems to 
insulate boilers and piping.
From the sample, EPA estimated that 73 3,000 federal 
and commercial buildings contained friable asbestos-con­
taining material (ACM), and 317,000 of those buildings 
contained some areas with significantly damaged ACM that 
was likely to become airborne.[369] It was estimated that 
190,000 buildings contained 1.2 billion square feet of 
sprayed-on or troweled-on materials, with an average asbes­
tos content of fourteen percent.[370] Estimates for removal 
of ACM in these buildings ranged from $100 to $150 billion. 
EPA estimated that 22.5 million office workers, and 369,200 
custodial workers worked in the buildings, and predicted 
3,300 deaths from asbestos-related disease by the year 
2118, among the population using these buildings.[371] An 
extension of EPA regulations to encompass these additional 
buildings was estimated to cost $53 billion over a thirty 
year period. Instead of widening the scope of its oversight, 
EPA recommended a $6.2 million increase in its annual budget 
over the next three years: to increase the number of trained 
asbestos-control personnel, to develop safe abatement 
methods, and to supplement educational, technical assistance
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and enforcement programs. No new regulations were proposed 
because of limited resources available in terms of funding 
and trained personnel. The schools were given top priority, 
"both because of the minerals' greater prevalence in schools 
and because asbestos exposure poses a greater cancer risk to 
children than adults."[372]
10.4.4 Asbestos Ban and Phase Out Rule
The EPA had already banned several uses of asbestos in the 
1970s and began investigating other asbestos containing 
products after French researchers reported that asbestos- 
impregnated floor tiles could release fibers through normal 
wear.[373] On June 20, 1986, the agency published a proposal 
to ban all uses of asbestos over the next ten years. The EPA 
estimated that the proposal would prevent 1900 deaths per 
year from asbestos-related cancers. On July 12, 1989, the 
EPA promulgated the Asbestos Ban and Phaseout Rule under 
TSCA. The Asbestos Ban and Phaseout Rule was designed to 
phase out the importation, manufacture and processing of 94% 
of all remaining asbestos-containing products in the United 
States, in three stages, over a seven year period.
The schedule for the Ban and Phase Out rule began in 
1990, when the manufacture, importation, or processing of 
asbestos in roof and floor felt, vinyl-asbestos tile, asbes­
tos clothing and asbestos-cement products was prohibited. 
Commercial distribution was prohibited in 1992. After 1994, 
the same applied to gaskets and some friction products,
137
followed in 1996 by paper products, roofing and other coat­
ing products, additional friction products, and asbestos- 
cement pipes and shingles. Under the rule, all commercial 
distribution of these products in the United States would 
be prohibited after 1997. Exemptions to the ban could be 
granted on a case-by-case basis. The rule did not affect 
existing asbestos-containing materials in buildings.[374]
The Asbestos Information Association of North America 
(AIA/NA) filed a petition in the US Court of Appeals in 
Richmond, Virginia.[375] The AIA was an industry supported 
lobbying group and public relations agency that was formed 
in 1970. The group challenged the authority under which 
the Asbestos Ban and Phase Out rule was established, but 
specified that the legal action did not pertain to friable 
asbestos products being abated from schools and other 
structures. The Asbestos Cement Pipe Producers Association 
joined the suit.
A decision by the US Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
in October, 1991, vacated enforcement of the Asbestos Ban 
and Phase Out Rule. The health effects of exposure to 
asbestos were not the basis for the suit, and they were not 
considered in the court's decision. The EPA has interpreted 
the court's decision to apply only to products that were 
still found in commerce after the rule was enacted, and in 
1993, published a list of product categories still subject 
to the rule. It is not clear which products will remain in 
commerce, but the business of asbestos has been sharply
curtailed in the United States.[376] Ten years after the 
OSHAct became effective, the apparent annual consumption of 
asbestos had decreased by half.[377]
CHAPTER 11
DISCUSSION 
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, and PUBLIC POLICY
11.1 Introduction
Asbestos was the miracle fiber that became the curse of 
the twentieth century. An understanding of its role in 
the development of the United States helps to explain how 
the hazards of exposure were perceived, interpreted and 
addressed.
Asbestos was remarkably marketable because of its 
versatility. Between 1900 and 1980, 36 million metric 
tons were used in over 3,000 products. Millions of build­
ings benefited from its unique fireproofing and insulating 
properties.[378]
In the 1950s, marketing non-regulated asbestos-contain­
ing products to the schools was a profitable venture for 
industry. Thirty years later, regulations for the asbestos- 
in-schools programs created a new market for asbestos abate­
ment, forcing technology and the practitioners needed to 
service that market to catch up.
11.2 Regulation of Hazardous Materials
Laws promulgated in the 1980s to protect workers exposed to 
hazardous materials included, for the first time, specific 




11.2.1 Origin of Federal Laws
The origin of these laws involved OSHA's experience in 
responding to oil spills in the chemical industry.[379]
OSHA's worker protection laws applied to the chemical 
industry, but laws for hazardous wastes and accidental 
releases were monitored by the EPA. OSHA had no jurisdic­
tion over workers responding to spills inside the plants, 
and the EPA had no mandate to regulate worker safety.
The first regulations to address hazardous materials 
and emergency response training were issued in 1980 under 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) to cover 
workers in treatment, storage, and disposal facilities.
This was followed by the Hazardous Communications Act of 
1984 (29 CFR 1910.1200), which applies to employees in 
companies using or manufacturing hazardous materials. In 
1986, OSHA was directed to regulate workers at hazardous 
sites or responding to emergencies at those sites. These 
regulations were promulgated in AHERA, which included 
standards for training asbestos abatement workers handling 
AHERA contracts.[380]
11.2.2 Creating A New Industry
Federal regulations created the asbestos abatement industry 
to address the health concerns of asbestos in the schools.
The market for asbestos abatement grew from about $600 
million in 1986[381] to over $1.5 billion by the following 
year, in contractor services alone.[382] New and improved
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technologies were developed to improve efficiency, and to 
meet the flurry of increasingly stringent regulations.
By 1989, asbestos abatement contractors and equipment 
suppliers were also engaged in hazardous materials manage­
ment and emergency response remediation. Eliminating 
economic losses faced by owners whose buildings contained 
asbestos provided another market for the growing abatement 
industry.[383]
11.3 Public Policy 
Like the TLV, the PEL was not meant to imply a safe level 
of exposure, but one that could be assessed using technology 
that was widely available. Limitations in both technology 
and available data were reflected in the standards. Advances 
in both of these areas provided some basis for setting 
limits, but many other factors were considered. Unlike the 
TLV, the PEL is codified in regulations and procedures that 
are enforceable under federal law. Court cases brought by 
both industry and labor challenging, the validity of OSHA's 
standards and how they were developed, are ongoing, as of 
1994.
11.3.1 Changing Conditions
As a matter of public policy, establishing an exposure limit 
involves elements of risk and burdens of uncertainty that 
must be evaluated in the decisionmaking process. Changing
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conditions produce different situations that influence how 
those risks and burdens are allocated. OSHA's first regula­
tions addressed unsafe conditions in manufacturing plants, 
mines and steel mills.[384] Changes in the economy, and 
advances in technology have produced new industries, with 
occupations and processes with different conditions. Regula­
tions addressing health and safety issues will always lag 
behind changes in the economy because hazardous conditions 
are not always readily discernible.
11.3.2 Defining the Problem
A problem has to be recognized before it can be defined or 
addressed. Klaidman comments on the high level of uncer­
tainty typical of health-risk issues, which makes them 
especially manipulable.[385]
Peters notes that government regulations may be respon­
sible for some common misconceptions about the hazards of 
asbestos. Asbestos is regulated as a mineral dust. The 
required warnings and labels caution against exposure to 
asbestos dust. In his 1930 report, Merewether emphasized 
control of dust levels. As Peters points out, most people 
believe dust is something that can be seen, but the most 
harmful asbestos fibers are too small to be seen by the naked 
eye, and they can stay airborne for long periods of time. A 
situation in which dust can be seen is one of gross 
contamination.[386]
143
11.3.3 Addressing the Problem
How a problem is addressed reflects the perspectives and 
values of the decision makers. Industry executives knew 
that exposure to asbestos dust was a health hazard, but they 
were not compelled to recognize it as such, or institute 
preventive measures. Their primary concern was the possi­
bility of escalating compensation costs from the adverse 
health effects from exposure to asbestos dust.[387] The 
industry's problem was originally defined in terms of lost 
production time and cost containment. Efforts to determine 
the nature and extent of the problem were undertaken from 
that perspective. The problem was addressed by suppressing 
information, influencing unfavorable legislation, and dis­
claiming positions contrary to their interests. Before the 
hazards of asbestos exposure became a matter of public 
debate, there were no effective rebuttals to the industry's 
position.
Industry was able to carry on business as usual as 
long as it did, because it retained control over conditions 
in the workplace. The OSHAct of 1970 finally established 
federal regulation of workplace conditions, six years after 
pressure to produce such legislation was initiated in 1964.
11.4 Summary
The 1964 studies established evidence of the hazards from 
occupational exposure to asbestos, which helped initiate the 
movement toward environmental legislation. Remediation of
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asbestos in the schools was addressed as a national priority 
because of fears that the situation placed an entire genera­
tion in jeopardy of developing debilitating asbestos-related 
diseases. Environmental exposures exploded on the scene in 
New York City in the summer and fall of 1989, when ruptures 
of asbestos-cement steam and water pipes seemed to occur on 
a weekly basis.[388]
One of the first of these ruptures occurred in Gramercy 
Park. The fine mist spewed from the steam pipe released two 
hundred pounds of asbestos, in a geyser that reached the 
rooftops of a row of affected apartment buildings. In that 
case, Con Edison was fined late in 1994, for failure to give 
proper notification and follow other required procedures.
The utility was able to settle OSHA's proposed sixty thou­
sand dollar fine for seven thousand dollars.[389]
The Occupational Safety and Health Act was passed under 
the authority of Congress to regulate commerce. Issues of 
health and safety, even when recognized as hazards, are 
weighed against economic interests. Science, research, and 
technology can provide information, but the results can only 
be explained through interpretation. The industry fought 
against stricter regulation of asbestos to the bitter end, 
citing lack of scientific proof as an argument for delay. 
Various aspects of exposure to asbestos will continue to 
prompt debates that could apply as well to: cigarette smoke, 
materials substituted for asbestos, hazardous waste disposal 
sites, and electromagnetic fields (EMFs).[390]
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Perception of risk and what is considered to be safe, 
are subject to opinion in any number of situations when 
health, safety, and the cost of peoples' lives are weighed 
against economic interests, by entities with diverse agendas 
and the power to impact policy decisions. As Peters notes, 
government mandated requirements are minimum guidelines 
"representing a real-life political compromise between 
influential interest groups" which, if used in a vacuum,
"can induce unsafe behavior, promote harmful misconceptions, 
and create detrimental attitudes."[391]
Standards for health and safety will continue to be 
based on incomplete data until better information is avail­
able. That may involve the amount of time it takes for the 
consequences of a hazard to outweigh the failure to recognize 
and address it.
There is some scientific consensus regarding the 
causation and progression of asbestos-related diseases. 
Unanswered questions about these processes are a primary 
source of the longstanding controversies regarding exposure 
to asbestos. Uncertainties include which fiber character­
istics induce disease mechanisms; the synergy of smoking and 
asbestos exposure that increases the risk of lung cancer; 
extrapolating the results of animal studies to humans; 
transferring occupational experience to non-occupational 
settings; using past exposure and disease experience (heavy 
in textiles) to predict present circumstances (light in 
schools); a threshold level below which disease will not
occur; and the role of differences in human susceptibility 
Research and technology may eventually provide better 
information about some of these processes.
CHAPTER 12
CONTROVERSIES
Some of the current knowns, unknowns, and continuing con­
troversies regarding the regulatory aspects of asbestos, 
are outlined briefly in this final chapter, including OSHA's 
1994 rule for occupational exposure to asbestos, the latest 
since the 1986 standard.
12.1 Regulatory Definitions Limited by Technology
For regulatory and analytical purposes, asbestos is defined 
as a fiber in terms of length and aspect ratio. The aspect 
ratio is a fiber's length compared to its width. OSHA 
defines a fiber as greater than 5 microns in length, with 
an aspect ratio of three to one or greater. EPA defines a 
fiber as greater than or equal to 0.5 microns in diameter, 
with an aspect ratio of five to one, with substantially 
parallel sides.
Exposure to airborne asbestos is determined by analy­
zing fiber counts of samples taken to be representative of 
conditions at the site. Collecting the samples, preparing 
them, and counting the fibers, are all subject to human and 
other errors. The instrumentation and procedures used are 
explained in Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber, pages 102-142, 
and are detailed in OSHA's regulations.
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NIOSH Method #7400 prescribes the method for analyzing 
fiber counts using phase contrast microscopy (PCM) at a 
magnification of four hundred times (400X). There are two 
sets of rules: The A rules apply to fibers with aspect
ratios of three to one or greater; the B rules apply to 
aspect ratios of five to one or greater, where the diameter 
is less than three microns. The units of measurement are 
miniscule. There are one million microns in one meter. One 
meter equals 39.37 inches, or 3.28 feet, or 100 centimeters. 
One fiber per cubic centimeter (1 f/cc) of air is equivalent 
to one million fibers in each cubic meter of air which, by 
definition, includes both asbestos and nonasbestos fibers.
PCM is not capable of detecting fibers with diameters 
of less than 0.25 microns, and less than 0.5 microns in 
length. It cannot distinguish between asbestos and other 
fibers.[392] The skill and accuracy of the microscopist 
counting the fibers is critical, but it is difficult to 
count what cannot be seen. Ultimately, the limits of 
readily available technology determined the lower value 
for an exposure limit.
The regulatory definition of a fiber reflects tech­
nological limitations in the detection, measurement, and 
counting of asbestos fibers. A 1985 EPA guidebook entitled, 
"Measuring Airborne Asbestos Following Abatement Action," 
stated that transmission electron microscopy (TEM) was "the 
best method for measuring airborne asbestos." TEM has a 
magnification of 10,00OX, and is capable of distinguishing
149
asbestos fibers from other fibers. As of December 14, 1989, 
AHERA required the use of TEM analysis for determining the 
final clearance levels in asbestos abatement projects.
12.2 Fiber Characteristics and Disease Effects 
Asbestosis, lung cancer, mesothelioma, and non-malignant 
asbestos-related diseases are detailed in Sourcebook on 
Asbestos Diseases by Peters, and Work-Related Lung Disorders 
by Cotes[393]. One of the long standing controversies 
concerns the causal, versus the collaborative or incidental, 
effect of exposure to asbestos fibers. The degree to which 
various types of asbestos promote specific diseases is still 
being debated, but all commercial forms of asbestos have now 
been shown to produce these diseases.
12.2.1 Long vs Short Fibers
Regulatory emphasis on longer fibers, and the difficulty 
of detecting and counting shorter fibers, led some to 
conclude that only longer fibers were potentially harmful, 
and shorter fibers relatively harmless.[394] The longer, 
thinner fibers are thought to be more carcinogenic, 
especially for mesothelioma, whereas, shorter fibers 
migrate deeper into body tissue.[395] The most harmful 
fibers are only one tenth the size of an object that can 
be seen by the naked eye. [396] Studies indicate that the 
fibers most likely to cause cancer are too thin to be 
observed by a light microscope.
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12.2.2 Asbestos Fibers in Body Tissue
Inhalation and ingestion are the primary routes by which 
asbestos fibers enter the body. Orally, asbestos does not 
appear to present a significant health hazard. Inhalation 
is the route which leads to ill health effects.
Asbestos fibers can be widely disseminated in the human 
body. Their transmission through body tissue has not been 
fully explained,[397] and the amount of fibers required to 
cause adverse reactions in living organisms has not yet been 
determined. The large surface area and specific surface 
reaction of the fibers are suspected to have some effect 
on cells.[398]
A latency period of twenty to forty years is typical 
before physical ailments become apparent. The length of 
the latency period varies with the type of disease. The 
likelihood of developing disease follows a dose/response 
relationship,[399] but the mechanism that initiates the 
malignant transformation remains unknown.
12.3 Latency and Liability
Latency was a key issue in the class action lawsuits. The 
question was whether insurers were liable for claims from 
the time of first exposure, or from the time that disease 
became apparent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia in 1981 answered the question of insurer liabil­
ity in Keene vs. INA. In that case, the court ruled that 
"all insurance policies in effect from the day of exposure
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until the time the illness manifests itself are responsible 
for the entire amount of the loss...".
Fibreboard had been insured by the Chubb Corporation's 
Pacific Indemnity Company under a twelve month general 
liability policy that began in 1956. That was followed by 
a three year policy, issued by a subsidiary of CNA Financial 
Corporation, which began in 1957, but was cancelled after 
twenty-two months. The terms of the policies were argued 
during litigation of a personal injury class action lawsuit 
against Fibreboard that began in 1979 in California. In 
1990, the California court ruled that the two insurers 
involved in the case faced unlimited liability. A three 
billion dollar settlement was proposed in 1993. At the time, 
Chubb's general counsel stated that there were 148,000 past 
or pending claims, and 186,000 new claims were anticipated 
against Fibreboard over the next twenty or thirty years. 
Chubb's share of the settlement proposal was $358 million, 
bringing their total reserves for injury claims arising 
from the one year policy to $1.25 billion.[400]
12.4 Changes in Classifications
Dust levels were the highest during a period when few 
measurements of dust levels were taken. More precise 
measurement techniques were adopted, but comparisons with 
earlier data, gathered using impingers, were compromised. 
Decades later, when disease became apparent, there was no 
reliable basis for assessing past exposures. Categories
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for classifying causes of death were also changed over 
the years[401] as the various pulmonary diseases were 
more precisely differentiated and defined.
In 1972, the Bureau of Mines began revising the format 
it used for collecting data on domestic asbestos consumption. 
Adjustments were made to reflect one hundred percent of 
apparent consumption for eleven major uses of asbestos.
The revisions negated the possibility of comparisons with 
earlier years. The difficulty of establishing a true or 
complete picture of past situations based on historical data, 
is aggravated when changes negate the basis for comparison.
12.5 Chrysotile
There is still considerable controversy over the ill health 
effects of chrysotile, in part because exposure to chrysotile 
does not produce mesotheliomas at the same rate as the 
amphiboles.[402] Most of the Canadian chrysotile that was 
used in the United States is naturally contaminated with 
approximately one percent tremolite, an amphibole, which was 
blamed for producing mesotheliomas found among Canadian 
miners. Tremolite is found in talc, and in children's play 
sand. It is controversial in its own right.[403]
12.5.1 Mesothelioma
Mesothelioma tumors, first linked to asbestos exposure in 
1943, were very rare. In 1960, Wagner reported thirty-three 
deaths from mesothelioma over a four year period, all from
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the North Western Cape Province of South Africa, where cro- 
cidolite was mined.[404] For this reason, mesothelioma was 
associated with crocidolite asbestos for a long time. Meso 
thelioma progresses rapidly, and is usually fatal within two 
years of diagnosis. It does not appear to be dose related, 
and smoking does not appear to increase the risk.[405]
12.5.2 The "amphibole hypothesis"
The argument that chrysotile is less carcinogenic than 
other forms of asbestos is outlined in an article on the 
"amphibole theory" by Mossman et al., in the January, 19,
1990 issue of Science.[406] In rebuttal, Nicholson, notes 
that chrysotile can partially dissolve in body fluids, and 
does not tend to remain in the lungs. This makes an esti­
mation of dose difficult to ascertain. Amphiboles fibers 
do accumulate in body tissue, and are visible upon autopsy. 
Nicholson also notes that lung cancer is three times more 
prevalent than mesothelioma among groups of workers exposed 
to asbestos.[407]
12.6 Lung Cancer
Cancer is a collection of diseases that affect various sites 
of the body in different ways. The progression of asbestos- 
related cancer is indistinguishable from cancer caused by 
some other agent.[408] Cancer is the second leading cause 
of death in the United States, after heart disease, and lung 
cancer is the number one cause of cancer related deaths.
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It is estimated that as many as sixteen thousand lung cancer 
deaths per year may be due to occupational exposure.[409] 
Whether or not asbestosis progresses to bronchial carcinoma, 
or lung cancer, is another controversial topic.[410]
12.6.1 Asbestosis
Asbestosis is a diffuse pulmonary fibrosis of the lungs, 
initiated by the inhalation of asbestos fibers.[411] The 
aerodynamic behavior and deposition of asbestos fibers as 
they travel through the respiratory tract are described in 
Bernarde's Our Precarious Habitat, and in The Normal Lung:
The Basis for Diagnosis and Treatment of Pulmonary Disease 
by John F. Murray. The body's natural defense mechanism 
attempts to destroy the foreign fibers by surrounding them 
with scar tissue. The build-up of scar tissue causes a 
thickening or fibrosis of the alveoli walls, and of the 
pleural tissue of the lung (pleural) cavity. The gas 
exchange function of the lungs is reduced as more air 
sacs are affected, causing a reduction in functional lung 
capacity. Straining to breathe produces an enlarged heart, 
typical of asbestosis sufferers. When this process is 
initiated by asbestos fibers, it is called asbestosis.[412] 
Eventually, the sufferer suffocates.
Fifty percent of asbestosis sufferers may develop 
lung cancer, the predominant form of respiratory cancer. 
Moderate exposure to asbestos increases the risk of 
developing lung cancer by a factor of five to ten.[413]
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12.6.2 Cigarette Smoke and Smoking
For those who smoke, and are exposed to asbestos, the risk 
factor for developing lung cancer increases by more than 
ninety. The risk appears to be dose related, and suggests 
some synergistic relationship between asbestos fibers and 
tobacco smoke. Asbestos is considered to be the second most 
important cause of lung cancer after tobacco smoke.[414] 
Bernarde notes the numbing effect of cigarette smoking on 
the cilia, which reduces the output of mucus and permits 
more asbestos fibers to slip deeper into the respiratory 
tract to the alveoli.[415]
Klaidman, in his book on media coverage and public 
health issues, notes that lung cancer was rare in the first 
third of the twentieth century, before smoking became 
popular. Between 1922 and 1952, cigarette sales rose by 639 
percent while the population was growing by only 54 percent. 
As smoking became more popular, yet another use was found for 
asbestos - in the filter tips of cigarettes. The rate of 
cancer among women increased almost four-fold between 1930 
and 1967, the same period in which the proportion of adult 
women smokers rose, from ten percent to an estimated thirty- 
five percent.
Smoking was linked to lung cancer in 1936 by Dr. Alton 
Ochsner who, in the 1950s, predicted that lung cancer would 
account for 18 percent of all deaths from cancer in 1970. In 
fact, lung cancer accounted for 19.7 percent of deaths from 
cancer in 1970.[416] The cancer rate in 1994 was eighteen
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percent higher than it was in 1971. At that rate, one third 
of the population can expect to develop some type of cancer 
during the course of a lifetime.[417]
12.7 Unregulated Chemicals 
Benjamin Goldman, in The Truth About Where You Live, details 
the geographic disparities in mortality rates among counties 
in the United States, and notes that they are declining for 
all causes of death except cancer, especially lung cancer. 
Goldman also discusses the large number of unregulated 
substances in every day use for which there are no data. The 
National Toxicology Program lists 117 chemicals as potential 
human carcinogens. The International Agency for Research in 
Cancer (IARC) lists 30 chemicals, mixtures, or occupational 
exposures as carcinogenic to humans, 61 as probable human 
carcinogens, and 64 as carcinogenic to animals.[418] "Less 
than 2 percent of the 70,000 chemicals in commerce have been 
fully tested for human health effects, and there are no 
health data whatsoever for over 70 percent.11 [419 ] Goldman 
attributes the dearth of data to the high cost of performing 
thorough human tests and industry's reluctance to conduct 
them. He also notes evidence that "animal tests themselves 
cause the cancer, because massive doses of almost anything 
seem to make cells divide, increasing the risk of mutations 
associated with cancer."[420]
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12.8 Experimental Animal Studies 
Klaidman also addresses the question of bias in the 
interpretation of experimental animal studies for risk 
assessment purposes, citing EPA's conservative guidelines 
requiring that animal experiments select the most sensitive 
strain of the species. He gives a specific example of using 
rats in testing formaldehyde:
" . . .  although rats get nasal cancers from 
formaldehyde and appear to be the species 
that is most sensitive to it, rats are 
unusual because they can breathe only 
through their noses. In contrast, other 
animals, notably humans, can breathe through 
the mouth and this would reduce significantly 
the estimate of cancer risk from formaldehyde 
in humans."[421]
A person engaged in heavy labor is more likely to 
breathe through the mouth, inhaling more of whatever is 
in the air. In an eight hour day, a worker breathes in at 
least five cubic meters of air. Heavy labor can increase 
the volume of inhaled air by a factor of five.[422] The 
example emphasizes how the effects of a decision that is 
based on an interpretation can be multiplied throughout the 
experimental, analytical, and policy-making stages of risk 
assessment and risk management.
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12.9 The One Fiber Theory 
The question of low level exposures encompasses debates 
surrounding environmental exposures, the "one fiber theory," 
and the reasonableness of enacting legislation such as AHERA. 
At issue is the reliability of extrapolating past occupa­
tional exposures to predict expectations of future disease 
produced under present day conditions, and the variability 
of individual human susceptibility to disease.
The one fiber theory postulates that one fiber can 
initiate the progression of disease. Opponents, such as 
Mossman, declare that "if one fiber of asbestos could kill, 
we'd all be dead, as the general population all contain 
asbestos fibers in their lungs." In supporting this 
position, Bernarde cites a study conducted in the 1970s, 
of the population of Paterson, New Jersey. The study was 
of interest because the former UNARCO asbestos textile mill 
was located in a residential area. The study concluded that 
contact with asbestos did not appear to have an adverse 
effect on the residents of Paterson.[423]
12.10 Substitutes
Glass wool, rock wool, steel wool, iron wire, synthetic 
rubber, organic plastics, cellulose, and treated paper are 
some of the materials that have been tested as possible 
substitutes for asbestos, but none of them can duplicate 
the variety and combination of advantageous properties 
found in asbestos.[424]
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During World War II, a fabric made from glass and 
asbestos yarns was developed to extend the limited supply 
of asbestos fibers. The United States Rubber Company 
manufactured a similar fabric named "Asbeston," which was 
said to be well-adapted for theatre curtains as well as 
fireproof draperies in ships, schools, hospitals, libraries, 
and hotels. Glass fibers have proven to be unsuitable as a 
replacement for asbestos in asbestos-cement and in friction 
products.[425]
In 1990, the EPA added man-made minerals, including 
glass fibers, rock wool, and slag wool fibers, to the list 
of hazardous air pollutants.[426] On July 1, 1994, the 
Department of Health and Human Services classified fiber­
glass insulation as a suspected cancer-causing agent, and 
listed it, along with radon, as one of seven additions to 
the Annual Report on Carcinogens. Fiberglass insulation, 
common in most homes, was said to be "perfectly safe when 
handled properly."[427] The same could be said about 
asbestos. Currently, there is no defined or universally 
accepted threshold level below which exposure to airborne 
asbestos fibers can be considered safe.
12.11 OSHA Final Rule, 1994
12.11.1 Challenges to the 1986 OSHA Standard
Various provisions in OSHA's 1986 standard were challenged 
by the Building and Trades Department of the AFL-CIO, and 
the Asbestos Information Association (AIA). The Court of
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Appeals upheld most of the provisions, but found that the 
ban on all spraying of asbestos containing products was 
unsubstantiated. The court ruled that the use of asbestos 
in encapsulating sprays would have to be allowed. In that 
process, asbestos is simultaneously sprayed and coated with 
resin, binding the fibers onto a surface. OSHA was ordered 
to take action on the ban, and other issues, by December 14, 
1988.
A second set of issues included smoking controls, the 
effective use of respirators, and the use of bilingual 
warnings and labels. OSHA responded to these issues on 
January 28, 1990. With the court's consent, an extension 
of time was granted to coordinate a proposal for a third 
set of three issues, with EPA and other regulatory agencies. 
These revisions were published in a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking on July 20. The time scheduled for receiving 
comments on these issues was extended, and an informal 
hearing was held from January 23 to February 8, 1991. The 
post-hearing briefing period was extended to July 24, 1991.
On June 8, 1992, the definition of asbestos in the 1986 
standard was amended to delete the non-asbestos forms of 
tremolite, actin, and anthrophyllite. In November, the 
comment period was re-opened, to allow additional public 
commentary on options to protect workers from inadvertent 
exposure to asbestos in buildings. Although not part of the 
court's remand order, the issue had been raised by OSHA and 
others.
In 1988, the Service Employees International Union 
(SEIU) petitioned, and subsequently sued EPA, seeking regu­
lation of asbestos usage in public and commercial buildings. 
As a result, EPA convened a series of joint meetings between 
May 1989 and May 1990. Representation at these meetings 
included OSHA, unions, states, asbestos manufacturers, con­
sultants and contractors, public interest groups, and other 
interested parties from the realty, lending, and insurance 
industries. "The major area of disagreement in the group 
dealt with the characterization of risk to general building 
occupants and office workers."[428] The need for specific 
federal inspection requirements was also disputed, but the 
group agreed that building service workers should be made 
aware of the presence of asbestos. As a result of these 
discussions, OSHA and EPA collaborated to enhance the com­
patibility of their respective regulations. The comment
period closed on January 4, 1993.
12.11.2 OSHA 1994 Final Rule
On August 10, 1994, OSHA published its final rule for
exposure to asbestos, which became effective on October 11. 
The evolution of the current PEL for asbestos, and details 
of the standards are included in the Codes of Federal Regu­
lation (CFR). Occupational exposure to asbestos in general 
industry is codified in 29 CFR 1910.1001, in the construc­
tion industry in 29 CFR 1926.1101 (previously 1926.58), and 
in the shipyard industry in 29 CFR 1915.1001. The standards
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include four classes of construction activity. Class I, 
for removal of known or presumed ACM, is the most hazardous, 
high risk activity. Class II involves removal activities 
that are not high risk. Class III involves repair and 
maintenance work where ACM or presumed ACM is disturbed.
Class IV includes maintenance and custodial activities where 
employees may contact ACM. Clean up of ACM waste and debris 
is also included in Class IV. As the hazard of an activity 
increases, the prescribed controls become more stringent. 
Mandatory methods of control for brake and clutch repair are 
included in the standard for general industry. This group of 
workers remains the most highly exposed to episodic releases, 
although the exposures are sporadic.
The TWA-PEL was reduced to 0.1 f/cc for all industries, 
because "this limit is feasible for most industry sectors to 
reach most of the time." A lower PEL "would be particularly 
unsuitable as compliance criteria because it is difficult to 
reliably measure." Such measurements, when taken, would not 
insure that employers had complied with the standard. In 
contrast, it would be easier to determine whether or not 
specified work practices were being followed.
OSHA's 1984 risk assessment had shown that significant 
risk would be reduced, but not eliminated, at the 0.1 f/cc 
level of exposure. At that level, the risk of cancer would 
be reduced to 3.4 per 1,000 workers, with a twenty year 
exposure risk of 2.3 per 1,000 workers. OSHA acknowledged 
that significant health risk remained at the 0.1 f/cc level,
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and mandated "operation-specific work practices" in the 1994 
standard, as the "most cost-effective means of assuring that 
significant risk is eliminated to the extent feasible."[429]
12.12 Conclusion
The use of asbestos has been banned in several countries, 
but it is still a marketable commodity in segments of the 
global economy. The possibility of financial ruin from 
disability claims, the potential of future lawsuits, the 
massive education and training campaign conducted to launch 
AHERA, the educated consumer's disfavor, and the specter of 
regulatory enforcement, were factors which led to a drastic 
reduction in domestic production, and use of asbestos-con­
taining products in the United States.
The public rulemaking process, formalized by the OSHAct, 
cut its teeth on asbestos. The regulatory policy adopted for 
friable asbestos, to reduce the exposure level to the lowest 
feasible limit, was realized in the 1994 OSHA standard. The 
limits of detection of the most widely and readily available 
technology now matches the regulatory definition of an 
asbestos fiber at the 0.1 f/cc PEL, a level recommended 
by NIOSH in 1976.[430]
OSHA standards will continue to come under attack by 
various industries and interests which continue to downplay 
the adverse health effects of their products. However 
imperfect the regulatory mechanism may be, the reality of 
enforceable federal regulations with comprehensive standards
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and practices to protect workers, and prevent injury and 
death as a consequence of performing one's duties in the 
workplace, has changed the laissez-faire relationship that 
previously existed between government and industry.
Having executed the policy adopted for exposure to 
asbestos, regulatory agencies have turned their attention 
to other pressing matters. The prodigious amount of asbes­
tos that was used in the United States has provided reason, 
at various times, for both profit and panic. The amount of 
ACM still in place, and still in commerce, will continue to 
provide sources of potential exposure.
Thirty years after the 1964 studies by Selikoff et al., 
and twenty-five years after the OSHAct, a much wider aware 
ness of the hazards and how to prevent or protect against 
them exists. Regarding the scientific literature, Peters 
notes the importance of distinguishing between causation 
of cancer and causation of asbestosis, because much, if not 
most, of the attention, experimental studies, and general 
conclusions have been based on the latter, as were the 
first TLV and the latest PEL limits levels for exposure to 
asbestos. Information and literature on every aspect of 
asbestos is more abundant than ever. These are tools to be 




















Asbestos-Containing Material. EPA 
defines ACM as any material containing 
more than one percent asbestos by weight.
American Conference of Governmental 
Industrial Hygienists recommends TLVs.
American Federation of Labor and Congress 
of Industrial Organizations labor union.
Air Hygiene Foundation. Begun by the 
Mellon Institute in 1935, and renamed the 
Industrial Hygiene Foundation (IHF) in 1947,
Asbestos Information Association.
American Industrial Hygiene Association.
American Medical Association.
Procedures to control fiber release from 
ACM, which may include repair, encapsula­
tion, enclosure, or removal.
Samples taken under ambient conditions, 
then analyzed to determine the concen­
tration of airborne contaminants, as a 
measure of the level of exposure.
The common and commercial name for 
a group of fibrous minerals.
Carcinogins Assessment Group of the EPA.
Consumer Product Safety Commission.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act.
U. S. Department of Labor
U. S. Environmental Protection Acency.
Using a paint or sealant product to 
adhere asbestos fibers to a surface.
Using barriers to surround, enclose, 




















Fibers per cubic centimeter of air.
Food and Drug Administration.
Material which can be crumbled, 
pulverized, or reduced to powder 
by hand pressure.
International Association of Heat and 
Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers.
International Agency for Research in 
Cancer classifies chemicals according 
to their cancer-causing potential.
Industrial Hygiene Foundation of 
America, evolved from the AHF.
International Labor Organization.
A dust trapping device that was used to 
obtain samples, which were analyzed by 
microscope at a magnification of 100X.
A professional qualified by education, 
training, and experience to anticipate, 
recognize, evaluate and develop controls 
for occupational health hazards.
The time period between exposure 
and manifestation of disease.
Million parts per cubic foot.
Mine and Safety Health Administration.
National Emission Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants.
National Institute for Occupational 
Health and Safety.
National Toxicology Program tests 
chemicals and reviews evidence for cancer.
Operations and Maintenance plans and 
programs, initiated under AHERA, to 
control and prevent exposure to friable 
asbestos in buildings.
The Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration within the Department 












Permissible Exposure Limit. Levels of 
occupational exposure set by OSHA.
Phase contrast microscopy. The most 
readily available, lowest cost method 
for analyzing air samples. NIOSH Method 
#7400 describes the procedure.
Polarized Light Microscopy, used to 
analyze bulk, and surface or wipe samples.
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.
Technical Assistance Program, started in 
1979 by EPA, established a Regional Asbestos 
Coordinator in each of agencies ten regional 
offices.
Transmission electron microscopy. Required 
by AHERA for analyzing air samples for final 
clearance in abatement projects. Magnifica­
tions range from lOOOx to over 250,000X. Can 
distinguish asbestos fibers from others. 
NIOSH Method #7402 prescribes the procedure.
Threshold Limit Values. Levels of exposure 
recommended by the ACGIH.
TLV-Ceiling. The concentration which 
should not be exceeded.
Time-weighted average. Refers to the 
average air concentration of contaminants 
during a particular sampling period.














Numerical limit levels adopted for 





ACGIH changed MACs to TLVs
12 f/cc, or 
2 mppcf *
OSHAct signed Dec. 29 
OSHAct eff. Apr. 29
First consensus, May 29 12 f/cc
ETS issued, Dec. 7 5 f/cc
First comprehensive, June 7 5 f/cc
5 f/cc








Issued August 10 0.1 f/cc
Eff. Oct. 11, 1994
* 12 f/cc for asbestos or 2 mppcf for all fibers. 
The conversion factor used was 6 f/cc = 1 mppcf.
APPENDIX C
MEASURING AIRBORNE ASBESTOS CONCENTRATIONS
C.l Common Units for Measuring Fiber Concentrations
mppcf = millions of particles per cubic foot 
f/cc = fibers per cubic centimeter 
ppcc = particles per cubic centimeter 
= 35.3 x mppcf
Length
Volume
1 meter (m) = 39.37 inches, or 3.28 ft 
= 100 centimeters (cm)
= 1,000,000 microns (um)
= 10,000,000,000 Angstroms (A)
1 cubic meter (m3) = 35.3 cf
= 1,000,000 cubic centimers (cc) 
1 liter (1) = 1,000 milliliters (ml)
= 61.02 cubic inches
Weight
1 pound = 454 grams (g)
1 gram = 1,000,000,000 nanograms (ng)
Source: EPA. "Guidance for Controlling Asbestos-Containing 
Materials in Buildings." (Purple Book)(Washington, D.C.: 
GPO, June 1986): B-l.
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Figure D.l Asbestos fiber lengths in 
millimeters with grade designations.
Source: Bureau of Mines. Asbestos. (Department of 
Commerce (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1979): 4.
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Crocidolite Na2(Fe2+, Mg)3Fe3+2Si8022(0H)2 
Anthophyllite (Mg, Fe2+)7Si8022(0H)2 
Tremolite Ca2Mg5Si8022 (OH) 2




































































































2675 0.210 Negative Very good
2400/ 0.212/ Negative Fair to
2540 0.217 good/ —
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Color Luster Texture
Chrysotile Green, gray Silky 
amber to white
Soft to harsh
Amosite Gray, yellow 
to dark brown
Vitreous Coarse but 
pliable




















Chrysotile High Very Good 824,000 max.
Amosite Good Fair 16.000 to
90.000
Crocidolite Good Fair 876,000 max.








[a]Source unless noted: Handbook of Asbestos Textiles.
2nd ed., (Philadelphia, Pa.: Asbestos Textile Institute,
1961) 8-9.
[b]Melvin A. Benarde, ed., Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber. 
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990) 14.
fclAsbestos in the Great Lakes Basin with emphasis on Lake 
Superior: A Report to The International Joint Commission 
from The Great Lakes Research Advisory Board 
(Feb. 1975) 9.
APPENDIX E 
A8BE8T0S COMPARED with OTHER SUBSTANCES 
Table E.l Airborne Concentrations of Dust, mppcf
Approximate concentration 
Substance (millions of particles per cf of air)
Pollen 0.05 - 0.2
Dust, rural air 0.2 - 2.0
Dust, city air 0.5 - 5.0
Dust, industrial district 1.0 - 20.0
Dust, dust storm 2,000 - 3,000
Source: Gross, William F. Applications Manual for Paint and 
Protective Coatings. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970): 64
Table E.2 Diameter of Various Fibers
Fiber Diameter, 
inches
























3520 to 7040 
3840
chrysotile 0.000000706 to 0.00000118 850,000 to 1,400,000




























Table E.4 Surface Area of Various Fibers
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Surface Area by N2 Adsorption, 















Source for Tables E.2,E.3, E.4: Rosato, D. V. Asbestos: Its 
Industrial Applications (New York: Reinhold Publishing, 
1959) 42-43, 50.
The density of chrysotile is 2600 g/m3. The density of the 
amphiboles is 3000 g/m3.
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Figure E.l Density and temperature of non-asbestos 
insulation materials
Source: Burgess, William A. Recognition of Health Hazards 
in Industry: A Review of Materials and Processes. New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1981): 158.
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Figure F.l Asbestos exports and imports by 
country in 1938, 1941, and 1945.
Source: Bureau of Mines. 1950 Materials Survey 
on Asbestos. (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1952): IX-1
APPENDIX F
U.S. ASBESTOS CONSUMPTION
Table F.l Allocation of Strategic Grades of Asbestos 
by End Use, in 1944
Canadian Spinning Fibers (Chrysotile) Percent
Woven brake linings and clutch facings 30
Mechanical packings and gaskets 19
Navy cable filler 18
Navy lagging cloth 13
Maintenance and repair of other
than electrical 4
Asbestos safety clothing 4
Aircraft 3
Asbestos yarn in flexible metal tubing 1
Miscellaneous textile uses  8
100
Rhodesian C. & G. Nos. 1 and 2 (Crocidolite)
Navy cable insulation 65




Navy felt insulation (lightweight blankets) 39
Molded amosite insulation 25
85% magnesia and other
high temp, insulation 22
Marine insulating board 11
Sprayed insulation  3100
Source: U.S. Bureau of Mines, 1950 Materials Survey 
on Asbestos, National Security Resources Board 
(Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1952) XII-9.
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Table F.2 Annual Imports to the U.S., 1935-1950
Short Tons
1935 166,585 1943 440,255
1936 243,602 1944 383,049
1937 307,188 1945 374,354
1938 179,490 1946 456,688
1939 242,561 1947 594,839
1940 246,613 1948 647,881
1941 419,196 1949 509,366
1942 419,242 1950 705,253
Table F.3 Asbestos Production, 1943-1950
Metric Tons
U.S. World U.S. World
1943 5,456 633,800 1947 21,804 872,000
1944 6,048 602,000 1948 33,649 995,000
1945 11,091 632,000 1949 39,360 895,000
1946 12,769 724,000 1950 38,495 1,206,000
Source: U .S . Bureau of Mines, 1950 Materials Survey on
Asbestos (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1952) IX-6.




1971 119,000 620,000 699,000
1972 12,000 670,000 748,000
1973 137,000 721,000 804,000
1974 103,000 706,000 779,000
1975 91,000 523,000 572,000
1976 104,000 596,000 659,000
1977 92,256 550,693 609,157
1978 93,097 570,000 618,706
1979 93,354 513,084 560,600
1980 80,079 327,296 358,700
1981 75,618 337,618 348,800
Source: Melvin A. Benarde, ed. Asbestos: The Hazardous 
Fiber, (Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990) 31. Benarde 
notes that figures may not total due to rounding and 
deposits/withdrawals from stock piles.
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Asbestos Cement Products 
Johns-Manville Corp.
National Gypsum Co.
Philip Carey Manufacturing Co.
GAF Corp.









American Builtrote Rubber Co.,, Inc. Trenton
Other A=Textiles, B=Paper, C=Miscellaneous
Howard Industries Berkley Hgts
Asbestos Corp. Bloomfield A
Kavon Filter Products Co. Cranford C
Janos Asbestos Co. E. Rutherford ABC
GAF Corp. Gloucester City B
Columbia Filter Co. Hawthorne C
Cellulo Co. Hoboken C
Imperial Products Co. Hoboken
Ladden Asbestos Corp. of New Jersey Irvington AB
Smyth Rubber & Packing Co. Jersey City C
Smith & Kanzler Corp. Linden BC
Johns-Manville Corp. Manville BC
Flaherty-Kennedy Filter Fabrics Maplewood C
Asbestos Products Manufacturing Corp. Newark C
Asbestospray Corp. Newark C
Johns-Manville Corp. New Brunswick C
Electrical Insulation Sales Co. North Bergen C
Brassbestos Manufacturing Corp. Paterson
La Favorite Rubber Manufacturing Co. Paterson C
J. T. Baker Chemical Co. Phillipsburg
Minerals & Insulation Co., Inc. Rochelle Park C
Baldwin-Ehret, Inc. Trenton C
Source: Rajhans, Gyan S., and Gordon M. Bragg. Engineering 
Aspects of Asbestos Dust Control. (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Ann 
Arbor Science Publishers, Inc., 1978): 176-182.
APPENDIX G
REGULATION OF ASBESTOS 
G.l Principal Federal Agencies
G.1.1 OSHA
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration in 
the Department of Labor is responsible for administering 
the OSHAct. The agency regulates matters of health and 
safety in occupational settings, and sets standards and 
permissible exposure limits for worker exposure.
G.l.2 EPA
The Environmental Protection Agency enforces public 
health and environmental safety laws. EPA regulates 
the handling, hauling, and disposal of toxic substances 
in air, water, and land, under a number of provisions, 
including the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), RCRA, 
and CERCLA.
Under the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Control Act,
EPA regulates the asbestos-in-schools programs, to control 
and eliminate exposure to friable asbestos in the nation's 
elementary and secondary school buildings.
G.l.3 CPSC
The Consumer Product Safety Commission regulates asbestos 
in consumer products, under the Consumer Product Safety Act, 




The Mine and Safety Health Administration regulates 
mining and milling of asbestos, and approves respirators.
G.l.5 FDA
The Food and Drug Administration is responsible for 
preventing asbestos contamination in food, drugs, and 
cosmetics, which might occur during the manufacturing 
process.
Sources: Environmental Protection Agency, Asbestos Fact 
Book (Washington, D. C.: GPO, Feb., 1985) 3.
Asbestos Exposed: The Inside Story (Philadelphia, Pa.: 
Asbestos Victims Special Trust Fund, 1992) 20.
G.2 Regulations Governing Asbestos
G.2.1 OSHA
Construction Industry Standard for Asbestos 
29 CFR 1926.1101 (Previously 29 CFR 1926.58).
General Industry Standard for Asbestos 
29 CFR 1910.1001
Maritime Industry Standard for Asbestos 
29 CFR 1915.1001
Respiratory Protection Standard 
29 CFR 1910.134
G.2.2 EPA
Worker Protection Rule 
40 CFR 763 Subpart G
Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act (AHERA) 
40 CFR 763 Subpart E
National Emission Standard for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP)
40 CFR 61 Subpart M
G.2 Regulations Governing Asbestos (continued)
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NESHAP The National Emission Standard for Hazardous 
Air Pollutants prohibits visible emissions to the outside 
air. NESHAP applies to demolition and renovation projects 
that disturb more than 260 In.ft. or 160 sq.ft. of ACM over 
a one year period.
RCRA The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
regulates the handling, manifesting, and disposal of solid 
waste in landfills. Some states classify ACM waste as 
hazardous waste under RCRA.
CERCLA The Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act Recovery Act, or "Superfund" 
Laws, classifies friable asbestos as a hazardous substance.
Source: EPA, "Managing Asbestos in Place: A Building Owner's 
Guide to Operations and Maintenance Programs for Asbestos- 










SELECTED EPA PUBLICATIONS for ACM
March. Orange Book.
"Asbestos-Containing Materials in School 
Buildings: A Guidance Document."
Part 1 outlines steps schools can take 
to conduct an asbestos control program.
Part 2 addresses school personnel, 
contractors and others, with emphasis 
on inspection and control work.
March. Blue Book
"Guidance for Controlling Friable Asbestos- 
Containing Materials in Buildings"
June. Purple Book
"Guidance for Controlling Asbestos-Containing 
Materials in Buildings"
October. Pink Book.
"Asbestos in Buildings: Simplified Sampling 
Scheme for Friable Surfacing Materials."
Silver Book
"Measuring airborne asbestos following 
an abatement action."
June. "Guidance for Preventing Asbestos 
Disease Among Auto Mechanics."
July.
"Managing Asbestos in Place: A Building Owner's 




B . 2  C O N S U M E R  
P R O D U C T  LISTBRIG
This list is a  se lection  of consum er prod­
u c ts  su sp ec ted  of containing a sb e s to s  by 
the  C onsum er Product Safety Com m ission. 
Not all b rands o r m odels of th e se  products 
necessarily  contain a sb esto s .
A S B E S T O S  P A P E R  
P R O D U C T S
A coustical ceiling tile 
Lamp so ck e ts  
Burner m ats for g as stoves 
Roofing felt (outer layer)
Pipe and  boiler covering 
Vinyl sh e e t flooring backing 
Radiator top insulation 
A ppliance heating shielding (paper)
Slow cookers 
Hair dryers 
P ap er sh e e ts  for heat insulation 
Millboard
TV and o th er electronic sw itch p lates 
Electric sw itch boxes 
M etal reinforced g ask e ts  (for air- 
cooked engines)
Electrical w ashers
Linings for ovens, kilns, sa fes, safety 
boxes, incinerators 
Millboard shee t
Wall protection behind heat- 
generating  products 
Floor protection under wood and 
coal stoves 
Soldering and welding blocks 
iron re s ts
Appliance heat shielding (millboard) 
T oasters
R otisserie broilers 
Fireproof wallboard 
M etal-clad fire doors and partitions 
Tent garm ents 
S tove pipe rings
C L O T H  A N D  W O V E N  
P R O D U C T S
A ppliance wiring










D eep fat fryers 
Electric fry pans 
Awnings 
C andlesticks 
Catalytic heater m antles 
C igarette lighter w icks 
Cord
Seals for high tem perature g askets
Valve steam  packings
Insulation for g lass handling tools
Reinforcing for braided wall stem  hose
Theater curtains
Felt
Reinforcem ents in plastics 
G askets
Reinforcem ents in a sb esto s  ta p e s  
Secondary insulation in high- 
tem perature wire and cable 
Asphalt im pregnated




Secondary  insulation in high- 
tem peratu re wire and cable 
A sphalt im pregnated roofing felts 
P iano and organ felts
Flexible air conductors for heating, 
cooking and ventilation equipm ent 
Heating pads (elem ent insulation) 
Ironing board pads and covers 
Lamp and lantern m antles 
Pipe and boiler covering 
P o t holders and oven mitts 












F lam e-resistant blankets 
Boots 
C aps
S m okers' bibs 
S toves-C oal and  wood burning 
Tape for pipe insulation 
Braid and rope for packing 
Motion picture sc reen s 
Tent grom m ents
A S B E S T O S  C E M E N T  
P R O D U C T S
W ater, sew er and sep tic  drain field pipe
Airduct pipe





Boiler and furnace baffles
Bulk sheeting
W elding shields
Baking sh e e ts
Blackboards
Laboratory table tops
Linings for vaults, sa fes , humidifiers
and  filing cab inets
V A R I O U S  M A T R I X  
P R O D U C T S
A dhesives (glues and epoxies)
Air d u c t cem ent for asbesto s-cem en t 
air duct
Buffing and polishing com pounds
Caulks and putties




Glazing com pound for ceram ics
Pipe & boiler coverings
Roof & driveway coatings
S ta ins & varnishes
Automotive undercoating
Refrigerant cem ents
Automotive muffler repair com pounds
R E S O U R C E  M A T E R I A L S
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P R O D U C T S  S U B J E C T  
T O  I N A D V E R T E N T  
A S B E S T O S  
C O N T A M I N A T I O N
Driveway gravel
Fertilizer & lawn care products
Potting m aterials (vermiculite)
Piaysand
Talcs for noncosm etic or food use  
applications
MISCELLANEOUS PRODUCTS
A coustical & therm al insulation m aterial, 
sprayed
Ammunition shell wadding 
Automotive mufflers
B arbecue firebed m aterials in gas 
barbecue grills 
Boat hull repair kits 
Flower pots 
Friction m aterials 
C lutch p lates 
Brake linings 
P o tte r 's  kilns
Reinforcem ent in molded p lastic & rubber 
Automotive radiator sealant 
P ottery  clay 
Pow der (asbestos)
Textured paint
C em ent, drywall & p laste r patching 
com pounds
Artificial g as fireplace em berizing material 
Phonograph records
C O N S U M E R  P R O D U C T S  
P O S S I B L Y  C O N T A I N I N G  
A S B E S T O S
APPLIANCES 
Air conditioners 
D ishw ashers 
Hand-held mixers 
Portable electric h eaters 
Popcorn poppers 
Refrigerators 
Vacuum  cleaners 
Waffle makers
MISCELLANEOUS PRODUCTS 
C arpet padding 
Fireplaces
Instan t papier m ache 
Light fixtures on railroad 
p assen g e r cars 
W elding m asks 
File cab inets
Bulk Fiber
Vinyl a sb e s to s  floor tiles
A brasive w heels
Aerial d istress  flares
M olded p lastics & phenolic lam inates
Pain ts
R E S O U R C E  M A T E R I A L S
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Source: "Asbestos Exposed: The Inside Story." 
(Philadelphia, Pa.: Asbestos Victims Special 
Trust Fund, 1992): 37-39.
APPENDIX J
Lifetime Risk Values for Selected Situations
L ife tim e risk
Selected risk  s itu a tio n s, m ain ly  U.S. d a la :,,!"  p e r  100,0(10
Extra high risk
Sm oking (all causes o f death) 21.900
Sm oking (cancer only) 8 .KO0
High risk
M otor vehicle. U.S.. 1975 (deaths) 1.600
Elevated risk
Frequent airline passenger (dcalhsi 7 30
C irrhusis of liver, m oderale drinker (deaths* 290
M olot accidents, pedestrians. U.S.. 1975 tdca thsi 2 U0
Skiing. 40 hours per year (deaths) 220
M oderate risk
Ligh t d r inke r ,  one bee r pe r  day  (can cer )  150
D r o w n i n g  deaths, all recrea tional ca u ses  140
A ir  po ll u tion .  U.S..  hen z o ta lp y rc n e  (cancer)  1 1(1
N a tu ra l  background  radia tion ,  sea level  (can c e r )  1 10
F req uen t  airline p assenger ,  co sm ic  ray s  (can c e r )  1 10
Loss risk
Hom e accidents. U.S., 1975 (deaths) KK
C ycling (deaths) 75
Person sharing room with smoker (cancer 1 75
D iagnostic x-rjys. U.S. (cancer) 75
(Risk level where few would commit their ow n resources to reduce 
risk: Royal Society. London. I9K3). (270) 70
Vers Low risk
Person living in brick building, additional natural radiation tcancer) 35
Vaccination for small pox. per occasion 1 death) 22
O ne transcontinental air flight per year (deathI 22
Saccharin, average U.S. consum ption (cancel 1 15
Consum ing Miami or New Orleans drinking w ater (cancer) 7
(Risk level where very few would consider action necessary, unless 
clear causal links with consum er products. Royal Society. London.
19K3I. (270) 7
Extrem ely low "rarc-cvent" risk 
One transcontinental air flight per sca t, natural radiation (canceri 4
Lightning (deathsi 3
H urricane (deaths) 3
C harcoal broiled steak, one per week (cancer) 3
ENVIRONM ENTAL ASBESTOS R ISK .' 19K5. (canceri
("around one per lUO.dOO or lower": (his Report) I
Source: Benarde, Melvin A., Ed. Asbestos: 
The Hazardous Fiber. (Boca Raton, Florida: 
CRC Press, 1990): 69.
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Microscopic Identification of 
Chrysotile and Amosite Fibers
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Dispersion Staining 
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The Industrial Revolution begins in England.
The signing of the Declaration of Independence 
establishes the United States of America.
The New England textile industry begins with a 
cotton spinning plant in Pawtucket, Rhode Island.
Henry Ward Johns moves to Brooklyn, and starts 
a small roofing materials business.
The Civil War begins.
Asbestos fiber mixed with sodium silicate 
was first used as an insulation material.
May 10. The first transcontinental railroad 
is established.
Mining of chrysotile begins in the Italian Alps.
Asbestos coverings for insulating boilers, 
and asbestos-cement products were introduced.
The first asbestos textile factory opens in England.
Mining of chrysotile begins in Canada.
The Salamander Association of Boiler and Pipe 
Fitters, the first union of absestos workers, 
was formed in New York City, N.Y.
Eighty-five percent magnesia insulation using 
asbestos fiber as a binder was introduced.
The H. W. Johns Manufacturing Company obtains 
its own mine in Canada.
Mining of the first deposits of Cape blue 
crocidolite, discovered by a German geologist 
named Lichtenstein, near Prieska, South Africa.
The H. W. Johns Manufacturing Company becomes 
the largest asbestos manufacturer and dealer 
in the world.
The first asbestos textile mill opens 












Johns dies from scarring of the lungs.
The Annual Report of Her Majesty7s Women 
Inspectors cites asbestos textile work, 
and describes the ill effects of the dust.
Corrugated asbestos paper for air-cell 
coverings is introduced.
Murray's post-mortem description of the 
lungs of a thirty-three year old asbestos 
textile worker documents the first case of 
death from asbestosis.
Manville buys out the H. W. Johns Manufacturing 
Company to form the new Johns-Manville Company.
The first study of mortality among asbestos 
workers appears in an article in the Bulletin 
de 1'Inspection du Travail et de 1 'Hygiene 
Industrielle.
Amosite discovered in the Transvaal, South 
Africa. Large scale extraction begins in 1908.
Murray reports the first asbestos-related death 
in England.
Brake shoes made with asbestos introduced.
The Hours of Service Act regulates working 
conditions nationally for the first time.
Johns-Manville begins a complex of asbestos 
factories, establishing the town that bears 
half its name - Manville, N. J.
The Department of Labor is formed to "foster, 
promote and develop" the lot of wage workers.
The Public Health Service's Division 
of Occupational Health is formed.
The United States enters World War I.
The first published report of asbestos-related 
disease in the United States, by Pancoast.
The U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes 
a special study conducted by Frederick Hoffman, 












Formal founding of Harvard University's School 
of Public Health. The Drinker brothers develop 
one of the first comprehensive programs in 
industrial hygiene.
Wisconsin enacts worker's compensation 
legislation covering asbestosis.
Lighter weight amosite is used in insulation 
instead of chrysotile to reduce the weight of 
naval vessels, as called for in the Washington 
Treaty of Limitations in Tonnage.
July 24. The first clear case of death due to 
asbestos exposure is described by W. E. Cooke 
in the British Medical Journal.
W. E. Cooke coins the name asbestosis to 
describe scarring of the lungs caused by 
inhalation of asbestos fibers.
The first disability claim for asbestosis is upheld 
by the Massachusetts Industrial Accident Board.
Gardner becomes Director of the Saranac 
Laboratories.
Seiler's reports a case of "pure" asbestosis from 
South Africa, which prompts a study of hundreds of 
asbestos textile workers in England, conducted by 
Merewether, Chief Inspector of Factories.
The Raybestos Company, and the Manhattan Rubber 
Company consolidate to become Raybestos-Manhattan, 
the country's largest manufacturer of friction 
products.
Lanza begins a study for the Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company. Completed in 1931, the study 
is published four years later, by the Public 
Health Service.
April. Construction begins on the Gauley Bridge 
tunnel.
Minnesota Medicine reports the first case of 
asbestosis found at autopsy in the United States.
Merewether and Price's report on asbestos and 
occupational health is published in England. 
Legislation on workplace conditions is enacted 













Industrial medicine has emerged as a distinct 
specialty, but industrial hygiene is not yet 
recognized as a specialized discipline.
32 Limpet, the first spray applied asbestos
containing product, is developed in England.
Major asbestos producers settle compensation 
claims filed by contract insulation workers.
Pancoast testifies as an expert witness for 
the defense concerning Gauley Bridge in the 
case of Raymond Johnson v. Rinehart and Dennis 
and E. J. Perkins, which came to trial in March.
Amosite felt is developed.
January 4. Lanza's study is published 
by the Public Health Service.
The Mellon Institute starts the Air Hygiene 
Foundation, at industry's request, in response 
to the "silicosis problem." The name was changed 
to the Industrial Hygiene Foundation (IHF) in 1941.
The spray-on application of asbestos for decorative 
finishes is introduced in the United States.
Summer. Courses in industrial hygiene, sponsored 
by the Public Health Service, lead to formation of 
the American Conference of Governmental Hygienists.
Lanza's textbook, Silicosis and Asbestosis, 
is published.
The Public Health Service has organized industrial 
hygiene units in twenty-eight states.
The ACGIH splits from the American 
Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA).
A study by Dreessen is published as a Public 
Health Service bulletin. It becomes the basis 
for the exposure level recommended by the ACGIH.
German physicians are calling lung cancer 
an occupational disease of asbestos workers.
The United States enters World War II.

















UNARCO begins operation of its plant in Paterson, 
New Jersey, to supply insulation for naval vessels.
January 20. Government restrictions are enacted 
to insure an adequate supply of strategic types and 
grades of asbestos for the war effort.
45 Eight states enact worker's compensation 
legislation to cover asbestosis.
Gardner begins the study of Kaylo for 
the Owens-Illinois Glass Company.
August. All restrictive orders imposed on 
asbestos during World War II are lifted by 
the end of the month.
The TLV Committee approves the addition 
of asbestos to the MAC list, and begins 
publishing an annual report.
Drinker's study of naval shipyards is published.
Hemeon's study of ten asbestos textile 
plants is completed, but never published.
Merewether's study on asbestos and lung 
cancer is published in England.
February. The Third International Conference 
of Experts on Pneumoconiosis is held in Sydney, 
Australia.
From 1940-1950, the demand for asbestos 
increased by two hundred percent.
The Lancet publishes Gloyne's study 
on lung cancer and asbestosis.
September. The Seventh Saranac Symposium 
is held but, unlike the preceding six, its 
proceedings are never published.
Selikoff establishes a medical clinic in 
Paterson, New Jersey.
UNARCO closes its Paterson plant and begins 
a similar operation in Tyler, Texas.
Richard Doll's study in England shows high 
rates of lung cancer among asbestos workers.













The Chase Manhattan Bank building in New York 
City is the first modern skyscraper to use 
spray-on fireproofing containing asbestos.
Wagner's report of thirty-three cases 
of mesothelioma in South Africa.
UNARCO sells its Tyler, Texas plant to Pittsburgh 
Corning, and leaves the asbestos business.
ACGIH maximum allowable concentrations (MACs) 
are renamed threshold limit values (TLVs)
Selikoff's seminal study of insulation workers.
The New York Academy of Science's International 
Conference on the "Biological Effects of Asbestos" 
is held at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York City.
Asbestos production increased to four million 
tons per year, from fifty tons in 1877.
ACGIH issues a Notice of Intended Change which 
includes special consideration for crocidolite.
The proposal is dropped, but is reconsidered at 
a later date.
Under provisions of the Walsh-Healy Public Contracts 
Act, a federal standard of 12 f/cc is enacted.
The Asbestos Information Association is formed.
President Nixon signs the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act on December 29.
Seventy percent of the world's asbestos supply 
is used in construction products.
March. EPA lists asbestos as a 
toxic air pollutant under NESHAP.
April 28. The OSHAct becomes effective, and items 
on the TLV list become enforceable under federal 
law. The TLV for asbestos, remains at 5 mppcf.
May 29. The first consensus standard adopted 
under the OSHAct sets an exposure level of 12 f/cc.
October. NIOSH inspects the Tyler, Texas plant.
The AFL-CIO petitions OSHA to reduce the exposure 










December 7. OSHA issues an emergency temporary 
standard (ETS) of 5 f/cc, and a peak exposure of 
10 f/cc.
February 3. Pittsburgh Corning closes the 
Tyler, Texas plant.
February 15. The New York City Council bans 
all spraying of asbestos.
June 7. OSHA's first comprehensive health standard 
for asbestos sets the permissible exposure limit 
(PEL) at 5 f/cc, with a ceiling limit of 10 f/cc.
April. NESHAP is revised to include the "no visible 
emissions" standard. The use of spray-on asbestos 
material for thermal, insulating, or fireproofing 
purposes is banned.
Asbestos consumption in the United States reaches 
a high point, exceeding 800,000 tons.
ACGIH lists the TLV for asbestos at 5 f/cc.
October 9. A proposal by OSHA to reduce the 
PEL to 0.5 f/cc is withdrawn because of the 
Supreme Court's decision on benzene.
Collection and disposal of ACM are included 
under the NESHAP "no visible emissions" standard.
Three thousand known commercial uses have 
been developed for asbestos.
July 1. The 2 f/cc PEL becomes effective, 
as called for in the 1972 standard.
Feb. The CPSC is petitioned to ban consumer products 
containing tremolite talc. Dry patching compounds 
are banned. The ban requested on other products, 
including play sand, is denied in 1981.
The EPA bans the use of spray-on asbestos for 
decorative purposes. The "no visible emissions" 
standard is extended to require removal of ACM prior 
to demolition.
April 26. Health, Education, and Welfare Secretary 
Joseph A. Califano, Jr. orders the Surgeon General 
to send an advisory letter describing the health 
risks of exposure to the nation's 400,000 
physicians, and urges those who are or were exposed 









June. The New York Academy of Science's second 
major conference, the "Health Hazards of Asbestos 
Exposure," is held at the New York Hilton.
Total employment at six mine and mill operations 
in the United States is four hundred.
Total world production of all grades and varieties 
of asbestos is estimated at 5.6 million metric tons.
March. The Technical Assistance Program is 
established, which includes a Regional Asbestos 
Coordinator for each of the EPA's ten regions.
EPA issues the two-part "Orange Book," a guidance 
document for handling ACM in the schools.
CPSC negotiates with manufacturers to voluntarily 
remove asbestos materials from hair dryers.
September. EPA issues a proposed rule on the 
identification and notification of friable ACM 
in schools.
From 1900 to 1980, thirty-six million metric tons 
of asbestos were used, and some thirty million tons 
was put in place.
June. EPA's final Identification and Notification 
Rule affects public and private, elementary and 
secondary schools nationwide.
UNARCO (name changed to UNR) files for bankruptcy.
August 26. The Manville Corporation files for 
reorganization under Chapter 11, after changing 
the company's name and moving its headquarters 
to Denver, Colorado. Johns-Manville became a 
subsidiary against which more than eleven thousand 
lawsuits were filed between 1980 and 1982.
Asbestos consumption drops to 300,000 tons.
Feb. EPA reports to Congress on ACM in buildings.
Manville sues the government for reimbursement of 
health claims paid to former shipyard workers, whose 
claims comprise half of those against the company.
June 28. The deadline for schools to meet EPA's 
Friable Asbestos-Containing Materials in Schools: 








November 4. OSHA publishes an ETS of 0.5 f/cc, 
which is challenged by the industry and subsequently 
overturned in Federal District Court, in March,
1984.
April 10. OSHA publishes a proposed rule covering 
all industries governed by the OSHAct (maritime, 
construction, and general industry).
August 11. President Reagan signs the Asbestos 
School Hazard Abatement Act (ASHAA), a loan and 
grant program to help schools eliminate asbestos 
hazards.
November 4. OSHA issues an ETS of 0.5 f/cc and 
permits the use of respirators. A court decision, 
answering a challenge by the AIA, reverts the PEL 
to 2 f/cc.
December. The Asbestos Action Program is 
established in the EPA's Office of Pesticides 
and Toxic Substances.
January. EPA establishes the first supervisory 
level training centers for training and 
certification of asbestos workers.
June. EPA issues the "Purple Book," a guidance 
document for ACM in buildings.
Approximately two thousand tons of asbestos per 
year is mined and processed in the United States.
January. A proposed Ban and Phase Down Rule 
is issued by EPA.
June 20. OSHA publishes new regulations for general 
industry and for the construction industry. The PEL 
is reduced to 0.2 f/cc and an action level of 0.1 
f/cc is established. The effective date is July 21.
October 22. President Reagan signs Public Law 
99-519, the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act, 
which includes standards for training asbestos 
abatement workers.
The Johns-Manville complex in Manville, N. J. is 
closed. At peak production, almost five thousand 
workers were employed to manufacture fire-proof 
products made with asbestos.








October 12. This original deadline for schools 
to complete inspections and submit management 
plans for AHERA is extended until May 9, 1989.
Manville emerges from bankruptcy.
July 9. Deadline for implementation of AHERA.
July 12. EPA's Asbestos Ban and Phaseout Rule 
would ban ACM products by 1997. The rule is 
challenged by the AIA, and overturned by the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in October, 1991.
Dec. 14. AHERA requires TEM analysis to establish 
final clearance levels for all abatement projects.
Sept. 10. Fire destroys Building A at the 
empty Johns-Manville plant in Manville, N. J.
March 6. EPA issues "An Advisory on Asbestos 
in Buildings."
February 2. The AFL-CIO challenges the
0.2 f/cc PEL, which is upheld by the court.
August 10. OSHA issues a final rule for 
occupational exposure to asbestos, setting 
the PEL at 0.1 f/cc. The effective date is 
October 11, 1994.
Figure L.l Trend of Asbestos Use, 1890 to 1980, 
in metric tons.
Source: Benarde, Melvin A., Ed. Asbestos: The 
Hazardous Fiber. (Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 
1990): 10.
REFERENCES
1. Benarde, Melvin A., ed. Asbestos; The Hazardous Fiber
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990): 3.
2. Benarde, Melvin A., ed. Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990): 28.
3. EPA. Managing Asbestos in Place: A Building Owner's
Guide to Operations and Maintenance Programs for 
Asbestos-Containing Materials (Washington, D.C.:
GPO, July, 1990): 1.
4. Bureau of Mines. Asbestos. Department of Commerce
(Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1979): 1.
5. Bureau of Mines. Asbestos. Department of Commerce
(Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1979): 2.
6. Berman, Daniel M. Death on the Job: Occupational Health
and Safety Struggles in the United States (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1978): 84.
7. Collegium Ramazzini. The Third Wave of Asbestos Disease:
Exposure to Asbestos"in Place. Crowne Plaza Manhattan, 
New York, N. Y., June 7-9, 1990.
8. Gannon, Bill. "Lautenberg Plans Effort to Triple Fines
for Asbestos Exposure Violations." The Star Ledger 
(Newark, N.J., Feb. 28, 1989): 29.
9. Department of Labor. Occupational Exposure to Asbestos;
Final Rule. Federal Register, Vol. 59, No. 153 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, August 10, 1994): 41030.
10. Benarde, Melvin A. Our Precarious Habitat: Fifteen Years
Later (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1989): 298.
11. Mossman, B. T., J. Bignon, M. Corn, A. Seaton, and
J. B. L. Gee. "Asbestos: Scientific Developments 
and Implications for Public Policy." Science 247 
(Jan. 19, 1990): 294-301.
12. Lemonick, Michael D. "An Overblown Asbestos Scare ?"
Time (Jan. 29, 1990): 65.
13. Benarde, Melvin A., ed. Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990): 283.
14. Collins, T. F. B. "Asbestos - The Lethal Dust." S. A.
Medical Journal (Durban, July 15, 1967): 639.
201
202
15. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health &
Safety of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1988): 142.
16. Collins, T. F. B. "Asbestos - The Lethal Dust."
S.A. Medical Journal (Durban, July 15, 1967): 639.
17. Asbestos in the Great Lakes Basin with emphasis on Lake
Superior. A Report to The International Joint 
Commission from The Great Lakes Research Advisory 
Board (Feb. 1975): 7.
18. Bureau of Mines. 1950 Materials Survey on Asbestos.
National Security Resources Board (Washington, D. C.: 
GPO, 1952): 1-1, 1-2.
19. Asbestos in the Great Lakes Basin with emphasis on Lake
Superior. A Report to The International Joint
Commission from The Great Lakes Research Advisory 
Board (Feb. 1975): 7.
20. Zim, Herbert S. and Paul R. Shaffer. Rocks and Minerals:
A Guide to Familiar Minerals, Gems, Ores and Rocks
(New York: Golden Press, 1957): 20.
21. Becklake, Margaret R. "Asbestos-Related Diseases of
the Lung and Other Organs: Their Epidemiology and 
Implications for Clinical Practices." American Review 
of Respiratory Disease 114 (1976): 193.
22. Bendure, Zelma and Gladys Pfeiffer. America's Fabrics:
Origin and History, Manufacture, Characteristics and 
Uses (New York: Macmillan Company, 1946): 250.
23. Zim, Herbert S. and Paul R. Shaffer. Rocks and Minerals:
A Guide to Familiar Minerals, Gems, Ores and Rocks
(New York: Golden Press, 1957): 75.
24. Collins, T. F. B. "Asbestos - The Lethal Dust."
S.A. Medical Journal (Durban, July 15, 1967): 639.
25. Asbestos in the Great Lakes Basin with emphasis on Lake
Superior. A Report to The International Joint 
Commission from The Great Lakes Research Advisory 
Board (Feb. 1975): 9.
26. Zim, Herbert S. and Paul R. Shaffer. Rocks and Minerals:
A Guide to Familiar Minerals, Gems, Ores and Rocks
(New York: Golden Press, 1957): 100.
27. Collins, T. F. B. "Asbestos - The Lethal Dust."
S.A. Medical Journal (Durban, July 15, 1967): 640.
203
28. Collins, T. F. B. "Asbestos - The Lethal Dust."
S.A. Medical Journal (Durban, July 15, 1967): 640.
29. Unless otherwise noted:
Bureau of Mines. 1950 Materials Survey on Asbestos. 
National Security Resources Board (Washington, D. C.: 
GPO, 1952): 1-3;
Collins, T. F. B. "Asbestos - The Lethal Dust."
S.A. Medical Journal (Durban, July 15, 1967): 640;
Handbook of Asbestos Textiles, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia, 
Pa.: Asbestos Textile Institute, 1961): 6.
30. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 142.
31. Benarde, Melvin A., ed. Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990): 27.
32. Collins, T. F. B. "Asbestos - The Lethal Dust."
S.A. Medical Journal (Durban, July 15, 1967): 639.
33. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 142.
34. Bureau of Mines. 1950 Materials Survey on Asbestos.
National Security Resources Board (Washington, D.C.: 
GPO, 1952): V-l.
35. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 147-148.
36. Benarde, Melvin A., ed. Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber 
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990): 22.
37. Collins, T. F. B. "Asbestos - The Lethal Dust."
S.A. Medical Journal (Durban, July 15, 1967): 639.
38. Becklake, Margaret R. "Asbestos-Related Diseases of
the Lung and Other Organs: Their Epidemiology and 
Implications for Clinical Practices." American Review 
of Respiratory Disease 114 (1976): 187.
39. Bureau of Mines. 1950 Materials Survey on Asbestos.
National Security Resources Board (Washington, D. C.: 
GPO, 1952): S-l.
204
40. Groner, Alex, and the Editors of American Heritage
and Business Week. The American Heritage History of 
American Business & Industry (New York: American 
Heritage Publishing Co., 1972): 64.
41. Bendure, Zelma and Gladys Pfeiffer. America's Fabrics:
Origin and History, Manufacture. Characteristics and 
Uses (New York: Macmillan Company, 1946): 251.
42. Bendure, Zelma and Gladys Pfeiffer. America's Fabrics:
Origin and History, Manufacture, Characteristics and 
Uses (New York: Macmillan Company, 1946): 80.
43. Bendure, Zelma and Gladys Pfeiffer. America's Fabrics:
Origin and History, Manufacture, Characteristics and 
Uses (New York: Macmillan Company, 1946): 273, 274, 
277.
44. O'Brien, Robert, and the Editors of Time-Life Books.
Machines, rev. ed. (Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 
1980): 57-58, 64-65.
45. Groner, Alex, and the Editors of American Heritage
and Business Week. The American Heritage History of 
American Business & Industry (New York: American 
Heritage Publishing Co., 1972): 64.
46. O'Brien, Robert, and the Editors of Time-Life Books.
Machines, rev. ed. (Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 
1980): 57-58.
47. Bendure, Zelma and Gladys Pfeiffer. America's Fabrics:
Origin and History, Manufacture, Characteristics and 
Uses (New York: Macmillan Company, 1946): 272.
48. O'Brien, Robert, and the Editors of Time-Life Books.
Machines, rev. ed. (Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 
1980): 58.
49. Groner, Alex, and the Editors of American Heritage
and Business Week. The American Heritage History of 
American Business & Industry (New York: American 
Heritage Publishing Co., 1972): 64.
50. O'Brien, Robert, and the Editors of Time-Life Books.
Machines, rev. ed. (Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 
1980): 55-58, 60.
51. Groner, Alex, and the Editors of American Heritage
and Business Week. The American Heritage History of 
American Business & Industry (New York: American 
Heritage Publishing Co., 1972): 64-65.
205
54. O'Brien, Robert, and the Editors of Time-Life Books,
Machines, rev. ed. (Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 
1980): 59.
55. Groner, Alex, and the Editors of American Heritage
and Business Week. The American Heritage History of 
American Business & Industry (New York: American 
Heritage Publishing Co., 1972): 55, 88.
56. O'Brien, Robert, and the Editors of Time-Life Books.
Machines, rev. ed. (Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 
1980): 59, 62.
57. Groner, Alex, and the Editors of American Heritage
and Business Week. The American Heritage History of 
American Business & Industry (New York: American 
Heritage Publishing Co., 1972): 89.
58. O'Brien, Robert, and the Editors of Time-Life Books.
Machines, rev. ed. (Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life 
Books, 1980): 59-60.
59. Groner, Alex, and the Editors of American Heritage
and Business Week. The American Heritage History of 
American Business & Industry (New York: American 
Heritage Publishing Co., 1972): 90, 89, 93.
60. Buder, Stanley. PULLMAN: An experiment in Industrial
Order and Community Planning 1880-1930 (1967; rprt. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1977): 7.
61. Buder, Stanley. PULLMAN: An experiment in Industrial
Order and Community Planning 1880-1930 (1967; rprt. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1977): 21-23.
62. Groner, Alex, and the Editors of American Heritage
and Business Week. The American Heritage History of 
American Business & Industry (New York: American 
Heritage Publishing Co., 1972): 90.
63. O'Brien, Robert, and the Editors of Time-Life Books.
Machines, rev. ed. (Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life 
Books, 1980): 59-60.
64. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 153.
65. Bureau of Mines. 1950 Materials Survey on Asbestos.
National Security Resources Board (Washington, D.C.: 
GPO, 1952): XII-2.
66. Raloff, Jane. "EPA moves to phase out asbestos goods."
Science News 129 (Feb. 1, 1986): 70.
206
67. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 143-144.
68. O'Brien, Robert, and the Editors of Time-Life Books.
Machines, rev. ed. (Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 
1980): 80.
69. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 144.
70. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 144.
71. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 145.
72. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 190.
73. Benarde, Melvin A., ed. Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990): 29-30.
74. Bureau of Mines. 1950 Materials Survey on Asbestos.
National Security Resources Board (Washington, D.C.: 
GPO, 1952): XII-5.
75. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 150-151.
76. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 145-145.
77. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 148.
78. Benarde, Melvin A., ed. Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990): 28.
207
79. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 148.
80. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 146-150.
81. Benarde, Melvin A., ed. Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990): 47.
82. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 151.
83. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985): 
12.
84. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 146, 151.
85. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 151.
86. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
141.
87. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 151-152.
88. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 148.
89. Benarde, Melvin A., ed. Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990): 30.
90. Bendure, Zelma and Gladys Pfeiffer. America's Fabrics:
Origin and History, Manufacture, Characteristics and 
Uses (New York: Macmillan Company, 1946): 251.
208
91. Benarde, Melvin A., ed. Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990): 30.
92. Benarde, Melvin A., ed. Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990): 30.
93. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 152.
94. O'Brien, Robert, and the Editors of Time-Life Books.
Machines, rev. ed. (Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 
1980): 105.
95. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 154.
96. O'Brien, Robert, and the Editors of Time-Life Books.
Machines, rev. ed. (Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 
1980): 105.
97. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 154.
98. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 153.
99. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 151-152.
101. Speights, Daniel A. and C. Alan Runyan. "Liability
Perspective." Asbestos Issues (July, 1989): 34.
102. Berman, Daniel M. Death on the Job: Occupational Health
and Safety Struggles in the United States (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1978): 84.
103. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York:Pantheon Books, 1985): 13.
104. McCulloch, Jock. Asbestos: Its Human Cost (New York:
Univ. of Queensland Press, 1986): 36.
105. Speights, Daniel A. and C. Alan Runyan. "Liability
Perspective." Asbestos Issues (July 1989): 32.
209
106. McCulloch, Jock. Asbestos: Its Human Cost (New York:
Univ. of Queensland Press, 1986): 37.
107. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988): 155.
108. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988): 139.
109. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985): 
12.
110. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
11.
111. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 156.
112. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985): 
11-13.
113. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial, (New York:Pantheon Books, 1985):
12 .
114. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 167.
115. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
13.
116. McCulloch, Jock. Asbestos: Its Human Cost (New York:
Univ. of Queensland Press, 1986): 38.
117. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
13.
118. McCulloch, Jock. Asbestos: Its Human Cost (New York:
Univ. of Queensland Press, 1986): 38.
210
119. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985): 
13.
120. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 167.
121. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
13.
122. McCulloch, Jock. Asbestos: Its Human Cost (New York:
Univ. of Queensland Press, 1986): 39.
123. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
13.
124. McCulloch, Jock. Asbestos: Its Human Cost (New York:
Univ. of Queensland Press, 1986): 38-39.
125. McCulloch, Jock. Asbestos: Its Human Cost (New York:
Univ. of Queensland Press, 1986): 40.
126. Speights, Daniel A. and C. Alan Runyan. "Liability
Perspective." Asbestos Issues (July 1989): 32.
127. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
13.
128. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 199.
129. McCulloch, Jock. Asbestos: Its Human Cost (New York:
Univ. of Queensland Press, 1986); 44.
130. Cotes, J. E., J. Steel, and G. L. Leathart. Work-
Related Lung Disorders (Oxford: Blackwell Scientific 
Publications, 1987): 200.
131. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 140.
132. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 199.
211
133. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 140.
134. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 200.
135. McCulloch, Jock. Asbestos: Its Human Cost (New York:
Univ. of Queensland Press, 1986): 44.
136. Cotes, J. E., J. Steel, and G. L. Leathart. Work-
Related Lung Disorders (Oxford: Blackwell Scientific
Publications, 1987): 200.
137. Cotes, J. E., J. Steel, and G. L. Leathart. Work-
Related Lung Disorders (Oxford: Blackwell Scientific
Publications, 1987): 200.
138. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
12.
139. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 155.
140. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 167.
141. McCulloch, Jock. Asbestos: Its Human Cost (New York:
Univ. of Queensland Press, 1986): 38.
142. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 166.
143. McCulloch, Jock. Asbestos: Its Human Cost (New York:
Univ. of Queensland Press, 1986): 52.
144. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 160.
145. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 139.
212
146. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 156.
147. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
14.
148. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 156.
149. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 157.
150. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
14.
151. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 157.
152. Glaishoff, Stuart. Newark: The Nation's Unhealthiest
City 1832-1985 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers 
University Press, 1988): 7.
153. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 165-166.
154. Glaishoff, Stuart. Newark: The Nation's Unhealthiest
City 1832-1985 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers 
University Press, 1988): 91.
155. Castleman, Barry I., and Grace E. Ziem. "Corporate
Influence on Threshold Limit Values." American Journal 
of Industrial Medicine 13 (1988): 532.
156. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 209.
157. McCulloch, Jock. Asbestos: Its Human Cost (New York:
Univ. of Queensland Press, 1986): 37.
213
158. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988): 174.
159. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988): 109.
160. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988): 175.
161. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
17.
162. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 175.
163. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 174.
164. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 180.
165. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 182-185.
166. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 169.
167. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
18-19.
168. Berman, Daniel M. Death on the Job: Occupational Health
and Safety Struggles in the United States (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1978): 27-28.
169. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985): 
14-16.
214
170. Cherniack, Martin, M. D., M. P. H. The Hawk's Nest
Incident; America's Worst Industrial Disaster 
(Yale University Press, New Haven, 1986); 55-56.
171. Cherniack, Martin, M. D., M. P. H. The Hawk's Nest
Incident: America's Worst Industrial Disaster 
(Yale University Press, New Haven, 1986): 57.
172. Cherniack, Martin, M. D., M. P. H. The Hawk's Nest
Incident: America's Worst Industrial Disaster 
(Yale University Press, New Haven, 1986): 69.
173. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
20.
174. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
19-20.
175. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985): 
21-22.
176. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
16.
177. Graebner, William. "Private Power, Private Knowledge,
and Public Health: Science, Engineering, and Lead 
Poisoning, 1900-1970." The Health & Safety of Workers, 
ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1988): 46.
178. Berman, Daniel M. Death on the Job: Occupational Health
and Safety Struggles in the United States (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1978): 96.
179. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988): 178.
180. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985): 
157-167; and
Berman, Daniel M. Death on the Job: Occupational Health 
and Safety Struggles in the United States (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1978): 1.
181. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988): 178.
215
182. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 160.
183. Graebner, William. "Private Power, Private Knowledge,
and Public Health: Science, Engineering, and Lead 
Poisoning, 1900-1970." The Health & Safety of Workers, 
ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1988): 51.
184. Berman, Daniel M. Death on the Job: Occupational Health
and Safety Struggles in the United States (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1978): 99.
185. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
14.
186. Speights, Daniel A. and C. Alan Runyan. "Liability
Perspective.11 Asbestos Issues (July 1989): 34.
187. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985): 
120.
188. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
119.
189. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
120.
190. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985): 
21- 2 2 .
191. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 209.
192. Berman, Daniel M. Death on the Job: Occupational Health
and Safety Struggles m  the United States (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1978): 85.
193. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 167.
194. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 185.
216
195. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985): 
113.
196. Berman, Daniel M. Death on the Job: Occupational Health
and Safety Struggles in the United States (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1978): 85.
197. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 167.
198. Speights, Daniel A. and C. Alan Runyan. "Liability
Perspective." Asbestos Issues (July 1989): 34.
199. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985): 
112.
200. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985): 
108-110.
201. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985): 
113.
202. Benarde, Melvin A., ed. Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990): 220.
203. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985): 
112.
204. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 171.
205. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 171.
206. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
115.
207. McCulloch, Jock. Asbestos: Its Human Cost (New York:
Univ. of Queensland Press, 1986): 41-42.
217
208. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
116.
209. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 200.
210. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985): 
58.
211. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
148.
212. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 201.
213. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985): 
118.
214. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 201.
215. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 202.
216. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 202.
217. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985): 
119.
218. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 201-202.
219. Speights, Daniel A. and C. Alan Runyan. "Liability
Perspective." Asbestos Issues (July 1989): 38.
218
220. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985): 
150.
221. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
150.
222. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985): 
150-151.
223. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
151.
224. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
147.
225. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
148.
226. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
152.
227. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
149.
228. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
178.
229. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 187.
230. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 187.
231. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 188.
232. Castleman, Barry I. Asbestos: Medical and Legal Aspects,
2nd ed. (Clifton, N.J.: Prentice Hall/Law & Business,
1988): 273.
219
233. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988): 188.
234. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988): 189.
235. Castleman, Barry I., and Grace E. Ziem. "Corporate
Influence on Threshold Limit Values." American 
Journal of Industrial Medicine 13 (1988): 545.
236. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 189.
237. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 190.
238. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 191.
239. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 190-192.
240. McCulloch, Jock. Asbestos: Its Human Cost (New York:
Univ. of Queensland Press, 1986): 44-45.
241. Berman, Daniel M. Death on the Job: Occupational Health
and Safety Struggles in the United States (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1978): 84.
242. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985): 
120.
243. Benarde, Melvin A., ed. Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990): 8.
244. Reitze, William B., William J. Nicholson, Duncan A.
Holaday, and Irving J. Selikoff. "Application of 
Sprayed Inorganic Fiber Containing Asbestos: 
Occupational Health Hazards." American Industrial 
Hygiene Association Journal 33 (1972): 178.
220
245. Benarde, Melvin A., ed. Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990): 232.
246. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985): 
120.
247. Benarde, Melvin A., ed. Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990): 232.
248. Benarde, Melvin A., ed. Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990): 232.
249. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 193.
250. Tarnoff, Stephen. "Trial Pits Manville vs. feds over
asbestos claim liability." Business Interests (May 4, 
1987): 8.
251. Bureau of Mines. 1950 Materials Survey on Asbestos.
National Security Resources Board (Washington, D. C.: 
GPO, 1952): XVIII-1.
252. Selikoff, Irving J., E. Cuyler Hammond, and Jacob Churg.
"Carcinogenicity of Amosite Asbestos." Archives of 
Environmental Health 25 (Sept. 1972): 184.
253. Tarnoff, Stephen. "Trial Pits Manville vs. feds over
asbestos claim liability." Business Interests (May 4, 
1987): 7.
254. D'Angelo, Wm. Chip and T. Michael Volatile. "Installing
Sprinklers in High-Rises May Result in Exposure to 
Asbestos." Occupational Health and Safety (March,
1989): 41.
255. Becklake, Margaret R. "Asbestos-Related Diseases of
the Lung and Other Organs: Their Epidemiology and 
Implications for Clinical Practices." American Review 
of Respiratory Disease 114 (1976): 190.
256. Benarde, Melvin A., ed. Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990): 47.
257. "Selikoff Initiates Follow-Up Tests on UNARCO Family
Members." Asbestos Action. White Lung Association 
of New Jersey 1 (Autumn 1990): 4.
258. "Selikoff Initiates Follow-Up Tests on UNARCO Family
Members." Asbestos Action. White Lung Association 
of New Jersey 1 (Autumn 1990): 4.
221
259. McCulloch, Jock. Asbestos: Its Human Cost (New York:
Univ. of Queensland Press, 1986): 28.
260. Benarde, Melvin A., ed. Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990): 231.
261. Selikoff, Irving J. "Asbestos-associated neoplasms."
Special Course on the Scientific basis for evaluation 
of asbestos-associated disease. Division of Environ­
mental and Occupational Medicine, Mount Sinai School 
of Medicine, New York, N. Y., March 6-17, 1989.
262. Benarde, Melvin A., ed. Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990): 232.
263. Bureau of Mines. Asbestos. Department of Commerce
(Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1979): 14.
264. Reitze, William B., William J. Nicholson, Duncan A.
Holaday, and Irving J. Selikoff. "Application of 
Sprayed Inorganic Fiber Containing Asbestos: 
Occupational Health Hazards." American Industrial 
Hygiene Association Journal 33 (1972): 178.
265. Reitze, William B., William J. Nicholson, Duncan A.
Holaday, and Irving J. Selikoff. "Application of 
Sprayed Inorganic Fiber Containing Asbestos: 
Occupational Health Hazards." American Industrial 
Hygiene Association Journal 33 (1972): 179.
266. Benarde, Melvin A., ed. Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990): 9.
267. Speights, Daniel A. and C. Alan Runyan. "Liability
Perspective." Asbestos Issues (July 1989): 38.
268. Speights, Daniel A. and C. Alan Runyan. "Liability
Perspective." Asbestos Issues (July 1989): 32.
269. Reitze, William B., William J. Nicholson, Duncan A.
Holaday, and Irving J. Selikoff. "Application of 
Sprayed Inorganic Fiber Containing Asbestos: 
Occupational Health Hazards." American Industrial 
Hygiene Association Journal 33 (1972): 178.
270. Speights, Daniel A. and C. Alan Runyan. "Liability
Perspective." Asbestos Issues (July 1989): 32.
271. Reitze, William B., William J. Nicholson, Duncan A.
Holaday, and Irving J. Selikoff. "Application of 
Sprayed Inorganic Fiber Containing Asbestos: 
Occupational Health Hazards." American Industrial 
Hygiene Association Journal 33 (1972): 178.
222
272. Reitze, William B. , William J. Nicholson, Duncan A.
Holaday, and Irving J. Selikoff. "Application of 
Sprayed Inorganic Fiber Containing Asbestos: 
Occupational Health Hazards." American Industrial 
Hygiene Association Journal 33 (1972): 179.
273. Reitze, William B., William J. Nicholson, Duncan A.
Holaday, and Irving J. Selikoff. "Application of 
Sprayed Inorganic Fiber Containing Asbestos: 
Occupational Health Hazards." American Industrial 
Hygiene Association Journal 33 (1972): 179.
274. Bureau of Mines. Asbestos. Department of Commerce
(Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1979): 5.
275. Reitze, William B., William J. Nicholson, Duncan A.
Holaday, and Irving J. Selikoff. "Application of 
Sprayed Inorganic Fiber Containing Asbestos: 
Occupational Health Hazards." American Industrial 
Hygiene Association Journal 33 (1972): 179-180.
276. "New York City In-Place Asbestos Bill Remains Stalled."
Asbestos Action. White Lung Association of New Jersey 
2 (Spring 1991): 9.
277. Safchuck, Paul. "Turner and Newell Sued by Chase Bank."
Asbestos Watch. White Lung Association 14 (May 1994): 
2.
278. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
29.
279. Castleman, Barry I., and Grace E. Ziem. "Corporate
Influence on Threshold Limit Values." American Journal 
of Industrial Medicine 13 (1988): 545.
280. Selikoff, I. J., Jacob Churg, and E. Cuyler Hammond.
"The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Insulation Workers 
in the United States." Annals of the New York Academy 
of Science 132 (1965): 140-142.
281. Selikoff, I. J., Jacob Churg, and E. Cuyler Hammond.
"The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Insulation Workers 
in the United States." Annals of the New York Academy 
of Science 132 (1965): 142.
282. Selikoff, I. J., Jacob Churg, and E. Cuyler Hammond.
"Asbestos Exposure and Neoplasia." Journal of the 
American Medical Association 188 (1964): 23-24.
283. Selikoff, I. J., Jacob Churg, and E. Cuyler Hammond.
"Asbestos Exposure and Neoplasia." Journal of the 
American Medical Association 188 (1964): 23-24.
223
284. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
30.
285. Selikoff, I. J., Jacob Churg, and E. Cuyler Hammond.
"Asbestos Exposure and Neoplasia." Journal of the 
American Medical Association 188 (1964): 24.
286. Selikoff, I. J., Jacob Churg, and E. Cuyler Hammond.
"The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Insulation Workers 
in the United States." Annals of the New York Academy 
of Science 132 (1965): 143.
287. Selikoff, I. J., Jacob Churg, and E. Cuyler Hammond.
"The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Insulation Workers 
in the United States." Annals of the New York Academy 
of Science 132 (1965): 146.
288. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
30.
289. Selikoff, I. J., Jacob Churg, and E. Cuyler Hammond.
"The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Insulation Workers 
in the United States." Annals of the New York Academy 
of Science 132 (1965): 146.
290. Selikoff, I. J., Jacob Churg, and E. Cuyler Hammond.
"The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Insulation Workers 
in the United States." Annals of the New York Academy 
of Science 132 (1965): 147.
291. Selikoff, I. J., Jacob Churg, and E. Cuyler Hammond.
"The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Insulation Workers 
in the United States." Annals of the New York Academy 
of Science 132 (1965): 147.
292. Selikoff, I. J., Jacob Churg, and E. Cuyler Hammond.
"The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Insulation Workers 
in the United States." Annals of the New York Academy 
of Science 132 (1965): 148.
293. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
31.
294. Speights, Daniel A. and C. Alan Runyan. "Liability
Perspective." Asbestos Issues (July 1989): 34.
295. Berman, Daniel M. Death on the Job: Occupational Health
and Safety Struggles in the United States (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1978): 87.
224
296. Berman, Daniel M. Death on the Job: Occupational Health
and Safety Struggles in the United States (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1978): 85.
297. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988): 140.
298. Brodeur, Paul. "Outrageous Misconduct." New Yorker Part
I (June 10, 1985): 72-80.
299. Brodeur, Paul. "Outrageous Misconduct." New Yorker Part
I (June 10, 1985): 57.
300. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
31.
301. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988): 140.
302. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 185.
303. Berman, Daniel M. Death on the Job: Occupational Health
and Safety Struggles in the United States (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1978): 99.
304. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 193.
305. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 194.
306. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 186.
307. Cheremisinoff, Paul N. A Guide to Working with Hazardous
Materials (Northbrook, 111.: Pudvan Publishing Co., 
1987): 46-47.
308. Castleman, Barry I., and Grace E. Ziem. "Corporate
Influence on Threshold Limit Values." American Journal 
of Industrial Medicine 13 (1988): 532.
225
309. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 194.
310. Castleman, Barry I. Asbestos: Medical and Legal Aspects,
2nd ed. (Clifton, N.J.: Prentice Hall/ Law & Business, 
1986): 250-251.
311. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 196.
312. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 197.
313. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985): 
143.
314. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 198.
315. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
143.
316. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
174.
317. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 198.
318. Castleman, Barry I. Asbestos: Medical and Legal Aspects,
2nd ed. (Clifton, N.J.: Prentice Hall/ Law & Business, 
1986): 253.
319. Castleman, Barry I. Asbestos: Medical and Legal Aspects,
2nd ed. (Clifton, N.J.: Prentice Hall/ Law & Business, 
1986): 283.
3 20. Castleman, Barry I. Asbestos: Medical and Legal Aspects, 

















Castleman, Barry I. Asbestos: Medical and Legal Aspects. 
2nd ed. (Clifton, N.J.: Prentice Hall/ Law & Business, 
1986): 255.
Castleman, Barry I. Asbestos: Medical and Legal Aspects, 
2nd ed. (Clifton, N.J.: Prentice Hall/ Law & Business, 
1986): 255.
Castleman, Barry I. Asbestos: Medical and Legal Aspects,
2nd ed. (Clifton, N.J.
1986): 256.
Prentice Hall/ Law & Business,
Castleman, Barry I. Asbestos: Medical and Legal Aspects, 
2nd ed. (Clifton, N.J.: Prentice Hall/ Law & Business, 
1986): 257.
Berman, Daniel M. Death on the Job: Occupational Health 
and Safety Struggles in the United States (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1978): 99.
Castleman, Barry I. Asbestos: Medical and Legal Aspects, 
2nd ed. (Clifton, N.J.: Prentice Hall/ Law & Business, 
1986): 253.
Castleman, Barry I., and Grace E. Ziem. "Corporate
Influence on Threshold Limit Values." American Journal 
of Industrial Medicine 13 (1988): 533.
Castleman, Barry I. Asbestos: Medical and Legal Aspects, 
2nd ed. (Clifton, N.J.: Prentice Hall/ Law & Business,
1986): 248.
McCulloch, Jock. Asbestos: Its Human Cost (New York: 
Univ. of Queensland Press, 1986): 53.
Cheremisinoff, Paul N. A Guide to Working with Hazardous 
Materials (Northbrook, 111.: Pudvan Publishing Co.,
1987): 47.
Castleman, Barry I. Asbestos: Medical and Legal Aspects. 
2nd ed. (Clifton, N.J.: Prentice Hall/ Law & Business, 
1986): 255.
Castleman, Barry I., and Grace E. Ziem. "Corporate
Influence on Threshold Limit Values." American Journal 
of Industrial Medicine 13 (1988): 531.
Castleman, Barry I., and Grace E. Ziem. "Corporate
Influence on Threshold Limit Values." American Journal 
of Industrial Medicine 13 (1988): 547.
Castleman, Barry I. Asbestos: Medical and Legal Aspects, 
2nd ed. (Clifton, N.J.: Prentice Hall/ Law & Business, 
1986): 283.
227
335. U. S. Congress. Public Law 91-596: OSHAct of 1970
(rprt. Washington D. C.: GPO, 1987): Preamble.
336. U. S. Congress. Public Law 91-596: OSHAct of 1970
(rprt. Washington D. C.: GPO, 1987): Sec. 6(a).
3 37. U. S. Congress. Public Law 91-596: OSHAct of 1970
(rprt. Washington D. C.: GPO, 1987): Sec. 6(b)(5).
338. Berman, Daniel M. Death on the Job: Occupational Health
and Safety Struggles m  the United States (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1978): 88.
339. Murray, Thomas H. "Regulating Asbestos: Ethics,
Politics, and the Values of Science." The Health & 
Safety of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 278.
340. Murray, Thomas H. "Regulating Asbestos: Ethics,
Politics, and the Values of Science." The Health & 
Safety of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 285.
341. Murray, Thomas H. "Regulating Asbestos: Ethics,
Politics, and the Values of Science." The Health & 
Safety of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 285.
342. NIOSH Testimony to POL on the Occupational Safety and
Health Administartion's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
on Occupatiopnal Exposure to Asbestos, Tremolite, 
Anthophyllite, and Actmolite, 29 CFR Parts 1910 
and 1926, Docket No. H-033d, presented at the OSHA 
Informal Public Hearing on May 9, 1990 (Washington, 
D.C.: GPO): 1.
343. Department of Labor. Occupational Exposure to Asbestos;
Final Rule. Federal Register, Vol. 59, No. 153 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, August 10, 1994): 40966.
344. Department of Labor. Occupational Exposure to Asbestos;
Final Rule. Federal Register, Vol. 59, No. 153 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, August 10, 1994): 40975.
345. Department of Labor. How OSHA Monitors State Plans
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, Jan. 1975).
346. Bakker, Juliet Tammenoms. "Wall Street Watch."
Hazmat World (Dec. 1988): 20.
347. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
183.
228
348. Brodeur, Paul. Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985):
311.
349. Brodeur, Paul. "Outrageous Misconduct." New Yorker
Part I (June 10, 1985): 49.
350. McCulloch, Jock. Asbestos: Its Human Cost (New York:
Univ. of Queensland Press, 1986): 27.
351. Brodeur, Paul. "Outrageous Misconduct." New Yorker
Part I (June 10, 1985): 49.
352. Quickel, Stephen W. "Triumph of Wile." Business Month
(Nov. 1988): 30.
353. "U. K. asbestos litigation more efficient: Report."
Business Insurance (Jan. 23, 1989): 26.
354. "Healthy Manville Immune From Suits. Victim's Trust
Works to Solve Payment Problems." Asbestos Watch. 
Newsletter of the White Lung Association 6 (Nov/Dec.
1988): 4.
355. Kelley, Kristine Portnoy. "Training and Certification."
Hazmat World (Feb. 1989): 46.
356. EPA. Asbestos Fact Book (Washington, D.C.: GPO, Feb.,
1985): 2.
357. Kelley, Kristine Portnoy. "Asbestos Abatement: An
Industry on the Run." Hazmat World (Nov., 1988): 37.
358. Benarde, Melvin A., ed. Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990): 232.
359. EPA. Asbestos Fact Book (Washington, D.C.: GPO, Feb.,
1985): 4.
360. Carver, Mary Beth, John Cowdery, and Alison Roberts.
"Compliance with AHERA Requires Continual Updating 
of Training." Occupational Health and Safety 
(March, 1989): 59.
361. EPA. Asbestos Fact Book (Washington, D.C.: GPO, Feb.,
1985): 4.
362. Romano, Jay. "Schools and Asbestos: Law Posing
Problems." The New York Times (June 18, 1989,
Sec. 12, NJ21): 1.
363. "Asbestos In The Schools." WLA Newsletter. New York



















"Politics and Policy: Why Throw Money at Asbestos ?" 
FORTUNE (June 6, 1988): 162.
Stone, Terri. "The Hazards of Asbestos." American City 
& Country (Feb. 1986): 69.
Kelley, Kristine Portnoy. "Asbestos Abatement: An 
Industry on the Run." Hazmat World (Nov., 1988):
37-42.
EPA. Asbestos Fact Book (Washington, D.C.: GPO, Feb., 
1985): 4.
Raloff, Jane. "EPA Finds Widespread Asbestos Hazard." 
Science News 133 (March 5, 1988): 150.
"Politics and Policy: Why Throw Money at Asbestos ?"
FORTUNE (June 6, 1988): 162.
EPA. Asbestos Fact Book (Washington, D.C.: GPO, Feb.,
1985): 4.
"Politics and Policy: Why Throw Money at Asbestos ?"
FORTUNE (June 6, 1988): 162.
Raloff, Jane. "EPA Finds Widespread Asbestos Hazard."
Science News 133 (March 5, 1988): 150.
Raloff, Jane. "EPA moves to phase out asbestos goods."
Science News 129 (Feb. 1, 1986): 70.
Steinway, Daniel M. "Scope and Numbers of Regulations 
for Asbestos-Containing Materials, Abatement Continue 
to Grow." Hazmat World (April 1990): 33.
"Newswires: Legal Matters." Hazmat World (Oct., 1989):
18.
Department of Labor. Occupational Exposure to Asbestos; 
Final Rule. Federal Register, Vol. 59, No. 153 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, August 10, 1994): 41027.
Benarde, Melvin A., ed. Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber 
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990): 31.
Bernarde, Melvin A. Our Precarious Habitat: Fifteen 
Years Later (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1989):
Kelley, Kristine Portnoy. "Training and Certification." 
Hazmat World (Feb. 1989): 46-47.
Kelley, Kristine Portnoy. "Training and Certification." 
Hazmat World (Feb. 1989): 46-47.
230
381. Kelley, Kristine Portnoy. "Asbestos Abatement: An
Industry on the Run." Hazmat World (Nov., 1988): 37.
382. Bern, Ronald L. "Evolution of Asbestos Abatement Spurs
Recent Advances in Efficiency." Occupational Health 
and Safety (Jan. 1989): 53.
383. Rich, Laurie A. "Asbestos Abatement Suppliers Look to
ER." Hazmat World (Feb. 1989): 70.
384. Horwitz, Tony. "9 to Nowhere: These Six Growth Jobs,
Are Dull, Dead-End, Sometimes Dangerous," Wall Street 
Journal (Dec. 1, 1994): A1, A8.
385. Klaidman, Stephen. Health in the Headlines: The Stories
Behind the Stories (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1991): 234.
386. Peters, George A. "The New Wave of Asbestos Litigation."
Risk Management (November 1987): 40.
387. Ozonoff, David. "Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related
Disease and Industrial Medicine." The Health & Safety 
of Workers, ed. Ronald Bayer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988): 209.
388. Nicholson, William J. "On the Carcinogenic Risks of
Asbestos Exposure in Buildings." Collegium Ramazzini 
Conference on the Third Wave of Asbestos Disease: 
Exposure to Asbestos in Place, New York, N.Y., June 
7-9, 1990 (rprt. Asbestos Action 1 Spring 1990): 5.
389. "Con Ed Confession." NYCOSH Safety Rep Newsletter of the
New York Committee for Occupational Safety and Health 
X (Fall 1994): 5.
390. "Secondhand Smoke: Is It a Hazard ?" Consumer Reports
(Jan. 1995): 27.
391. Peters, George A. "The New Wave of Asbestos Litigation."
Risk Management (November 1987): 30.
392. Benarde, Melvin A., ed. Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990): 110.
393. Cotes, J. E., J. Steel, and G. L. Leathart. Work-
Related Lung Disorders (Oxford: Blackwell Scientific 
Publications, 1987): 200-219.
394. Peters, George A. and Barbara J. Peters. Sourcebook on
Asbestos Diseases: Medical, Legal, and Engineering 
Aspects (New York: Garland Publishing, 1980): B12.
395. Peters, George A. "The New Wave of Asbestos Litigation."
Risk Management (November 1987): 40.
231
396. Nicholson, William J. "On the Carcinogenic Risks of
Asbestos Exposure in Buildings." Collegium Ramazzini 
Conference on the Third Wave of Asbestos Disease: 
Exposure to Asbestos in Place, New York, N.Y., June 
7-9, 1990 (rprt. Asbestos Action 1 Spring 1990): 14.
397. Peters, George A. and Barbara J. Peters. Sourcebook on
Asbestos Diseases: Medical, Legal, and Engineering 
Aspects (New York: Garland Publishing, 1980): B8.
398. Asbestos in the Great Lakes Basin with emphasis on
Lake Superior. A Report to The International Joint 
Commission from The Great Lakes Research Advisory 
Board (Feb., 1975): 23.
399. Benarde, Melvin A., ed. Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990): 290.
400. Fitzgerald, Beth. "Asbestos Settlement Costs Chubb $358
million." The Star Ledger (Newark, N.J.: Aug. 31, 
1993): 31, 38.
401. Bureau of Mines. Asbestos. Department of Commerce
(Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1979): 10.
402. Nicholson, William J. "On the Carcinogenic Risks of
Asbestos Exposure in Buildings." Collegium Ramazzini 
Conference on the Third Wave of Asbestos Disease: 
Exposure to Asbestos in Place, New York, N.Y., June 
7-9, 1990 (rprt. Asbestos Action 1 Spring 1990): 5.
403. "Asbestos in Play Sand: The Facts." Public Citizen
Press Release, July, 1988;
"Over NIOSH Protests, OSHA Extends Stay Exempting
Tremolite From the Asbestos Standard." WLA Newsletter. 
New York White Lung Association 1 (Summer 1988):
1-2; and
"Tremolite Asbestos Still Unregulated. Contaminated 
Playsand in Use." Asbestos Watch. Newsletter of the 
White Lung Association 6 (Nov./Dec. 1988): 5.
404. Wagner, J. C., C. A. Sleggs, and Paul Marchand.
"Diffuse Pleural Mesothelioma and Asbestos Exposure 
in the North Western Cape Province." British Journal 
of Industrial Medicine 17 (1960): 260.
405. Benarde, Melvin A., ed. Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990): 294.
406. Mossman, B. T., J. Bignon, M. Corn, A. Seaton, and
J. B. L. Gee. "Asbestos: Scientific Developments 
and Implications for Public Policy." Science 247 
(Jan. 19, 1990): 294.
232
407. Nicholson, William J. "On the Carcinogenic Risks of
Asbestos Exposure in Buildings." Collegium Ramazzini 
Conference on the Third Wave of Asbestos Disease: 
Exposure to Asbestos in Place, New York, N.Y. June 
7-9, 1990 (rprt. Asbestos Action 1 Spring 1990): 5.
408. Goldman, Benjamin A. The Truth About Where You Live:
An Atlas for Action on Toxins and Mortality (New York: 
Time Books/Random House, 1991): 21.
409. Goldman, Benjamin A. The Truth About Where You Live:
An Atlas for Action on Toxins and Mortality (New York: 
Time Books/Random House, 1991): 31.
410. Benarde, Melvin A., ed. Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990): 289.
411. Peters, George A. and Barbara J. Peters. Sourcebook on
Asbestos Diseases: Medical, Legal, and Engineering 
Aspects (New York: Garland Publishing, 1980): B8.
412. Benarde, Melvin A. Our Precarious Habitat: Fifteen Years
Later (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1989): 286-289.
Murray, John F., M. D. The Normal Lung: The Basis 
for Diagnosis and Treatment of Pulmonary Disease 
(Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1976):
278-281.
413. Peters, George A. and Barbara J. Peters. Sourcebook on
Asbestos Diseases: Medical, Legal, and Engineering 
Aspects (New York: Garland Publishing, 1980): B2.
414. Goldman, Benjamin A. The Truth About Where You Live:
An Atlas for Action on Toxins and Mortality (New York: 
Time Books/Random House, 1991): 100.
415. Benarde, Melvin A. Our Precarious Habitat: Fifteen Years
Later (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1989): 286-289.
416. Klaidman, Stephen. Health in the Headlines: The Stories
Behind the Stories (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1991): 189.
417. Taylor, Robert N. "Did You Know ?" City News
(Plainfield, N.J.: Aug. 31, 1994): 6.
418. Goldman, Benjamin A. The Truth About Where You Live:
An Atlas for Action on Toxins and Mortality (New York: 
Time Books/Random House, 1991): 86.
419. Goldman, Benjamin A. The Truth About Where You Live:
An Atlas for Action on Toxins and Mortality (New York: 
Time Books/Random House, 1991): 21.
233
420. Goldman, Benjamin A. The Truth About Where You Live:
An Atlas for Action on Toxins and Mortality (New York: 
Time Books/Random House, 1991): 21.
421. Klaidman, Stephen. Health in the Headlines: The Stories
Behind the Stories (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1991): 13.
422. Castleman, Barry I. Asbestos: Medical and Legal Aspects,
2nd ed. (Clifton, N. J.: Prentice Hall/Law & Business,
1986): 261.
423. Benarde, Melvin A., ed. Asbestos: The Hazardous Fiber.
(Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1990): 294.
424. Bureau of Mines. 1950 Materials Survey on Asbestos.
National Security Resources Board (Washington, D. C.: 
GPO, 1952): XIII-1.
425. Bureau of Mines. 1950 Materials Survey on Asbestos.
National Security Resources Board (Washington, D. C. : 
GPO, 1952): XIII-2.
426. Vu, Vanessa T. "Regulatory Approaches to Reduce Human
Health Risks Associated with Exposures to Mineral 
Fibers." Health Effects of Mineral Dusts, ed. George 
D. Guthrie, Jr., and Brooke T. Mossman. Reviews in 
Mineralogy 28 (Washington, D.C.: Mineralogical Society 
of America, 1993): 552.
427. "Fiberglass Classified as Possible Carcinogen by Federal
Government." Washington Post July 2, 1994 (rprt. New 
York: NYCOSH Newsletter, Sept. 20., 1994): 2.
428. Department of Labor. Occupational Exposure to Asbestos;
Final Rule. Federal Register, Vol. 59, No. 153 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, August 10, 1994): 41027.
429. Department of Labor. Occupational Exposure to Asbestos;
Final Rule. Federal Register, Vol. 59, No. 153 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, August 10, 1994): 41027.
430. Bureau of Mines. Asbestos. Department of Commerce
(Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1979): 14.
